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Attached is the bail application in Chambers v. Mississippi, 
No. A-785. This is the case I mentioned earlier this afternoon. 
The application itself, filed by Ramsey Clark, is as tho rough ..... 
and complete as I have yet seen. 
The essential facts are these. Petr was charged in Miss. TC 
with the murder of a Woodville, Mississippi policeman. The shooting 
occurred during a disturbance surrounding the arrest of a black 
man, i.e.p during a racial disturbance. Petr was in a crowdLof 
men from which the shot came. The dying officer turned and fired 
into the crowJlwounding Chambers in the neck and back. He has 
contended throughout that he is innocent. At trial he endeavored 
to prove that another, McDonald, shot the policeman. McDonald 
confessed to the police and gave a signed and sworn statement to 
that effect. McDonald later repudiated the story and claimed that 
he only made the confession as part of a plot to share in the money 
damages that Chambers might get from the city in a damage suit 
arising out of the shooting. All charges were then dropped against 
him. The defendant called McDonald at trial. McDonald's confession 
and repudiation was read to the jury. Petr's attorney renewed a 
motionp once made before trial, to treat McDonald as an adverse 
witness and cross-examine him. The ct rejected the motion. 
Petr then sought to introduce the testimony of three men who 
had hea: rd McDonald, at various times after the, shooting, claim that 
he had been the killer. The state refused to allow this into evidence 
on the basis that it was all hearsay. 
The jury found Petr guilty and imposed a life sentence. The 
conviction was aff'd by the Mississippi SC. The questions here--
whether the state rules of evidence must yield to the federal 
constitutional rights to (1) cross-examine witnesses, and (2) to 
introduce witnesses in ones own behalf~"is a substantial one. I 
think there is substantial likelihood that this Court will grant 
cert for at least three reasonsa (1) the case would appear to 
be at odds with Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, in which a 
state rule of evidence--the "coparticipant" rule~--was held an 
inadequate basis for interferring with the dominant federal right 
to aall witnesses invthe defendant's behalf; (2) the case pre-
sents the thoroughly discredited,but still formally accepted, 
rule of Donnally v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (this is the rule 
that while declarations against civil or pecuniary interest are 
exceptions to the hearsay rulep declarations against criminal 
interest are not excepted); (3) it appears that this Petr 
may well be innocent, making this a compelling case to take a good 
look at state procedural requirements which mayp in this case at 
leastp operate to deny an accused the basic substance of a fair 
trial. 
As to the other relevant bail issues, Petr was out on bail 
both prior to trial and again during the pendency of his appeal 
to the state SC. He was denied a bail request pending cert to 
this Court after the affirmance of his conviction. He is no 
threat to flee the jurisidiction, having spent virtually all his 
life in Woodville where he has a home, wife, and 9 kids. He has 
C!47 
.-& offer of employmeht from a cement contractor and the affidavit 
of his minister that he is a reliable and religious man (he is a 
deacon). He is able to post $15,000 bond and is willing to meet 
other requirements which might be imposed (report periodically to 
the sheriff, live at home, obtain a job, stay away from ex-cons) 
I would grant the bail request, setting bail at $15,000 and 
imposing all the requirements specified by Petr. 
GRANT LAH 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NO. A-785 
LEON CHAMBERS V. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
ADMITTING PETITIONER TO BAIL 
MR. JUSTICE P6WELL, Circuit Justice. 
Gounse l fo~ 
On January 31, 1972,\Leon Chambers, Petitioner in No. 71-
5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice for the States comprising 
the Fifth Circuitp an application for bail pending consideration 
of his petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner's ~ counsel 
!'elfi~tuJie¥8ly detailed the reasons making it appropriate f<l>r me 
to exercise my discretion,under 18 U.S.C. § 3148pto admit this 
Petitioner to bail. ~copy of his certiorari petitionp which 




to his application. The Attorney General of Mississippi 
:f/J~ 
toAa response objecting to the application . • ~~ 
On February 1, 1972, after careful &v&l~aeing Petitioner's 
application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. In order 
to assure that Petitioner would not "flee or pose a danger to any 
other person" (18 u.s.c. § 3148), I imposed a number of conditions 
--2--
on his release. He was required to post bail bond in the sum of 
$15,000, to live at home with his family in his hometown of Wood-
ville, Mississippi, to find employment, and to report immediately 
upon release and periodically thereafter to the local sheriff. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney General of 
Mississippi filed an application for reconsideration of my order 
H..&.- /J..I~..; rf ~ 
admitting Petitioner to bail. Althoughlna hai'iS for sqgl;a an 
~T~~~~~-.A-~~~ 
~ ::::::~:::,:::• ~:::M::=:::::aij:::ra:::8•::5::8:8;;;:::·h:::rt's 
"7&o4r1' ......... 1t.&odl ~ ~ ~ 4-1•~·~.1 .. .,.~ 
carefulJ.yJr•iwi:ol:JQa 4ite a~pli:oatign hgowi'o of the seriousness 
oi" lais a11 C@!Rtioiis in tlais partiollliiili' Oii'O 4t. response from 
Petitioner's counsel.u&8 &188 ealleei :158!!' a1! Iii) Icqacsl'! and: has 
ne1c l!tcett zecetve~. 
'* remain f>!i1!'8l!!aeieel ~R&l'! thi8 PoH ti ana• Ufii fj:P8JH!!!'4:y adlltttted 
tr;r.hai 1 pendi P@l 8i8JUI8i1!ion -a, 1!hi s callili't of lai s aortiapari 
pe1!ie4e~.~The Attorney General, in addition to contending that 
Aao ... 4.,-.h 
Petitioner 0 s case is frivolous, a]i'O a 1 iiMs that Petitioner's 
"' 
"return to the community will create a dangerous situation to 
citizens of that community." 
+-h.·$ 
In support of ~ latter allegation, 
' . 
7t.Q A¢ -; ~.C,.. 'f.~ t-~ ClrJ.r(,., ~ ~ 
~ Hw. ~~~·~. (A..._~ 
~~ ,.;:t-~ ~ ~ ,~:, . 
 ~ ~~4.t«4A441a'~ Q,A·A..~'f.,·~J.....~ • 
he proffers the affidavits of the County Sheriff, the local Police~ 
..,.._~ 
Commissioner, and the Chief of Police of Woodville. In conclusory 
documents state that Petitioner's presence will create 
situation in the community, which might 
result in e l'ftiiA asser;tj QQS ?FQ j PQOH¥fii;'~;is8le ui<h 
~ threat to tA& oe~~~ai&y, Petitioner is a lifelong 
Woodville; he has a wife and nine children there; he 
ently without incident. During his incarceration after 
his conviction it appears been a model pri-
soner. 
On this record, I am e to conclude that Petitioner's 
mere presence in the communi y poses such a threat to the public 
"that the only way to prote t against it would be to keep[h.irn)in 
jail." Sellers v. 
JUSTICE BLACK). 
3 6 , 3 8 ( 19 68 ) ( MR • 
·~~~~~~~~~~~~~MM~ .. ~~~~y· 





lAgrefgrek this application for recon-
sideration will be denied. 
Application denied. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NO. A-785 
. LEON CHAMBERS v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
ADMITTING PETITIONER TO BAIL 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, Circuit Justice. 
On January 31~ , 1972, counsel for Leon Chambers, Petitioner 
in No. 71-5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice for the States com-
prising the Fifth Circuit, an application for bail pending consideration 
of his petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner's counsel detailed 
the reasons making it appropriate for me to exercise my discretion, 
under 18 U. S.C. § 3148, to admit this Petitioner to bail. A copy of 
his certiorari petition, which raises two nonfrivolous Constitutional 
questions, was also attached to his applbation. The Attorney General · 
of Mississippi declined to file a response objecting to the application. 
On February 1, 1972, after careful review of Petitioner's 
application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. In order to 
assure that Petitioner would not "flee or pose a danger to any other 
person" (18 U.S. C. §3148), I imposed a number of conditions on his 
release. He was required to post bail bond in the sum of $15, ooo;· 
~· 
2. 
to live at home with his family in his hometown of Woodville, Mississippi; 
to find employment; and to report, immediately upon release and 
periodically thereafter
1 
to the local sheriff. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney General of 
Mississippi filed an application for reconsideration of my order admitting 
Petitioner to bail. Although the Rules of this Court do not provide 
for such an application, I have carefully reexamined all papers submitted 
including a response f:com Petitioner's counsel. 
The Attorney General, in addition to contending that Petitioner's 
case is frivolous, asser:'s that Petitioner's "return to the community 
will create a dangerous situation to citizens of that community." In 
support of this latter allegation, he proffers the affidavits of the County 
Sheriff, the local Police Commissioner, and the Chief of Police of 
Woodville. In conclusory terms, th~se documents state~ that 
Petitioner's presence will create a tense and explosive situation in 
the community, which might result in bloodshed. No specific facts 
sra..+~d , n r~f 
are showd'l v;hiea suppor~ the opinions expressed. On the contrary, 
it appears that this Petitioner's roots in the community and record 
3. 
of good behavior merit his release pending final determination of 
his case. Petitioner is a lifelong resident of Woodville; he has a 
wife and nine children there; he served for a period on the Woodville 
police force; he is a Deacon in the local Baptist Churc~ and he has 
no prior criminal record. Before his trial he was released on bail 
for approximately 15 months, apparently without incident. During 
his period of incarceration after his conviction it appears that Petitioner 
has been a model prisoner. 
On this record, I am unable to conclude that Petitioner's mere 
presence in the community poses such a threat to the public "that the 
only way to protect against it would be to keep [him] in jail. " Sellers 
v. United states, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (1968) (MRo JUSTICE BLACK). 
oJ.-J ~ (ftj .,.,,+1-/n ! 
r h .e • • I .,.., t-O I'.) A I J 1 ; S 
':PRe 8:f3:fllieation fm I8QQRii9:stttttou ,.:H:l ~ @leftte~. 
/' .... ~~,.llrftlfJ I . 
-A.pplieatiQI:l GQHied:; 
r 1 IJ SrJ c.:n·des-~(J. 
·. 
- ... ~ lfp/ss 2/14/72 
MEMORANDUM 
Re: 71-5908 Chambers v. Mississippi 
Application for bail was received by me on January 31, 1972. 
No response was received and no request to file one was made. 
After careful review, by Larry Hammond and myself, I granted 
the application on February 1, 1972. 
On February 11, an application from the Attorney General of 
Mississippi to reconsider the granting of bail was received. I 
requested a response, which was also received on the 11th. I have 
reviewed the Attorney General's application carefully, and reexamined 
the original petition, response and exhibits. I am still of the opinion 
that the reasons set forth in the original application make an adequate 
showing for granting bail. This defendant was out on bail - as I compute 
the time for some 15 months pending arraignment and pending trial, 
with no adverse consequences. He lives in the community, is married 
and has nine children, owns his home subject to a mortgage, has 
no prior criminal record and was a model prisoner after he was 
committed to the Mississippi penitentiary. 
The Attorney General of Mississippi suggests the possibility 
of violence but the affidavits filed by him are largely conclusl/ory 
and set forth relatively few facts. 
2. 
In view of the suggestion of possible violence, this matter has 
concerned me and accordingly I conferred with Mr. Justice Stewart. 
He was good enough to review the papers (as well as have one of his 
clerks do so). He concurs in my view that the application to reconsider 
my order of February 1, should be denied. 
L. F. P., Jr. 






Re: 71-5908 Chambers v. Mississippi 
Application for blll was received by me on January 31, 1972. 
No response was received and no request to file one was made. 
After careful review, by Larry Hammond and myself, 1 granted 
the application on February 1, 1972. 
) 
I 
On February 11, an application from the Attorney General of 
~ / /Mississippi to reconsider the granting of ball was received. 1 
' I / 
1 requested a response, which was also received an the 11th. I have 
reviewed the Attorney General's applleation carefully, and reexamined 
the original petition, response and exhibits. I am still of the opinion 
that the reasons set forth in the original application make an adequate 
showing for granting bail This defendant was out an bail - as 1 compute 
the time for some 15 months pending arraignment and pending trial, 
with no adverse consequences. He lives in the community, is married 
and has nine children, owns his home subject to a mortgage, has 
no prior criminal record and was a model prisoner after he was 
committed to the Mississippi penitentiary. 
The Attorney General of Mississippi suggests the possibility 
of violence but the affidavits filed by him are largely conclusatory 
and set forth relatively few facts. 
,, 
2. 
In view of the suggestion of possible violence, this matter bas 
coocemed me and accordingly I conferred with Mr. Justice Stewart. 
He was good enough to review the papers (as well as have one of his 
clerks do so). He concurs in my view that the application to reconsider 
my order of February 1, should be denied. 
L. F. P., Jr. 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Leon Chambers, 
v. 
Rtate of Mississippi. 
No. A-785 
Application for Reconsideration of 
Order Admitting Petitioner to 
Bail. 
[February 14, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
On January 31, 1972, counsel for Leon Chambers, peti-
tioner in No. 71- 5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice 
for the States constituting the Fifth Circuit, an applica-
tion for bail pending consideration of his petition for writ 
of certiorari. Petitioner's counsel detailed the reasons 
making it appropriate for me to exercise my discretion , 
under 18 U. S. C. § 3144, to admit this petitioner to baiL 
A copy of his certiorari petition. which raises two non-
frivolous constitutional questions, was also attached to 
his application. The Attorney General of Mississippi 
declined to file a response objecting to the application. 
On February 1, 1972, after careful review of petitioner's 
application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. 
In order to assure that petitioner would not flee or pose 
a danger to any other person, I imposed a number of 
conditions on his release. He was required to post bail 
bond in the sum of $15,000; to live at horne with his 
family in his hometown of Woodville, Mississippi; to 
find employment; and to report, immediately upon re-
lease and periodically thereafter, to the local sheriff. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney 
General of Mississippi filed an application for reconsid-
eration of my order admitting petitioner to bail. Al-
though the Rules of this Court do not provide for such 
an application, I have carefully re-examined all papers 
submitted including a response from petitioner's counseL 
2 CHAMBERS v. MISSISSIPPI 
The Attorney General, in addition to contending that 
petitioner's case is frivolous, asserts that petitioner's 
"return to the community will create a dangerous situa-
tion to citizens of that community." In support of 
this latter allegation, he proffers the affidavits of the 
County Sheriff, the local Police Commissioner, and the 
Chief of Police of Woodville. In conclusory terms, these 
documents state that petitioner's presence will create 
a tense and explosive situation in the community, which 
might result in bloodshed. No specific facts are stated 
in support of the opinions expressed. On the contrary, 
it appears that this petitioner's roots in the community 
and record of good behavior merit his release pending 
final determination of his case. Petitioner is a lifelong 
resident of Woodville; he owns a home, subject to a 
mortgage; he has a wife and nine children there; he 
served for a period on the Woodville police force; he is 
a deacon in the local Baptist Church; and he has no 
prior criminal record. Before his trial he was released 
on bail for approximately 14 months, apparently without 
incident. During his period of incarceration after his con-
viction it appears that petitioner was a model prisoner. 
On this record, I am unable to conclude that peti-
tioner's mere presence in the community poses such 
a threat to the public "that the only way to protect 
against it would be to keep [him] in jail." Sellers v. 
United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38, 21 L. Ed. 2d 64, 67 
(1968) (Black, J.). 
The order admitting petitioner to bail is hereby 
reaffirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFB 
Leon Chambers, 
v. 
Rtate of Mississippi. 
No. A- 785 
Application for Reconsideration of 
Order Admitting Petitioner to 
Bail. 
[February 14, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
On January 31, 1972, coullsel for Leon Chambers, peti-
tioner in No. 71- 5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice 
for the States constituting the Fifth Circuit, an applica-
tion for bail pending consideration of his petition for writ 
of certiorari. Petitioner's counsel detailed the reasons 
making it appropriate for me to exercise my discretion , 
under 18 U. S. C. § 3144, to admit this petitioner to bail. 
A copy of his certiorari petition, which raises two non-
frivolous constitutional questions, was also attached to 
his application. The Attorney General of Mississippi 
declined to file a response objecting to the application . 
On February 1, 1972, after careful review of petitioner's 
application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. 
In order to assure that petitioner would not flee or pose 
a danger to any other person, I imposed a number of 
conditions on his release. He was required to post bail 
bond in the sum of $15,000; to live at home with his 
family in his hometown of Woodville, Mississippi; to 
find employment; and to report, immediately upon re-
lease and periodically therea.fter, to the local sheriff. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney 
General of Mississippi filed an application for reconsid-
eration of my order admitting petitioner to bail. Al-
though the Rules of this Court do not provide for such 
an application , I have carefully re-examined all papers 
submitted including a response from petitioner's counseL 
2 CUAl\IBEllS v. MISSISSIPPI 
The Attorney General, in addition to contending that 
petitioner's case is frivolous, asserts that petitioner's 
"return to the community will create a dangerous situa-
tion to citizens of that community." In support of 
this latter allegation, he proffers the affidavits of the 
County Sheriff, the local Police Commissioner, and the 
Chief of Police of Woodville. In conclusory terms, these 
documents state that petitioner's presence will create 
a tense and explosive situation in the community, which 
might result in bloodshed. No specific facts are stated 
in support of the opinions expressed. On the contrary, 
it appears that this petitioner's roots in the community 
and record of good behavior merit his release pending 
final determination of his case. Petitioner is a lifelong 
resident of Woodville; he owns a home, subject to a 
mortgage; he has a wife and nine children there; he 
served for a period on the Woodville police force; he is 
a deacon in the local Baptist Church; and he has no 
prior criminal record. Before his trial he was released 
on bail for approximately 14 months, apparently without 
incident. During his period of incarceration after his con-
viction it appears that petitioner was a model prisoner. 
On this record, I am unable to conclude that peti-
tioner's mere presence in the community poses such 
a threat to the public "that the only way to protect 
against it would be to keep [him] in jail." Sellers v. 
United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38, 21 L. Ed. 2d 64, 67 
(1968) (Black, J.). 
The order admitting petitioner to bail is hereby 
reaffirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
--
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Leon Chambers, 
v. 
:::\tate of Mississippi. 
No. A-785 
Application for Reconsideration of 
Order Admitting Petitioner to 
Bail. 
[February 14, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
On January 31, 1972, counsel for Leon Chambers, peti-
tioner in No. 71-5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice 
for the States constituting the Fifth Circuit, an applica-
tion for bail pending consideration of his petition for writ 
of certiorari. Petitioner's counsel detailed the reasons 
making it appropriate for me to exercise my discretion , 
under 18 U. S. C. § 3144, to admit this petitioner to baiL 
A copy of his certiorari petition, which raises two non-
frivolous constitutional questions, was a.lso attached to 
his application. The Attorney General of Mississippi 
declined to file a response objecting to the application. 
On February 1, 1972, after careful review of petitioner's 
application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. 
In order to assure that petitioner would not flee or pose 
a danger to any other person, I imposed a number of 
conditions on his release. He was required to post bail 
bond in the sum of $15,000; to live at home with his 
family in his hometown of Woodville, Mississippi; to 
find employment; and to report, immediately upon re-
lease and periodically thereafter, to the local sheriff. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney 
General of Mississippi filed an application for reconsid-
eration of my order admitting petitioner to bail. Al-
though the Rules of this Court do not provide for such 
an application, I have carefully re-examined all papers 
submitted including a response from petitioner's counsel.. 
2 CITAl\IBERS v . MISSISSIPPI 
The Attorney General, in addition to contendillg that 
petitioner's case is frivolous, asserts that petitioner's 
"return to the community will create a dangerous situa-
tion to citizens of that community." In support of 
this latter allegation, he proffers the affidavits of the 
County Sheriff, the local Police Commissioner, and the 
Chief of Police of Woodville. In conclusory terms, these 
documents state that petitioner's presence will create 
a tense and explosive situation in the community, which 
might result in bloodshed. No specific facts are stated 
in support of the opinions expressed. On the contrary, 
it appears that this petitioner's roots in the community 
and record of good behavior merit his release pending 
final determination of his case. Petitioner is a lifelong 
resident of Woodville; he owns a home, subject to a 
mortgage; he has a wife and nine children there; he 
served for a period on the Woodville police force; he is 
a deacon in the local Baptist Church; and he has no 
prior criminal record. Before his trial he was released 
on bail for approximately 14 months, apparently without 
incident. During his period of incarceration after his con-
viction it appears that petitioner was a model prisoner. 
On this record , I am unable to conclude that peti-
tioner's mere presence in the community poses such 
a threat to the public "that the only way to protect 
against it would be to keep [him] in jail." Sellers v. 
United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38, 21 L. Ed. 2d 64, 67 
(1968) (Black, J.). 
The order admitting petitioner to bail is hereby 
reaffirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Leon Chambers, 
v. 
State of Mississippi. 
No. A-785 
Application for Reconsideration of 
Order Admitting Petitioner to 
Bail. 
[February 14, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
On January 31, 1972, counsel for Leon Chambers, peti-
tioner .in No. 71-5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice 
for the States constituting the Fifth Circuit, an applica-
tion for bail pending consideration of his petition for writ 
of certiorari. Petitioner's counsel detailed the reasons 
making it appropriate for me to exercise my discretion, 
under 18 U. S. C. § 3144, to admit this petitioner to baiL 
A copy of his certiorari petition, which raises two non-
frivolous constitutional questions, was also attached to 
his application. The Attorney General of Mississippi 
declined to file a response objecting to the application. 
On February 1, 1972, after careful review of petitioner's 
application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. 
In order to assure that petitioner would not flee or pose 
a danger to any other person, I imposed a number of 
conditions on his release. He was required to post bail 
bond in the sum of $15,000; to live at home with his 
family in his hometown of Woodville, Mississippi; to 
find employment; and to report, immediately upon re-
lease and periodically thereafter, to the local sheriff. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney 
General of Mississippi filed an application for reconsid-
eration of my order admitting petitioner to bail. Al-
though the Rules of this Court do not provide for such 
an application, I have carefully re-examined all papers 
submitted including a response from petitioner's counseL 
2 CIIAl\IBEHS v. MISSISSIPPI 
The Attorney General, in addition to contending that 
petitioner's case is frivolous, asserts that petitioner's 
"return to the community will create a dangerous situa-
tion to citizens of that community." In support of 
this latter allegation, he proffers the affidavits of the 
County Sheriff, the local Police Commissioner, and the 
Chief of Police of Woodville. In conclusory terms, these 
documents state that petitioner's presence will create 
a tense and explosive situation in the community, which 
might result in bloodshed. No specific facts are stated 
in support of the opinions expressed. On the contrary, 
it appears that this petitioner's roots in the community 
and record of good behavior merit his release pending 
final determination of his case. Petitioner is a lifelong 
resident of Woodville; he owns a home, subject to a 
mortgage; he has a wife and nine children there; he 
served for a period on the Woodville police force; he is 
a deacon in the local Baptist Church; and he has no 
prior criminal record. Before his trial he was released 
on bail for approximately 14 months, apparently without 
incident. During his period of incarceration after his con-
viction it appears that petitioner was a model prisoner. 
On this record, I am unable to conclude that peti-
tioner's mere presence in the community poses such 
a threat to the public "that the only way to protect 
against it would be to keep [him] in jail." Sellers v. 
United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38, 21 L. Ed. 2d 64, 67 
(1968) (Black, J.). 
The order admitting petitioner to bail is hereby 
reaffirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
~u.prnnt <!fou:d of tlrt~b ~tldtg 
~t:poritt" of~uisiotul 
'Jifaslp:ngto-n. ~. <!f. 2ll,?).J.~ 
February 16, 1972 
Dear Mr. Justice Powell: 
We shall appreciate any suggestions 
that you may care to give us concerning 
the attached draft of a syllabus for your 
opinion in connection with the application 
for reconsideration of order admitting 




Jf (2;r? /(} ; 6 
;;::;JPutze0Jr. 1F"~) 
Reporter of Decisions 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice 
Judges 
The Court Reporter has sent us the attached syllabus to be 
printed in the u.s. Report along with your opinion in the Mississippi 
criminal case. I suggest the following alteration of that 
syllabus a 
"tili/A Application of Mississippi Attorney General, contending 
that Petitioner's return to the community will create a dangerous 
situation , supported by affidav~ts of local law enforce-
ment officials stating in conclusory terms that petitioner's 
presence will create a tense and explosive situation in the 
community, is denied • • • etc (same from here to end) 
This effects two changes: (1) it deletes the reference to the AG's 
allegation that the issues are frivolous (this clause should be 
striken or another clause should be added stating that the issues 
are not frivolous); and (2) it omits the word "merely" fiTDm line 5. 
I do not think that these syllabi are terribly important, but 
I do think that they should be accurate and state as clearly as 
possible what the case was about. 
February 16, 1972 
Re: No. A-785 Chambers v. Mississippi 
Dear Mr. Putzel: 
Thank you for your prqlosed syllabus. I would c:mly request 
the deletion of the words underlined in red oo your copy.. With that 
deletion, the headnote would read as follows: 
"Application of Mississippi Attorney General, contending 
that petitioner's return to the community will create a 
dangerous situation, supported by affidavits of local law 
enforcement officials stating in cooclusory terms that 
petitioner's presence will create a tense and explosive 
situation in the community, is denied and the order 
admitting petitioner to bail is reaffirmed, as petitioner 
is a llfeloog resident of the community, owns his home, 
has his family there, served em the local police force, 
is a deacoo in a local church, has no prior records, and 
was released on bail for 14 months before trial, apparently 
without incident." 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Henry Putzel, Jr. 
Reporter of Decisions 
lfp/ss 
Enc. 





REa Chpbg;a Xa M1st1tliPP1 
Attached you will find Mr. Putzel't propoaed technical 
cahngaa in your in•chambers opinlon. I think they ahould 
be accepted. 
Upon rereading the opinion I noted what now appears to have 
been an error in it. At two points I cited the federal statute 
18 u.s.c. I 3148. This ls the statute relied on by the parties 
and I relied on it as well without independently evaluating 
whether the statute is strictly applicable. Now, having studied 
the JU.tter 110re closely, I a convinced that this statute 
does not apply to atate prisoners who apply for cert but only 
to federal prisoners. Stern & Gressman, the fore.-,at auth• 
or1t1es on Supreme Court practice, have a sectlon dealing 
with the question of the jurisdictional authority for ba111ng 
thOse under state authOrity (Pp. SS5•57). They conclude that 
the jur1sd1ct1onal bula ls unclear and that the Court has 
never really faced that problem squarely. But, other easel 
have led to a grant ofbail without worrylng with the uncertain 
atatua of the jurladlctlonal. If we were to write on the 
subject I would find the jur1ad1ct1on under 18 u.s.c. I 3144 
and under 28 u.s.c. I 2101(!). But, I do not believe lt la 
neceeaary to expound on the jurlsdlctional laaue here. 
At any rate, the opinion 1a in error where lt cltea 18 u.s.c. 
I 3148 and needs to be corrected. 1 have made the correction• 
I &U88eat. the corrected copy will, 1f you qree, be sent 
to the part lea aa a aatter of courae. And, aince they led me 
into thla error, I u certain that they will have no complaint. 
I 
the corrected copy wtllbe the one publlehed 1n the official 
and unoff1clal reportera. 
I ,, 
I' 
nte error l• min"* and I a to~ry lt happened. •o ••r· 
loua harm baa been don• since lt May still be amend$<! befetn 
!Gina into fiftal pr1nt. 
' !•• 
2/24/72--LAH 
REs Chambers v. Mississippi 
Attached you will find Mr. Putzel 9 s proposed technical 
changes in your in-chambers opinion. I think they should 
be accepted. 
Upon rereading the opinion, I noted what now appears 
to have been an error in it. At two points I cited the federal 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3148. This is the statute relied on by 
the parties and I relied on it as well without independently 
evaluating whether it was strictly applicable. Now, having 
studied the matter more closely, I am convinced that this 
section does not apply directly to state prisoners but only 
to federal prisoners. I have consulted Stern & Gressman, 
the foremost authority on Supreme Court practice, and they 
have a section of their book wfuich is directly in point. The 
jurisdictional authority for a single Justice to grant bail 
to a state prisoner pending cert is 18 U.S.C. § 314~. While 
I think the jurisdictional authority is clear, I see no need 
to expound on the jurisdictional issue. 
But, the opinion is in error and must be corrected. I 
have made the corrections I think appropriate. The 
corrected copy will, if you agree, be sent to the parties 
as a matter of course. And, since they led me into this 
blunder, I am certain that they will have no complaint. 
The corrected copy will be the one which is published in the 
official and unofficial Supreme Court reporters. 
The error is mine and I am sorry that it happened. 
LAH 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NO. A-785 
LEON CHAMBERS V. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
ADMITTING PETITIONER !0 BAmL 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, Circuit Justice. 
On January 31, 1972, Leon Chambers, Petitioner in No. 71• 
5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice for the States comprising 
the Fifth Circuit, an applieation for bail pending consideration 
of his petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner's able counsel 
persuasively detailed the r94SOU8 making it appropriate f•r me 
to exercise my dt.acretton.under 18 u.s.c. I J148,to admit this 
Petitioner to bail. C copy of his c~rtiorari petition, which 
raises two nonfrtvolous Constitutional questions, was also 
attached to his application. The Attorney General of Mississippi 
declined to a response objecting to the application. 
un FebJ:uary 1, 1972, after carefully evaluating Petitioner's 
application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. In order 
to assure that Petitioner would not "flee or pose a danger to any 
other person• (18 u.s.c. I 3148), I imposed a number of conditione 
on his relea e. He wae required to post bail bond in the eum of 
$15,000, to live at home with his family in his hometolm of Wood• 
ville, Miseisaippi, to find employment, and to report immediately 
upon release w1d periodically thereafter to the local sheriff. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney General of 
Hisaiasippt. filed an application for reconsideration of my order 
adaitttng Petitioner to bail. Although no basis for such an 
application has been found in either the statutes or this Court • s 
Rules.(and the Attorney General hal cited me to none), I have 
carefulty reviewed the application 'lecauee of the seriousness 
of his allegations in this particular ease. A response from 
Petitioner's counsel w•& also call ed for at my requ!tst and has 
now been received. 
I remain persuaded that this Petitioner was properly admitted 
to ball pendina disposition by this Court of hia certiorari 
petition, The Attorney General, in addition to contending that 
Petitioner's c.ee ia frivolous, also claims that Petitioner's 
"return to the community will create a dangerous situation to 
c1tlzena of that coJIIIUnity." In •upport of the latter allegation, 
--3--
he proffers the affidavits of the County Sheriff, the local Police 
Commissioner. and the Chief of Police of Woodville. In conolusory 
terms, those documents atate that Petitioner's presence will create 
' 
a tense and explosive situation in the community, which might 
reeult in bloodshed. those assertions are incompatible with 
afftdav.ts filed in Petitioner's behalfr indicating that he poses 
no threat to the community. Petitioner is a lifelong resident of 
WoodviJ le; he has a 1-1ife and nino children t..'1<:1re1 ht!! setved for 
a period on the Woodville police forcet he is a Deacon tn the loeal 
Baptist Churehr and he has no prior crimtnal record . Before his 
trial he was released on bail for approximately 15 months, appar• 
ently withnu inct dent. During hi a period of inca.t""Ceration after 
his conviction it appeara that Petitioner ha been a model pri• 
eoner. 
On thie record, I am unable to conclude that Petitioner'• 
"that the only way to protect against it would be to keep him tn 
jail. • Sellers .v .. .Unttcd St;at;eR, 89 S.Ct. 36, 38 (1968 ) (MR. 
JUSTICE BLACK). the Attorney General's assertions are refuted by 
--4·--
Petitioner's aff1dav1ta. therefore, th1a application :for recon-
sideration will be den1ed. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ~lliMO 
Since I was wrong once I determined to review more 
carefully the jurisdictional basis for your grant of bail 
in this Mississippi case. Jurisdiction may be found on the 
following reasoning: 
(1) The applicable federal statute is 18 u.s.c. § 3144: 
"Whenever the judgment of a State Court in any criminal 
proceeding is brought to the Supreme Court of the United 
States for review, the defendant shall not be released 
from custody until a final judgment upon such review, or, 
if the offense is bailable, until a bond, with sufficient 
sueeties, in a reasonable sum, is given." 
(2) The pertinent question under this statute is whether 
"the offense is bailable." That requires an examination of 
Mississippi law. In Hississippi a person convicted of murder 
may be released on bail pending appeal pursuant to the follow~ 
ing state: 
'',A person convicted of • • • murder • • . shall not be 
entitled to release from imprisonment pending an appeal 
to the Supreme Court, unless it be ordered by the court 
in which conviction is had, or by the Supreme Court •.• 
and the making of such order shall be a matter of dis-
cretion with either the court or judge to be exercised 
with the greatest caution, and only when the peculiar 
circumstances of the case render it proper . II 
The "Supreme Court" to which the statute refers is obviously the 
Mississippi Supreme Court. The test, under 3144 however, is 
whether the petitioner was bailable in the state pending his 
appeal in that state's courts. Chambers was clearly ~ailable. 
Therefore, this Court has the power to bail him pending cert. 
That this Court has the power is made clear by a discussion 
in Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1895) dealing 
with the predecess~or to section 3144. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO 
Sinco I was ''lt'ORS once l detetnl1ned to revt.ew mor• 
carefully the jur1sd1ct1ona1 bas1a for your grant of bail 
in th1a t-Jtsslsslppl. ease. Jur1sdtct1oa may be found on the 
following reasoning• 
(1) the applicable f•deral statute l& 18 u.s.c. I 3144• 
•Whene.ver the judgment of a State Court t.n any orimtnal 
proceedlng 1& brought to the Supreme Court of the Unlted 
Statee f'or revlew, the defendant shall .not be released 
from custody until a final judgment upon such review, or, 
"' the 2Ui!DI' 11 btllllakta au I \lQOsl• Wl.fh IYUiet.en; 
t~ltl • LFl I EII.MMJa\1 1111•· it BUeQ • • 
(2) ·\1\e penlnent queatlon under this statute ta whether 
•the offense la batl•ble.• that requires an examination of 
Misaiaalppi l•w.. In Ml••lselppt a peraon convicted of murder 
uy be released on ball pendtns appeal pursuant to the follow-
tng ·atatet 
lA person convleted of .... murder ••• shall not be 
•ntltled to nleue from t.•prlaonraent pendlna en appeal 
to the Suprtr~~e Court, unleaa 1t be ordered by the court 
ln Wbieh conviction ts bad. or by the Supreme Court • • • 
And the u.ld.ns of euoh order ahall be a utter of dls• 
eretlon Vlth either the court or judge to be exerelaed 
with the greatest caution, and only when the peculiu 
e trcumstances of the case render it proper • • • • " 
The •supreme Court" to which the statute refers :Ls obViously the 
Mtssl.ssipp1 Sup:reme Court. 'Dle teat, under 3144 hol~ever, l.a 
whether the petitioner was bailable ln the atate pending hts 
appeal in thet state• s courts.. Chambers was clearly ilat.lable. 
n arerore • thts CoW!'t has the power to ~11 h1na Jendina cert. 
that this Court hae the power i.s raade cleu by a discussion 
1n HydiAO X• tvk.u• 156 u.s. 277, 28S·86 (189S} doalt.ng 
"'-.th the predeoeeaM:t to eectlon 3144. 
' ' 
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No. 71-5908 
Chambers v. Mississippi Coni. 11/17/72 
DOUGLAS, J. ~ MARSHALL, J. /(...._..,... • ., • 
lk~trj~~ 
~-"1-.' • . , 
BLACKMUN, J. 
~~~~~~ 
cf- tJ~~ vT~~ ~ 
~~~ ~ia,.__J 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu:p-umt QJoud of tqt ~nittb .itatts 
Jfasqi:ttghttt. ~. QJ. 2llgtJ!.~ 
November 20, 1972 
PERSONAL 
Re: No. 71-5908 - Chambers v. Mississippi 
Dear Lewis: 
I am assigning the above to you and I agree with you that 
it must be written very narrowly. 
We have a real problem on a state case and there is much 
in what Bill Rehnquist said about intruding in state procedures and 
11 constitutionalizing everything." Nonetheless, this can be reversed 
on no grounds except the Federal Constitution and were I doing it, 
I would rest it on the unique factors of this case and even call them 
unique, i. e. : 
(a) There was eye-witness testimony that McDonald was 
seen shooting the victim. 
(b) There was evidence that McDonald purchased two 
pistols of the caliber that killed the victim. 
(c) No evidence that Chambers owned a 22. 
(d) Professed testimony that McDonald had told three 
persons he had done the killing. 
You know all this as well as I do and I recite it only to under-
score that my approach would be to hold (but I would avoid a "totality 
of circumstances" concept) that in these peculiar and unique circum-
stances McDonald was inherently a hostile witness and that due process 
required he should have been subject to all the attacks available on such 
a witness. 
2. 
If this is narrowly done, there is a good chance to pick up 
Rehnquist and I would try to do that. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
/ 
... 
Memo to the file 
From: Lewis F 0 Powell, Jr. November 21, 1972 
Re: No 0 71-5908 Chambers v. Mississippi 
At the Conference, and in talking about what constitutional 
error had been committed by the trial court, several Justices re-
ferred to California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 which held - in brief 
summary- that the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause and the 
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No. 71-5908, Chambers v. Mississippi 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a policeman. 
The jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment and the Mississippi 
Supreme Court affirmed, one Justice dissenting. Chambers v . 
. Mississippi) 252 So. 2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his 
application for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. Two weeks 
later, on the State's request for reconsideration, that order was 
reaffirmed. 405 U.S. 1205 (1972). Subsequently the petition for 
certiorari was granted, 405 U.S. 987 (1972), to consider whether 
petitioner's trial was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for murder 
occurred in the small town of Woodville in southern Mississippi. 
- 2 -
~ :mmstx ':fhe:v merit beiawstaied-in Borne det On Saturday 
evening, June 14, 1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman 
and Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool hall 
to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named C. C. Jackson. 
Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. 
The officers' first attempt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated by 
20 or 25 men in the crowd who intervened and wrestled him free. 
Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty removed his riot gun, 
a 12-gauge sawed-off:.lBi:lxx' shotgun, from the car. Three deputy 
sheriffs arrived shortly thereafter and the officers again attempted 
to make their arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by 
the onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol shots were 
A..;~; w ~ o...lj 
Forman did not wiblQSS UlQ shooting, but immediately saw 
~ J. , , t 
fired. 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. Before Liberty 
died he turnecbaDir.t around and fired both barrels of his riot gun 
~'vt~ tt.l 
~al men fleeing d~ alley 
~ 
The first shot 
Lu.-v. ~.-v ~ Jt:!l~.,,.A. 
)... '7 · · ~~r ,..~a J:.t 
--3--
was wild and high and scattered the crowd standing 
~ 
at the face of the alley. ~ appeared, however, to 
" 
take more deliberate aim before the second shot and 
hit one of the men in the crow~n the back of the 
head and neck as he ran down the alley. That man was 
Leon Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whlether Liberty's shots hit 
-"•s u, 
anyone. One of the deputy sheriffs testif ied at trial 
that he was standing several feet from Liberty and that 
he saw Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff 
stated that, although he could not see whether Chambers 
had a gun in his hand, he did see Chambers "break his 
arm down" shortly before the shots were fired. The 
officers who saw Chambers fall thought he was dead 
d~~ 
ti~either to examine 
to 
him or/search for the murder weapon. Instead they 
attended to Aamaa Liberty, who was placed in the police 
+-~~ 
car and @a••~ to the hospital where he was declared 
~;r;k(/f 
dead on arrival. tL ~ty-l.bd ~!Uj' 
~ tv..i JH'.S•V .ll( ~ ~~ft.-,,:- ,;11 -~ 
Shortly after the shooting three of Chambers' ~- ~. 
' 
friends discovered that he was not yet dead. James 
1/ 
William5; Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded 
--4--
.,_,..,. ... ,...-AJ. 
him into a car and~ him to the same hospital. Later 
~~ 
that night)~ County Sheriff discovered that Chambers 
was still alive~a a guard~d outside his room. 
~ 1\ 
Chambers 
Ml was subsequently charged with the capital offense of 
murdering~ Liberty. He pleaded not guilty and has 
asserted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with 
the story of another man, Gable McDonald. McDonald, 
a lifelong resident of Woodville, was in the crowd on 
s .. ~.·.J;~~ 
the e'l"ning of Liberty • s death. :OI>elitlll therg•fteJ;,, t 
he left his wife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
~. 
and found a job at a sugar wtil!lR .. In November of 1 
that same year he returned to Woodville when his wife 
informed him that an acquaintance of his, known as 
Reverend Stokes, wanted to see him. Stokes owned a 
gas station in N@atchez, Mississippi, several miles 





i•p the~ to see him. After talking to Stokes, Me-
Donald agreed to make a statement to Chambers' 
.~~~ 
attorneys,who~ uLfice~ in Natchez. Two days later he 
appeared at the attorneys' offices and gave a sworn 
confession that he ...._. shot Officer Liberty. He ~ 
t ~~ J,~ a.kw-4, bA.tl 'J 
s#ated that':!' friend of his, James Williams, .alwea~ 
--5--
that he shot Liberty. He said that he used his own 
~ 
pistol, a 9-sho1t 22-caliber revolver, which he had 
discarded shortly after the shooting. In response 
to questions from Chambers' attorneys, McDonald 
affirmed that his confession was voluntary and that 
no one had compelled him to come to them. Once 
hJ., 
the confession ~ been transcribed,ti signed, and 
witnessed, McDonald was taken over to the local police 
authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, Me~ 
A.·Ultt 1.1 
Donald repudiated his prior/confession. He testified 
that Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot 
Liberty. He claimed that Stokes had promised -~ that 
he would not go to jail and that he would share in the 
• 
proceeds of a lawsuit that Chambers would 
~ ~o-,-, J. 
f:i: against 
the town of Woodville. On examination by his own attorne' 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald 
swore that he had not been on the scene when Liberty 
was shot but had been down the street drinking beer in 
~T~ 
--~ 
a cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When heard 
.}N.. )r_J 1,c ( A/~~ J/j 
the shooting~ walked up the street and found Chamber~ I~:~J 
in the alley. He ).aad Turner and Williams -pi:eltea 
~t!.~~ 
took ~hospit~ ~
k~ .,__ft-lu. ~~ 
~..A .:lAO> ''""' ..... #'-{ ~ 
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he did not know what had happened, that there was no discussion about 
the shooting either going to or coming back from the hospital, and that 
it was not until the next day that he learned that Chambers had been 
felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addition, McDonald 
stated that while he once owned a ~22 -caliber pistol he had lost it many 
months before the shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at 
that time. The local justice of the peace accepted~ McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local authorities 
undertook no further investigation of his possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the next year.V 
At trial he endeavored to develop two grounds of defense. He first 
attempted to show that he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer 
testified that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although three 
officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified that they assumed he 
was shooting his attacker, none of them examined Chambers to see 
whether he was still alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no 
weapon was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a . 22-caliber pistol. One witness 
- 7 -
testified that he was standing in the street near where Liberty was 
.s hot, that he was looking at Chambers when the shooting began, and 
that he was sure that Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald had 
shot Officer Liberty. He was only partially successful, however, in 
his efforts to bring the facts surrounding this defense to the jury's 
attention. ~ta~ Samuel Hardin, a lifelong friend of McDonald's ) 
testified that he saw McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness -
one of Liberty's cousins - testified that he saw McDonald immediately 
after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. In addition to the testimony 
of these two witnesses, Chambers' primary goal was to show the jury 
that McDonald had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers 
attempted to prove that McDonald admitted responsibility for the 
murder on four separate occasions, once when he gave the sworn 
statement to Chambers' counsel and three other times prior to that 
occasion in private conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to~ 
A 
~~ 
this portion of his defense by the striek application of certain Mississippi 
- 8 -
R']rnRRH evidence rules. Chambers~ asserts in this Court, 
as he did unsuccessfully in his motion for new trial and on appeal 
to the State Supreme Court, that taken together the application 
of these evidentiary rules .. ~ rendered his trial fundamentally 
~ 
unfair and deprived him of due process of law. \IDGOP the Fou:rhH~:ath 
~ '\L~VJ ~ 
~endm:ent. It is necessar~\to examine carefully the e£itieal 
rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought a ruling 
that, if the State chose not to call McDonald itself, he be allowed 
to call him as an adverse witness. Attached to the motion were 
copies of McDonald's sworn confession and of the transcript of 
his preliminary hearing at which he repudiated that confession. 
The trial court granted the motion requiring McDonald to appear 
- -.J..o ;z.......:; *L~.J._ d).A.. 
c.. ) ~·~~.s~~~l\ /;w._ 
but reserved ruling on the adverse witness motion. At trial') 4..Jkz.....i--> 
c,W-.l.J. c )'),,, t1, A1t )) ~ 
Chambers laid a predicate for the introduction of ~ sworn out-of-court 
-9-
confession, had it admitted into evidence, and read it to the jury. 
The S1ate , upon cross-examination, elicited from McDonald the fact 
that he had rejected his prior confession. McDonald further testified, 
as he had at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise of Reverend 
Stokes that he would not go to jail and kH: would share in a sizable 
tort recovery from the town. He also retold his own story of his 
actions on the evening of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe 
down the street, his absence from the scene during the critical IE riod, 
and his subsequent trip to the hospital with Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, Chambers 
renewed his motion to examine McDonald as an adverse witness. The 
/'"' ~ 
trial court denied the motion, stating: "He may be hostile , but ~ is 
1\ 
not adverse in the sense of the word, so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal the State Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling, 
finding that "McDonald's testimony was not adverse to appellant" because 
"[!!1 owhere did he point the finger at Chambers 0" 252 So. 2~at 2 'l-0. 
-10-
Defeated in his attempt to chall 
renunciation of his prior confession, 
~~~~~~ 
that he shot the officer. The first of these, Samuel Hardin, would 
have testified that, on the night of the shooting, he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after their return 
from the hospital and that while driving McDonald home later that 
night, McDonald stated that he shot Liberty. The State objected 
to the admission of this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. 
The trial court sustained the objection. a.lf 
Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald had said he 
was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, also was called to 
testify. In the jury's presence, and without objection, he testified 
had 
that he had not been in the cafe that Saturday and had not/any beers 
with McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence of the 
jury, Turner recounted his conversations with McDonald while they 
were riding with James Williams to take ~ Chambers to the hospital. 
When asked whether McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
-ll-
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him that he "shot 
him." Turner further stated that one week later, when he met McDonald 
at a friend's house, McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation 
and urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued to the court 
that, especially where there was other proof in the case that was corro-
borative of these out-of-court statements, ~eBa.ki-'-e-seY-iB&!'ffiH.m-8.-ng 
Pema-~ Turner's testimony regarding McDonald's self-incriminating 
remarks should have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Again,~ the trial court sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's neighbor. 
They had been friends for about 25 years. Although Carter had not 
~b~ 
been in Woodville on the evening of the shooting, he/ learned about it 
the next morning from McDonald. That same day he and McDonald 
walked out to a well near McDonald's house and there McDonald told 
him that he was the one who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified 
that McDonald also told him that he had disposed of the . 22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that several weeks after 
the shooting he accompanied McDonald to Natchez where McDonald 
~ .s 
purchased another • 22}to replace the one he had discarded.4.. The jury 
-12-
was not allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged that 
these statements were admissible, the State objected, and the court 
to 
sustained the objection.~ On appeal the State Supreme 
Court approved the lower court's ldlldgl exclusion 
of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay grounds. 
252 So.2~at -;':JV. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. 




ru~e· and~'party witness" or "voucher" ) 
~e was unable either to cross-examine McDonald 
or to present witnesses in his own behalf who would 
have d~credited McDonald's repudiation and demon-
strated his complicity. Chambers had, however, 
chipped away at the fringes of McDonald's story by 
fwwt~~~ 
introducing admissible tlestimony\that he had not 
been seen in the cafe where he says he was when the 
shooting started, that he had not been having beer 
I 
~ 
with ~ Turner, and that he/\ "'mac a . 2 2 pis to 1 
at the time of the crime. But what remained was a 
single confession and an arguably acceptable renun-
t 
ciation. It was far less persiauasive than Chambers' 
--.) 
f, 
defnse might have been had he been given an opportunity 
I 
~-~~ 
to subject McDonald's stateme~s toj cloeer serutiny 
or had the other confessions been introduced. 
III 
in a criminal trial 
The right of an accused/to due process is, in 
>' 
-13-
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the state's 
accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to 
call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential 
to !hils due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in In re 
~~ 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), identified these as among the minimum 
1\ 
essentials ~ a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against 
him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense - a right 
to his day in court - are basic to our system of jurisprudence; 
and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine 
the witnesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be re-
presented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 40 i_ U.S. t.fJ/ (1972); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 4ll, 428-29 (1969); Spechtv. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both 
of those elements of a fair trial are implicated in the present case. 
A~ 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject McDonald's damning 
repudi; ation and alibi to cross-examination. He was not allowed to test 
the witness.:S recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to "sift" 
his conscience so that the jury might judge for itself whether McDonald's 
-14-
testimony was worthy of belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
242-243 (1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable 
rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of 
confrontation, and helps assure the "accuracy of the truth-determining 
process." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, _!g_(l970). It is, indeed, . 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which 
is this country's constitutional goal." Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400, 
405 (1965). Of course, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not 
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other 
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. ~ E.g., Mancusi 
v. Stubbs, ~ Qv' U.S. &0 cf (1972). But its denial or significant diminution 
calls into question the ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and 
requires that the competing interest be closely examined. Berger v. 
California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's request to cross-examine McDonald was 
denied on the basis of a Mississippi common law rule that a party may not 
impeach his own witness. The rule rests on the presumption- without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case - that a party who calls 
-15-
a witness "vouches for his credibility." Clark v. Lansford, 191 S. 2d 123 , 
125 (Miss. 1966). Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive English trial 
practice in which "oath-takers" or "compurgators" were called to stand 
behind a particular party's position in any controversy. Their assertions 
were strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal trials today, 
their role bore little relation to the impartial ascertainment of the facts. it. 7 
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once enjoyed , and 
apart from whatever usefulness it retains today :mtx:x in the civil trial 
process, it bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal 
process. Criminal defendants do not select their witnesses; they must 
take them where they find them. l 
- 16 -
Moreover, the rule has been condemned as archiac, irrational, 
and potentially destructive of the truth -gathering process. It 
recently has been rejected altogether by the new Rules of Evidence ,. 
applicable in all federal courts. As applied in this case, the 
"voucher" rule's impact was doubly harmful to Chambers' efforts 
to develop his defense. Not only was he precluded from cross-
examining McDonald, but, as the State conceded at oral argument, 
,o 
• 
he was also restricted in the scope of his~ direct examination 
by the "voucher" rule's corollary requirement that the examiner 
' 
~ bound by anything the witness might say. He was, therefore, 
effectively prevented from exploring the circumstances of McDonald's 
three prior oral confessions and from challenging the renunciation 
of the written confession. 
Mississippi does not go so far as to contend that its rule 
should override the accused's right of confrontation. Instead, it 
argues that there is no imcompatibility between its rule and 
Chamber's rights because no right of confrontation exists unless 
- 17 -
the testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The State's 
brief in this Court asserts, therefore, that the'right of confrontation 
I I 
ii-1 
is limited to witnesses against the accused. " ~ Relying on 
the trial court's determination that McDonald was not "adverse", 
and on the state Supreme Court's holding that McDonald "did not 
IL 
fi 
point the finger at Chambers, " the State contends that Chambers' 
constitutional right was not involved. 
The argument that McDonald's testimony was not "adverse" 
to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. The state's proof 
at trial excluded the theory that more than one person participated 
in the shooting of Liberty. To the extent that McDonald's sworn 
confession tended to incriminate him, it tended also to OORXbn 
~ 
exculpate Chambers. And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same extent 
that it exculpated.McDonald. In these circumstances, it can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seriously adverse 
to Chambers. The right to confront and cross-examine one who 
- 18 -
gives damaging testimony against an accused is a matter of substance, 
and does not turn on technicalities as to whether the witness was 
initially put on the stand by one party or the other. We conclude that 
the State'sX\XCII:X "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, impermissibly 
interfered with Chambers' constitutional rights. 
B 
Chambers' efforts to present to the jury the full picture of 
McDonald's possible responsibility for Liberty's murder was further 
t-).. ,~ .... l 
frustrated by the court's refusal to allow him to introduce the 
A 
testimony of Hardin, Turner and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on three separate 
occasions shortly after the crime, implicating himself as the 
murderer. The State Supreme Court approved the exclusion of 
this evidence on the ground that it was hearsay. The hearsay rule 
is normally respected. It is a rule based on long experience and 
~xttv 
grounded in the notion that loliAr9Ua"bl~ evidence should not be 
presented to the triers of fact. L 7 
1"/ -.-
r Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because 
~J 
they lack theJ indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under 
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the 
solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to 
cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor 
and credibility may be assessed by the jury. California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). 
A number of exceptions have been developed over the years 
to allow admission of hearsay statements made under circumstances -
that tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for the absence 
of the oath and opportunity for ~ cross-examination. Among 
the most prevalent exceptions are declarations against interest. •-
A founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate 
a statement against his own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi 
recognizes that exception but applies it only to declarations against 
,,s,. 
pecuniary interest. It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case, that are against the 
penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. state, 99 Miss. 719, 55 
So. iiti 961 (1911). 
:2<) -·-
Prior to the changes accomplished by the new federal Rules 
I~ = 
~ 
of Evidence, declarations xp:iDtx against ~penal interest 
were normally excluded in federal courts under the authority of 
Donnelly v. United states, 228 U.S. 243, 272-73 (1913). The 
exclusion was premised on the belief that confessions of criminal 
activity might be motivated by numerous extraneous considerations 
and, therefore, are not inherently as reliable as statements against 
pecuniary or proprietary interest. While that rationale has been 
I] 
tJ5 
the subject to scholarly criticism, we need not decide in this 
case whether, under other circumstances, it might serve some 
valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony. 
Each of the hearsay statements involved in this case 
was originally made and subsequently offered at ~ trial under 
circumstances that attested to its reliability. First, each of 
McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously to a close 
acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second, each 
one was corroborated by some other evidence in the case -
McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness, and 
'· .I 
z,l -.-
other testimony consistent with his statement, including prior 
ownership of a . 22 -caliber revolver and his subsequent purchase 
of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions 
provided additional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may 
I 
be the parameters of the penal-interest rationale, each confession 
here was in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably 
against interest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 473, 484 
(1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). McDonald stood 
to benefit nothing by disclosing his role in the shooting to any of his 
three friends and he must have been aware of the possibility that 
disclosure would lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner "not to 
mess him up. " Finally, if there was any question about the truth-
fulness of the extrajudicial statement~ McDonald was present in 
the courtroom and had been under oath. He could have been cross-
and his 
examined by the state,/ 1DiK demeanor and responses weighed by 
; 
the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The 
; ' 
availability of McDonald significantly distinguishes this case from 
the prior Mississippi~ precedent, Brown v. State, supra, and from 
Donnelly, since in both cases the declarant was unavailable at the 
,q 
time of trial. 
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused 
to present witnesses in his own defense. ~- ~·, Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); In re Oliver, supra. In the exercise 
of this right
1 
the accused, as is required of the ~tate, must com ply 
with established rules of procedure and evidence which are designed 
to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
....... 
and innocence. Although perfhaps no rule of evidence has been 
~ 
more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that 
ha:v&-lOH:g eKistea ft:Hd-oftOft ~ tailored to allow the introduction 
k 
of evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy/\ Recognition 
that the hearsay rule ~.not be applied mechanistically to 
defeat the ends of justice is especially appropriate in this case. 
L -Fe1 Ute ~ eal'to;;s st!!!ea a'eM ~ he testimony rejected by the 
. 
.4tf 
trial court as to McDonald's several confessions bore~ maieifC:,. 
~~ 
" 
of trustworthiness. R shetdel ha:vg "been admHt~. In bi:gHk light 
of all the facts, no interest of the state in enforcing its hearsay 
rule could outweigh Chambers' right to present this evidence of 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the <X Fourteenth Amendment. ~ 
We add that in reaching this judgment, and in setting aside Chambers' 
conviction, we invoke no new principles of law. Nor~ signal 
any dimunition in the respect traditionally accorded to the ~tates -
in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal 
trial rules and processes. Rather, we hold q;Fcx: quite simply 
that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. James-Williams was indicted along with Chambers. The 
State, however, failed to introduce any evidence at trial that could 
implicate Williams in the shooting. At the conclusion of the State's 
case, in-chief the trial court granted a directed verdict in his favor. 
C~· 
2. Upon petitionerts motion, a change of venue was granted and 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the east of Woodville. The 
change of trial setting was in response to petitioner's claim that, 
because of adverse publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
and sheriff's staffs in Woodville, he could not obtain a fair and impartial 
trial there . 
1. ~'s-
-2ij. On the record in this case, it is clear that PQtitionE»"'s asserted 
denial of due process is properly before us. He objected during trial 
to each of the court's rulings. As to the confrontation claim, petitioner 
asserte1 his right to treat McDonald as an adve~se ~both be~ 
~~His ,;;otion for new trial, filed after the jury's ver-
dict, listed as error the trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination 
of McDonald and the exclusion of evidence corroborative of McDonald's 
17.-_~~ 
guilt., aftd~concluded that the trial "was not in accord with fundamental 
fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." 
-2-
~ 
*reasserted those same claims on appeal to the State Supreme 
A. 
Court. Mter the affirmance of his conviction by that Court, pGU-
~ 
Hefter filed a petition for rehearing addressed almost entirely to the 
""' 
claim that his trial had not been conducted in a manner consistent 
with traditional notions of due process. The State Supreme Court 
~) 
raised no question that petitioae:r..!..s claims were not properly asserted, 
w ~~ 
and no claim was made here that thiA ease-W1l'S not properly reviewable 
by this Court. See street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1969); 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420-23 (1965). 
. Hardin's testimony, unlike the testimony of the other two men 
who stated that McDonald had confessed to them, was actually given 
in the jury's presence. Mter the State's objection to Hardin's account 
of McDonald's statement was sustained, the trial court ordered the 
jury to disregard it. 
~ 
\. A gun dealer from Natchez testified that McDonald had made 
two purchases. The witness!; business records indicated that McDonald 
purchased a 9-shot 22 caliber revolver about a year prior to the murder. 
He purchased a different style . 22 three weeks after Liberty's death. 
~ 
, . It is not entirely clear whether the trial court's ruling was 
-3-
premised on the same hearsay rationale underlying the exclusion 
of the other testimony. In this instance the State argued that 
Carter's testimony was an impermissible attempt by petitioner to 
impeach a witness (McDonald) who was not adverse to him. The 
trial court did not state why it was excluding the evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hearsay. 
252 So. 2¥t ).10 . 
1 
-&J. 3A. J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 896 , at 658-61 (Chadbourn ed. 
1970); C. McCormick, Evidence ~ 38, at 75-78 (1972). 
'{. C. McCormick, Evidence ~ 38, at 75-78 (1972); E. Morgan, 
Basic Problems of Evidence 70-71 (1962); 3A. J. Wigmore, Evidence 
~ 898, at 661 (Chadbourn ed. 1970). 
1\ 
I 
~. Rule 607, Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts~ 
(approved Nov 'l-0 , 1972). 
,o 
I. Tr . ~-: ral ~rg ~at 3 (g . .. 
,, 
•. Respondent's brief at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
-4-
/l. 
~. 252 So. 2~t 2 Z() . 
I..J 
-,.. See Donnelley v. United States , 228 U.S. 243, 272 (1913). 
,q 
!§. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest, 58 Harv. L.Rev. 1 (1944). 
t5 
.lJ . H. McElroy, Mississippi Evidence § 46 (1955). 
~ ~ I 
.fi. Rule 804, Rules of Evidence for the United States Court~/ approved 
Nov. 7./J , 1972). 
11 
~. See . e.g. , Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 804, Rules of Evidence 
)lb 
for the United States Courts (approved Nov . .Z.O , 1972); 50 J. Wigmore, 
~ -
Evidence § 147%at 284 (3d ed. 1940); Wright, Uniform Rules of Hearsay, 
• 
26 U. C. nn. L. R~ . 575 (1957); United States v. Annunziato , 293 F. 2d 373, 
~ 
378 (2d Or.), cert. detJ.ie__9, 368 U.S. 919 (196l)(Friendly, J.); Scolair v. c ,---.,. 
United States, 406 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 
, OS CliP 
~ 
(1969). 
. The Mississippi case which refused to adopt a hearsay exception 
I 
for declarations against penal interest concerned an out-of-court declarant 
who purportedly stated that he had committed the murder with which his 
-5-
brother had been charged. The Mississippi Supreme Court believed 
that the declarant may have been motivated by a desire to free his 
brother rather than by any compulsion of guilt. The Court also noted 
that the declarant had fled, was unavailable for cross-examination, and 
may well have known at the time he made the statement that he would not 
w s5 
suffer for it. Broljn v. State , 99 Miss. 719, ~ So. 961 (19ll). There is, 
in the present case, no such basis for doubting McDonald's statements. 
11 
lJ. McDonald's presence also deprives the State's argument for re-
tention of the penal-interest rule of much of its force. In claiming that 
"[t1 o change the rule would work a travesty of justice," the State posited 
the following hypothetical: 
"If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the 
crime; B could tell C and D that he committed the crime; 
B could go into hiding and at A's trial C and D would 
testify as to B' s admission of guilt; A could be acquitted 
and B would return to stand trial; B could then provide 
several witnesses to testify as to his whereabouts at the 
time of the crime. The testimony of those witnesses 
along with A's statement that he really committed the 
crime would result in B' s acquittal. A would be barred 
from further prosecution because of the protection against 
double jeopardy. No one could be convicted of perjury as 
A did not testify at ~ his first trial, B did not lie under 
oath, and C and D were truthful in their testimony." 
Respondent's brief, at 7 n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
Obviously, "B' s" absence at trial is critical to the success of the justice-
subverting ploy. 
Draft 12/18/72 lfp/ss 
No. 71-5908, Chambers v. Mississippi 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a policeman. 
The jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment and the Mississippi 
Supreme Court affirmed, one Justice dissenting. Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 252 So. 2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his 
application for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. Two weeks 
later, on the State's request for reconsideration, that order was 
reaffirmed. 405 U.S. 1205 (1972). Subsequently the petition for 
certiorari was granted, 405 U.S. 987 (1972), to consider whether 
petitioner's trial was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for murder 
occurred in the small town of Woodville in southern Mississippi. 
- 2 -
On Saturday 
evening, June 14, 1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman 
and Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool hall 
to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named C. C. Jackson. 
Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. 
The officers' first attempt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated by 
20 or 25 men in the crowd who intervened and wrestled him free. 
Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty removed his riot gun, 
a 12-gauge sawed-offEt:ml' shotgun, from the car. Three deputy 
sheriffs arrived shortly thereafter and the officers again attempted 
to make their arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by 
the onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol shots were 
i 
fired. but immediately saw 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. Before Liberty 
died he turnedxmd: around and fired both barrels of his riot gun 
..,VV\l:< t; 
i;.Q'l!a:PEI S&V9ral men fleeing dow~ alley 
~ 
The first shot 
,., 
-
was wild and high and scattered the crowd standing 
at the face of the alley. ~ appeared, however, to 
take more deliberate aim before the second shot and 
hit one of the men in the crow~n the back of the 
head and neck as he ran down the alley. That man was 
Leon Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whjether Liberty's shots hit 
anyone. One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial 
that he was standing several feet from Liberty and that 
he saw Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff 
stated that, although he could not see whether Chambers 
had a gun in his hand, he did see Chambers "break his 
arm down" shortly before the shots were fired. The 
officers who saw Chambers fall thought he was dead 
d rfu,..f'~ 
ti~either to examine 
.~~-~ 
aad no effort ~e a.t>:::::t;,flat: 
A 
to 
him or/search for the murder weapon. Instead they 
attended to ~AWQA Liberty, who was placed in the police 
+--~~ 
car and @a••~ to the hospital where he was declared 
.. ~J,;e/uvf 
dead on arrival. tl. ~~u-.J ~ (,e,._ 
)v Jv, !;u <- _/ f pifwt 1 ~ j, I r< , ;:11 -~./, 
Shortly after the shooting three of Chambers' ~· (l'tiZ . 
' 
friends discovered that he was not yet dead. James 
_]_/ 
Williams, Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded 
--4--
.,. • ,. •• fUlt:..J. 
him into a car and~ him to the same hospital. Later 
~~ 
that night)~ County Sheriff discovered that Chambers 
was still alive ~~ a guard~d outside his room. 
i\ 
Chambers 
Ml was subsequently charged with the capital offense of 
murdering~ Liberty. He pleaded not guilty and has 
asserted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with 
the story of another man, Gable McDonald. McDonald, 
a lifelong resident of Woodville, was in the crowd on 
s ... ..JA.·~~~ 
the e11ening of Liberty's death. ~loaO't 1 JI thereafter;., t , 
he left his wife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
,.,wJ.. 
and found a job at a sugar~lAR" In November of 1 
that same year he returned to Woodville when his wife 
informed him that an acquaintance of his, known as 
Reverend Stokes, wanted to see him. Stokes owned a 
gas station in N@atchez, Mississippi, several miles 




McDona d  
tzp the~ to see him. After talking to Stokes, Me-
Donald agreed to make a statement to Chambers' 
. ~  
attorneys,wh~~ uLfice~ in Natchez. Two days later he 
appeared at the attorneys' offices and gave a sworn 
confession that he ......_ shot Officer Liberty. He ~ 
t J. e, h~ tdu~-4 ~ 'J 
slated tha~friend of his, James Williams, ••5&?~ 
--5--
that he shot Liberty. He said that he used his own 
* pistol, a 9-sho~22-caliber revolver, which he had 
discarded shortly after the shooting. In response 
to questions from Chambers' attorneys, McDonald 
affirmed that his confession was voluntary and that 
no one had compelled him to come to them. Once 
h~ 
the confession ~ been transcribed,jj signed, and 
witnessed, McDonald was taken over to the local police 
authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, Me~ 
A-<.<Utt'' 
Donald repudiated his prior/ confession. He testified 
that Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot 
Liberty. He claimed that Stokes had promised ·~ that 
he would not go to jail and that he would share in the 
proceeds of a lawsuit that Chambers would 
• 
~ .... "}) 1. 
t:i~ against 
the town of Woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald 
swore that he had not been on the scene when Liberty 
was shot but had been down the street drinking beer in 
..,.J..T~ 
a cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When heard 
J.,..,.. /.t_{ 1, _,I I J,:l 
the shooting~ walked up the street and found Chambersj ly:» 
in the alley. He >.aRd Turner and Williams 1Jie l~tea 
-'h<.~~~ 




he did not know what had happened, that there was no discussion about 
the shooting either going to or coming back from the hospital, and that 
it was not until the next day that he learned that Chambers had been 
felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addition, McDonald 
stated that while he once owned a ~22 -caliber pistol he had lost it many 
months before the shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at 
that time. The local justice of the peace accepted~ McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local authorities 
undertook no further investigation of his possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the next year.V 
At trial he endeavored to develop two grounds of defense. He first 
attempted to show that he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer 
testified that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although three 
officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified that they assumed he 
was shooting his attacker, none of them examined Chambers to see 
whether he was still alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no 
weapon was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a . 22-caliber pistol. One witness 
- 7 -
testified that he was standing in the street near where Liberty was 
.s hot, that he was looking at Chambers when the shooting began, and 
that he was sure that Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald had 
shot Officer Liberty. He was only partially successful, however, in 
his efforts to bring the facts surrounding this defense to the jury's 
attention. ~fl ~ Samuel Hardin, a lifelong friend of McDonald's ) 
testified that he saw McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness -
one of Liberty's cousins - testified that he saw McDonald immediately 
after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. In addition to the testimony 
of these two witnesses, Chambers' primary goal was to show the jury 
that McDonald had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers 
attempted to prove that McDonald admitted responsibility for the 
murder on four separate occasions, once when he gave the sworn 
statement to Chambers' counsel and three other times prior to that 
occasion in private conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted tn his attempt to~ 
A. 
~~ 
this portion of his defense by the stFiek application of certain Mississippi 
- 8 -
RXERRH evidence rules. Chambers~ asserts in this Court, 
as he did unsuccessfully in his motion for new trial and on appeal 
to the State Supreme Court, that taken togetheT the application 
of these evidentiary rules -~ rendered his trial fundamentally 
~ 
unfair and deprived him of due process of law. Yndo:P the FOYrte~mth 
-~ ~~) ~ 
....-:2\.meHdm:ent. It is necessar~ \to examine carefully the e-Eitieal 
rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought a ruling 
that, if the State chose not to call McDonald itself, he be allowed 
to call him as an adverse witness. Attached to the motion were 
L 
copies of McDonald's sworn confession and of the transcript of 
his preliminary hearing at which he repudiated that confession. 
The trial court granted the motion requiring McDonald to appear 
---1-o ~ VL£_.c..~.&_ tt/lA. 
) ~~Huz_s~~~f\ tw... 
but reserved ruling on the adverse witness motion. At tria 4-Jftu...J../ 
~ ().JjJ c ht - If. !1, J ) 
~ 
Chambers laid a predicate for the introduction of~ sworn out-of-court 
-9-
confession, had it admitted into evidence, and read it to the jury. 
The S1ate, upon cross-examination, elicited from McDonald the fact 
that he had rejected his prior confession. McDonald further testified, 
as he had at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise of Reverend 
Stokes that he would not go to jail and kH would share in a sizable 
tort recovery from the town. He also retold his own story of his 
actions on the evening of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe 
down the street, his absence from the scene during the critical IE riod, 
and his subsequent trip to the hospital with Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, Chambers 
renewed his motion to examine McDonald as an adverse witness. The 
~ ~ 
trial court denied the motion, stating: "He may be hostile, but~ is 
" 
not adverse in the sense of the word, so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal the State Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling, 
finding that "McDonald's testimony was not adverse to appellant" because 
"f!!lowhere did he point the finger at Chambers." 252 So.2~at 2 "l0. 
-10-
Defeated in his attempt to chall 
that he shot the officer. The first of these, Samuel Hardin, would 
have testified that, on the night of the shooting, he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after their return 
from the hospital and that while driving McDonald home later that 
night, McDonald stated that he shot Liberty. The State objected 
to the admission of this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. 
The trial court sustained the objection. alf 
Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald had said he 
was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, also was called to 
testify. In the jury's presence, and without objection, he testified 
had 
that he had not been in the cafe that Saturday and had not/any beers 
with McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence of the 
jury, Turner recounted his conversations with McDonald while they 
were riding with James Williams to take ~ Chambers to the hospital. 
When asked whether McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
-ll-
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him that he "shot 
him." Turner further stated that one week later, when he met McDonald 
at a friend's house, McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation 
and urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued to the court 
that, especially where there was other proof in the case that was corro-
borative of these out-of-court statements, ~eBal4'-s-seY-4BeP:iiJHlQ-Hoflg 
PeRlQ-:Piffi Turner's testimony regarding McDonald's self-incriminating 
remarks should have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Again,~ the trial court sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's neighbor. 
They had been friends for about 25 years. Although Carter had not 
~ ~ 
been in Woodville on the evening of the shooting, hejlearned about it 
the next morning from McDonald. That same day he and McDonald 
walked out to a well near McDonald's house and there McDonald told 
him that he was the one who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified 
that McDonald also told him that he had disposed of the . 22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that several weeks after 
the shooting he accompanied McDonald to Natchez where McDonald 
~ .s 
purchased another . 22}to replace the one he had discarded.'4.. The jury 
-12-
was not allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged that 
these statements were admissible, the State objected, and the court 
~ 
sustained the objection.~ On appeal the State Supreme 
--12-lfv) 
Court approved the lower court's ldlldgl exclusion 
of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay grounds. 
252 So.2~at ')1-V, 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. 
As a consequence of the combination of Mississippi's ~ 
~:~ ~-~ 
'Ahea~say : ule1 ":_~'party witness" or "voucher• ) 
~-was ~nable either to cross-examine McDonald 
or to present witnesses in his own behalf who would 
have dylcredited McDonald's repudiation and demon-
strated his complicity. Chambers had, however, 
chipped away at the fringes of McDonald's story by 
fwwt~~~ 
introducing admissible tlestimony\that he had not 
been seen in the cafe where he says he was when the 
shooting started, that he had not been having beer 
with~ Turner, and that he~2 pistol 
at the time of the crime. But what remained was a 
single confession and an arguably acceptable renun-
t 
ciation. It was far less perslauasive than Chambers' 
-.......) 
t.. 
defnse might have been had he been given an opportunity 
I 
~-~~ 
to subject McDonald's stateme~s toJ cloeer ser~tiny 
or had the other confessions been introduced. 
III 
in a criminal trial 
The right of an accused/to due process is, in 
~-
-13-
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the §.tate's 
accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to 
call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential 
to !1M due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in In re 
~t...h 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), identified these as among the minimum 
1\ 
essentials ~ a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against 
him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense - a right 
to his day in court - are basic to our system of jurisprudence; 
and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine 
the witnesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be re-
presented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 40 l_u.s. 'iJ/ (1972); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 4ll, 428-29 (1969); Spechtv. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both 
of those elements of a fair trial are implicated in the present case. 
A~ 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject McDonald's damning 
repudif ation and alibi to cross-examination. He was not allowed to test 
the witness,S recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to "sift" 
his conscience so that the jury might judge for itself whether McDonald's 
-14-
testimony was worthy of belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
242-243 (1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable 
rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of 
confrontation, and helps assure the "accuracy of the truth-determining 
process." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, _fi_(l970). It is, indeed, 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which 
is this c ountryr s constitutional goal." Pointer v. Texas , 3 80 U.S. 400, 
405 (1965). Of course, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not 
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other 
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. ~ E.g., Mancusi 
v. Stubbs, ~ 0 J U.S. vO ~ (1972). But its denial or significant diminution 
calls into question the ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and 
requires that the competing interest be closely examined. Berger v. 
California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's request to cross-examine McDonald was 
denied on the basis of a Mississippi common law rule that a party may not 
impeach his own witness. The rule rests on the presumption- without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case - that a party who calls 
-15-
a witness "vouches for his credibility." Clark v. Lansford, 191 S. 2d 123, 
125 (Miss. 1966). Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive English trial 
practice in which "oath-takers" or "compurgators" were called to stand 
behind a particular party's position in any controversy. Their assertions 
were strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal trials today, 
their role bore little relation to the impartial ascertainment of the facts. "Q::. 7 
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once enjoyed, and 
apart from whatever usefulness it retains today :kr:lOCx in the civil trial 
process, it bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal 
process. Criminal defendants do not select their witnesses; they must 
take them where they find them. I 
7 
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Moreover, the rule has been condemned as archiac, irrational, 
and potentially destructive of the truth-gathering process. It 
recently has been rejected altogether by the new Rules of Evidence ,. 
applicable in all federal courts. As applied in this case, the 
"voucher" rule's impact was doubly harmful to Chambers' efforts 
to develop his defense. Not only was he precluded from cross-
examining McDonald, but, as the state conceded at oral argument, 
10 • 
he was also restricted in the scope of his~ direct examination 
by the "voucher" rule's corollary requirement that the examiner 
t 
~ bound by anything the witness might say. He was, therefore, 
effectively prevented from exploring the circumstances of McDonald's 
three prior oral confessions and from challenging the renunciation 
of the written confession. 
Mississippi does not go so far as to contend that its rule 
should override the accused's right of confrontation. Instead, it 
argues that there is no imcompatibility between its rule and 
Chamber's rights because no right of confrontation exists unless 
- 17 -
the testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The State's 
brief in this Court asserts, therefore, that the'right of confrontation 
I I 
¥1 
is limited to witnesses against the accused. " ~ Relying on 
the trial court's determination that McDonald was not "adverse", 
and on the State Supreme Court's holding that McDonald "did not 
ll-
ft 
point the finger at Chambers," the State contends that Chambers' 
constitutional right was not involved. 
The argument that McDonald's testimony was not "adverse" 
to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. The State's proof 
at trial excluded the theory that more than one person participated 
in the shooting of Liberty. To the extent that McDonald's sworn 
confession tended to incriminate him, it tended also to oomdln 
J 
exculpate Chambers. And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same extent 
that it exculpated.McDonald. In these circumstances, it can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seriously adverse 
to Chambers. The right to confront and cross-examine one who 
- 18 -
gives damaging testimony against an accused is a matter of substance, 
and does not turn on technicalities as to whether the witness was 
initially put on the stand by one party or the other. We conclude that 
the State'sX\XIJIX "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, impermissibly 
interfered with Chambers' constitutional rights. 
B 
Chambers' efforts to present to the jury the full picture of 
McDonald's possible responsibility for Liberty's murder was further 
l .._,'.J 
frustrated by the court's refusal to allow him to introduce the 
A 
testimony of Hardin, Turner and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on three separate 
occasions shortly after the crime, implicating himself as the 
murderer. The State Supreme Court approved the exclusion of 
th:E evidence on the ground that it was hearsay. The hearsay rule 
is normally respected. It is a rule based on long experience and 
~th:~ttr; 
grounded in the notion that lolRr9Ual;)l~ evidence should not be 
presented to the triers of fact. L 7 
14'/ -.-
r Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because 
~ 
they lack theJ indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under 
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the 
solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to 
cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor 
and credibility may be assessed by the jury. California v. Green, 
399 u.s. 149, 158 (1970). 
A number of exceptions have been developed over the years 
to allow admission of hearsay statements made under circumstances -
that tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for the absence 
of the oath and opportunity for ~ cross-examination. Among 
KY 
the most prevalent exceptions are declarations against interest. 
1 
A founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate 
a statement against his own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi 
recognizes that exception but applies it only to declarations against 
I.Sg 
pecuniary interest. It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case, that are against the 
penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 




Prior to the changes accomplished by the new federal Rules 
'" = ~ 
of Evidence, declarations rgaindx against ~penal interest 
were normally excluded in federal courts under the authority of 
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 272-73 (1913). The 
exclusion was premised on the belief that confessions of criminal 
activity might be motivated by numerous extraneous considerations 
and, therefore, are not inherently as reliable as statements against 
pecuniary or proprietary interest. While that rationale has been 
I] 
t15 
the subject to scholarly criticism, we need not decide in this 
case whether, under other circumstances, it might serve some 
valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony. 
Each of the hearsay statements involved in this case 
was originally made and subsequently offered at :K trial under 
circumstances that attested to its reliability. First, each of 
McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously to a close 
acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second, each 
one was corroborated by some other evidence in the case -
McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness, and 
1,/ -.-
other testimony consistent with his statement, including prior 
ownership of a . 22 -caliber revolver and his subsequent purchase 
of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions 
provided additional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may 
I 
be the parameters of the penal-interest rationale, each confession 
here was in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably 
against interest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 473, 484 
(1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). McDonald stood 
to benefit nothing by disclosing his role in the shooting to any of his 
three friends and he must have been aware of the possibility that 
disclosure would lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner "not to 
mess him up. " Finally, if there was any question about the truth-
fulness of the extrajudicial statement~ McDonald was present in 
the courtroom and had been under oath. He could have been cross-
and his 
examined by the State,/ J.Dix demeanor and responses weighed by 
; 
the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The 
;" 
availability of McDonald significantly distinguishes this case from 
the prior Mississippi:~ precedent, Brown v. State, supra, and from 
Donnelly, since in both cases the declarant was unavailable at the 
,q 
time of trial. 
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused 
to present witnesses in his own defense. ~· ~·, Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); In re Oliver, supra. In the exercise 
of this right
1
the accused, as is required of the ~tate, must comply 
with established rules of procedure and evidence which are designed 
to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
........ 
and innocence. Although per.haps no rule of evidence has been 
~ 
more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that 
bave· lOBg enist-ed aBQ..ofteft 8:7' tailored to allow the introduction 
k fl.. 
of evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthJJ\ Recognition 
that the hearsay rule ~a .not be applied mechanistically to 
defeat the ends of justice is especially appropriate in this case. 
-,.:J 
- Ill -
L -F6I the I ettsen~ ~tateswaoeev~ he testimony rejected by the 
I 
trial court as to McDonald's several confessions bore~ i,BQi9:ift::,. 
(IA4IA .(..lA 
" 
of trustworthiness. R ~"hetda h:ftvQ ]?eep admHt~. In ~ light 
of all the facts, no interest of the state in enforcing its hearsay 
rule could outweigh Chambers' right to present this evidence of 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the <X Fourteenth Amendment. 
We add that in reaching this judgment, and in setting aside Chambers' 
conviction, we invoke no new principles of law. Nor~ signal 
any dimunition in the respect traditionally accorded to the ~tates -
in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal 
trial rules and processes. Rather, we hold ~ quite simply 
that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. James-Williams was indicted along with Chambers. The 
State, however, failed to introduce any evidence at trial that could 
implicate Williams in the shooting. At the conclusion of the State's 
case ... in-chief the trial court granted a directed verdict in his favor. 
C~· 
2. Upon petitionerts motion, a change of venue was granted and 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the east of Woodville. The 
change of trial setting was in response to petitioner's claim that, 
because of adverse publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
and sheriff's staffs in Woodville, he could not obtain a fair and impartial 
trial there . 
t ~'s-
-2ij.. On the record in this case, it is clear that pQtition9-l'' s asserted 
denial of due process is properly before us. He objected during trial 
to each of the court's rulings. As to the confrontation claim, petitioner 
asserte,his right to treat McDonald as an adverse~th b~ 
e ng tr~His motion for new trial, filed after the jury's ver-
dict, listed as error the trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination 
of McDonald and the exclusion of evidence corroborative of McDonald's 
~~~ 
guilt., aftd~concluded that the trial "was not in accord with fundamental 
fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." 
-2-
~ 
~reasserted those .s:a:me claims on appeal to the State Supreme 
A. 
Court. After the affirmance of his conviction by that Court, ~ 
~ 
Hef:ter filed a petition for rehearing addressed almost entirely to the 
-\ 
claim that his trial had not been conducted in a manner consistent 
with traditional notions of due process. The State Supreme Court 
~) 
raised no question that petitione~ claims were not properly asserted, 
w ~~ 
and no claim ~s made here that thlA ease~WftoS not properly reviewable 
by this Court. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1969); 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420-23 (1965). 
. Hardin's testimony, unlike the testimony of the other two men 
who stated that McDonald had confessed to them, was actually given 
in the jury's presence. After the State's objection to Hardin's account 
of McDonald's statement was sustained, the trial court ordered the 
jury to disregard it . 
..s 
'4.. A gun dealer from Natchez testified that McDonald had made 
two purchases. The witness!, business records indicated that McDonald 
purchased a 9-shot 22 caliber revolver about a year prior to the murder. 
He purchased a different style . 22 three weeks after Liberty's death. 
\\ 
,. It is not entirely clear whether the trial court's ruling was 
-3-
premised on the same hearsay rationale underlying the exclusion 
of the other testimony. In this instance the State argued that 
Carter's testimony was an impermissible attempt by petitioner to 
impeach a witness (McDonald) who was not adverse to him. The 
trial court did not state why it was excluding the evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hearsay. 
252 So. 2~t ).10 . 
1 
-&;. 3A. J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 896, at 658-61 (Chadbourn ed. 
1970); C. McCormick, Evidence ~ 38, at 75-78 (1972). 
~. C. McCormick, Evidence ~ 38, at 75-78 (1972); E. Morgan, 
Basic Problems of Evidence 70-71 (1962); 3A. J. Wigmore, Evidence 
~ 898, at 661 (Chadbourn ed. 1970). 
'\ n 
~. Rule 607, Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts /1 
(approved Nov 1-0 , 1972). 
,o 
' • Tr ./<-= ral ~rg ~at 3 (g 
, , 
,, 
Ill. Respondent's brief at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
-4-
/1. 
Jl/.. 2 52 So. 2c}?¥J.t 2 Z() . 
L..J 
;.. See Donnelley v. United States , 228 U.S. 243, 272 (1913). 
,q 
;!. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest, 58 Harv. L.Rev. l (1944). 
lS 
.lJ . H. McElroy, Mississippi Evidence § 46 (1955). 
lb ~ t 
.fi. Rule 804, Rules of Evidence for the United States Court~_.( approved 
Nov. 7,/J , 1972). 
17 
~. See . e.g. , Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 804, Rules of Evidence 
J b-
for the United States Courts (approved Nov. ZO , 1972); 5. J. Wigmore, "' -
Evidence ~ l47%at 284 (3d ed. 1940); Wright, Uniform Rules of Hearsay, 
, 
t e. 
26 U. C~nn. L. Rv. 575 (1957); United States v. Annunziato , 293 F. 2d 373, 
~ 
378 (2d Or.), cert. del}ie_sJ, 368 U.S. 919 (l96l)(Friendly, J.); Scolair v. c r--.,. 
United States, 406 F. 2d 563, 564 (9th Cir.), C!3rt. denied, 395 U.S. 981 
"' ::;:u c;;p so 
(1969). 
. The Mississippi case which refused to adopt a hearsay exception 
I 
for declarations against penal interest concerned an out-of-court declarant 
who purportedly stated that he had committed the murder with which his 
• • •• 1'! 
-5-
brother had been charged. The Mississippi Supreme Court believed 
that the declarant may have been motivated by a desire to free his 
brother rather than by any compulsion of guilt. The Court also noted 
that the declarant had fled, was unavailable for cross-examination, and 
may well have known at the time he made the statement that he would not 
"" 55 suffer for it. Broljn v. State, 99 Miss. 719, '6§ So. 961 (l9ll). There is, 
in the present case, no such basis for doubting McDonald's statements. 
11 
1J. McDonald's presence also deprives the State's argument for re-
tention of the penal-interest rule of much of its force. In claiming that 
"[tl o change the rule would work a travesty of justice," the State posited 
the following hypothetical: 
"If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the 
crime; B could tell C and D that he committed the crime; 
B could go into hiding and at A's trial C and D would 
testify as to B' s admission of guilt; A could be acquitted 
and B would return to stand trial; B could then provide 
several witnesses to testify as to his whereabouts at the 
time of the crime. The testimony of those witnesses 
along with A's statement that he really committed the 
crime would result in B' s acquittal. A would be barred 
from further prosecution because of the protection against 
double jeopardy. No one could be convicted of perjury as 
A did not testify at ~ his first trial, B did not lie under 
oath, and C and D were truthful in their testimony." 
Respondent's brief, at 7 n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
/ 
Obviously, "B' s" absence at trial is critical to the success of the justice-
subverting ploy. 
Judges 
Res Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Chambers: I am 
disinclined to respond at all to his dissent. Our point 
is sufficiently made in the footnote to the opinion. The 
objections on state law grounds were made during trial 
and after the trial was over Petr raised his due process 
ground which, I think, fairly referred to the collective 
consequence of the trial court's rulings which depiived 
him of a fair chance to make out his defense. The trial 
court could not possibly have been unaware that the 
rub in the case was precisely the failure to allow him 
a meaningful chance to make a case. This is not the 
sort of error that can be made on constitutional grounds 
as each ruling is made. We have held only that the 
cumulative impact was a denial of due processs we have 
refrain~d from relying on any one point in the case. 
In addition, the claims were pressed on appeal, 
in the petn for eehearing, and the State has never 
raised an "independent and adequate state ground" 
claim in its response to the cert petn, in its brief, or 
at oral argument. While the basic point of WHR's dissent 
is accurate, I think we have demonstrated its inapplicability 
under the circumstances of this case. 
LAH 
Judges 
Re • Chambers 
Attached is a proposed third draft to go to the 
printer, it touches on two points• 
(1) Upon further consideration, it occurs to me 
that it might be wmrthwhile to respond to Justice 
Rehnquist by making our position a little clearer. 
Therefore, I suggest the rider attached to the footnote 
on page 6. I believe our position is sufficient without 
it but I would hate like the devil to lose any of the 
three outstanding votes because of the dissent. This 
added short discussion will help the und~cided Justices 
focus on our rationale and should persuade them that we 
are not taking anp "extraordinary" action. 
(2) With reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
() (L 
I have disctvdred that the procedure is a little un-
usual. When the rules were approved here they were 
(or will shortly be) transmitted to Congress pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. 3771. Then, automatically they will become 
effective on July 1, 1973. Congress need not take any 
action. Section 3771 gives the Supreme Court the power 
to promulgate rule and reserves for the Congress no 
veto, although, of course, Congress could always take 
away the power or write a statete that would supercede the 
SC rules. Charlie Wright confirms my reading of the 
statute. His work on the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states (vol 1., §§ 1 & 2) that the Supreme 
Court is the rulemaking authority and does not even mention 
any congressional role. The requirement of transmitting 
the rules to Congress appears to be only a reporting 
""'I .. 
--2--
function and little more. Therefore. I think the 
referecnes on pages 12 and 15 are proper as I have 
amended them. If you are still uncer~~in you might 
ask Justice Brennan at lunch some day about it. There 
I 
may be a nonstatutory practice that has developed that 
we do not know about. 
LAH 
/ 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Just1ce Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
~· Justice Blackmun Mr. Justice Powell 
1st DRAFT From· Rehnquist, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~'I~ lated: _ _;__b /yJ _ 
~0. 71-5908 Recirculated: 
Leon Chambers. Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
[January -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Were I to reach the merits in this case, I "·ould have 
considerable difficulty in subscribing to the Court's 
further constitutionalization of the intricacies of the 
common law of evidence. I do not reach the merits. 
since I conclude that petitioner failed to properly raise 
in the Mississi) )i courts the constitutional issue whi~h 
he seeks to 1a ve this ourt decide. 
28 U. S. C. § 1257 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the high-
est court of a State in which a decision could be 
had, may be revie,ved by the Supreme Court as 
follows: 
"(3) By writ of certiorari, where any title, 
right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or 
claimed under the Constitution, treaties or sta.tutes 
of, or commission held or authority exercised under, 
the United States." 
We deal here with a limitation imposed by CongreAs 
upon this Court's authorit to review ·udO'I 
state cour s. Is a Jr:WWrij st jqnr l WJ?He'iil) Cardinale v. 
LoU1'.siana, 394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969), which has always 
been interpreted with careful regard for the delicate 
-------
71-5908-DISSENT 
2 CH. \?IIBEHS v. MISSISSI PI 'I 
nature of the authority conferred upon this Court to 
review the judgments of state courts of last resort: 
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). citecl by 
the Court in its n. 3. the following language from the 
earlier case of Netu York ex 1·el. Bryant v. Zim.merman, 
278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928), was quoted: 
t 1e state court wjth fair prcqjBjQ') and in due time." 
394 U. S., at 584 (emphasis added). 
The uestion of whether a constitutional issue has been 
raised in cue nne in the state courts is one genera 
eft to state procgclurg, su Ject to t 1e important con 1t10n 
that the state procedure give no indication "that there 
was an attempt on the part of the state court to evade 
the decision of Federal questions, duly set up, by un-
warranted resort to alleged rules unclet· local practice." 
Louisville & 1\Tashville R. Co, v. Woodford, 234 U. S, 
46, 51 (1914). More recently the Court has stated in 
Hemu y. 11Ji,ssis.sippi 379 U, S. 443, 447 (1965) that: 
• 
"These cases settle the proposition that a litigant's 
procedural defaults in state proceedings do not pre-
vent vindication of his federal rights unless t];_~ 
FState's insistence on compliance \\'ith its procedural. 
rule servos a legitimate state interest." 
/ 
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Since the Court in H emy '"as dealing with a rule of 
trial procedure from the State of Mississippi, its a11alysis 
in that case is particularly helpful in deciding this one. 
It was conceded by all parties there that the Mississippi 
rules required contem Joraneous objection to evidentiary 
cylings, and this ourt commente : 
"The Mississippi wle . . . clearly does serve a 
legitimate state interest. By immediately appris-
ing the trial judge of the objection, counsel gives 
the court the opportunity to conduct the trial with-
out using the tainted evidence. If the objection 
is well taken the fruits of the illegal search may 
be excluded from jury consideration. and a reversal 
and new trial avoided." 379 U. S., at 448. 
In that case. the petitioner had made his motion to 
exclude the evidence at the close of the State's case, and 
this Court observed that a rulin& on the motiOn at that 
point would ver likely have Jrevented the ossibility 
o reversal and new trw · ust as surel 
mo 1 n made contcm Jora"'n11e•o•u•sPiliiiiiilli!iil'llljijiillli-.!liiiiiilllli•ljiipll._e 
evidence. 
Here. however, the record of the state proceedings 
shows that the first occasion on which petitioner's coun-
sel even hinted his previous evidentiary ob · ec ion 
1ac a constitutional bas1s was a . e nne he filed a 
motiOn for new trial. '13"y delaying his constitutional-
contention until after the evidence was in and the jury 
had retired and returned a verdict of guilty against him, 
petitioner denied the trial court an opportunity to re- \\ 
consider his evid£~ti~!,l rulin~,.i!l_the liSjht...cl_ th~ czn-
stitutional Q~~n. While this Court in Henry ex---pressed doubt as to the adequacy for federal purposes 
of Mississippi's differing treatment of a motion to exclude 
at the close of the State's case and an objection made 
contem.poraneously with the offer of the evidence, there 
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can be no doubt that the policy supporting Mississippi's J 
requirement of contemporaneous objection c~;,pot be 
equally well served b a motion for new trial followin 
1e rene ition of the jury's verdict. 
1 
It is perfectly true. as the Court states in n. 3 of 
its opinion, that petitioner "objected durin0 trial J2 
each of the court's rulin0s." But this is only half the 
test; the ljt jga pt §Pcl' illll t g h wg 9 dccisiOP berg op a 
constitutional claim must not only object or otherwise 
advise the lower court of ius cia1m that a ru fwg IS error, 
5ut he must make it clear that his claim of error is 
con.stduhonall~ ~rounded . In Bailey v. Anderson' 326 
0. §. 263 ( 19 5 . the peti tioner argued in this Court 
that a state court condemnation award which failed to 
include interest from the elate of possession denied him 
just compensation in violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court noted that 
in the state circuit court petitioner had requested that 
the award iuclude interest from the date of taking, and 
that the circuit court without explanation had rejected 
this claim. But this Court went on to say: 
Neither the majority Dor the dissenting opiniolls of the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi contains one syllable that 
/. 
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refers expressly or by implication to any claim based 
on the Constitution of the United States. Those opinions 
did of course treat the evidentiary objections and proffers 
which this Court now holds to be of constitutional di-
mension, but it passed on them in terms of nonconstitu-
tional evidentiary questions which are one of the staples 
of the business of appellate courts which regularly review 
claims of error in the conduct of trial. Since Mississippi 
re uires contem o · ction to evidentiar rul-
mgs unng t 1e trial , it would have been entirely proper 
for the Supreme Court of Mississippi to conclude that 
even though petitioner mi ht have asserted constitutional 
claims in his brief there, t 1ey too ate 
to reguire considerp.tjgp by jt 
l'lus Court said m Street v. New Y ark: 
"Moreover, this Court has stated that when, as 
here, the highest state court has failed to pass upon 
a federal question, it will be assumed that the omis-
sion was due to want of proper presentation in the 
state courts, unless the aggrieved party in this Court ) 
can affirmatively show on the contrary. ;; §!54 d. §. 
'576, 582. 
If, by some xtraordinaril . lenient construction of the 
decisional reqmre at the constitutional claim be 
made "in due time" in the state , the mak-
ing of sue a claim or t e rst time in a motion for 
a new trial were deemed timely, it is stil(::!Xtraor?!nargy 2::) 
doubtful that this petitioner adequately raised any con-
stitutional claims in his motion for new trial. That 
motion consisted of the following pertinent points: 
"3rd, the Court erred in refusing to declare 
Gable McDonald a hostile and adverse witness and 
permitting the Defendant to propound leading ques-
tions as on cross-examination. 
"4th, the Court erred in refusing to permit the 
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admission of Gable McDonald admitting the killing 
of Aaron Liberty. 
"6th. the trial of the Defendant was not in ac-
cord with fundamental fairness guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States and Article Three, Sections Fourteen 
and Twenty-Six of the Constitution of the State 
of Mississippi." 
judge w o could glean rom 1 lOll t Hl 1e sepa-
Thtely stated third and fourth points, dealing as they 
clo in customary terms of claims of trial error in the 
exclusion or admission of evidence. were in tended to be 
bolstered by the generalized assertion of the violation 
of due process contained in a separately stated point. 
The contention of the sixth point, standing by itf'elf, that 
"the trial of the Defendant was not in accord with funda-
mental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States" directs 
the trial court to no particular ruling or decision which 
he may have made during the trial; it is a bald asser-
tion that the tria 1 from be innin to end was somehm 
un amen a !Y un air. 1 ven the most lenient construc-
tion of that part of 28 U. S. C. ~ 1257 '"hich requires 
that the "title, right, privilege or immunity" be "spe-
cially set up or claimed" could not aid petitioner in his 
claim that this point properly raised a federal constitu-
tional issue. 
This Court under the Constitution has thecextii? 
~elicate but equally necessary authority to 
review judgments of state courts of last resort on isslles 
\Yhich turn on construction of the United States Consti-
tution or feclcral la\L But before we undertake to tell a 
state court of last resort that its judgment is inconsistent 
/ 
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with the mandate of the Constitution, it behooves us 
to make certain that in doing so we adhere to the 
congressional mandate which limits our jurisdiction. 
Believing as I do that petitioner has not complied with 
28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3), I would dismiss the writ of 
certiorari. 
/ 
Memo to: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F . Powell, Jr . January 2, 1973 
No. 71-5908 Chambers v. Mississippi 
Justice Marshall has just advised me orally that he is 
joining us in Chambers. This gives us a court. 
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January 3, 1973 
Re: Chambers v. Mississippi - No. 71-5908 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
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Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
r.January -, 1973] 
Mn. Jcs'l'lCI~ PowELL delivered the opuuon of the 
Court. 
Petitioner. Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonment and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 ( 1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court. petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Jmtice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order \Vas reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405 
U. S. 987 ( 1972), to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. \Ve conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for 
murder occurred in the small town of "'Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attempt to handcuff Jackson ·was frustrated "·hen 20 
or 25 men in the crmvcl intervened and wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Three deputy sheriffs arrived shortly there-
after and the officers again attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more. the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots '"ere fired. Forman was looking in a different 
direction when the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gun into an alley in the area from 
"·hich the shots appeared to have come. The first shot 
was wild and high and scattered the crowd standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot and hit one 
of the men in the crowd in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran down the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman cou lcl not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he •vas 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not see \Yhether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he did sec Chambers "break his arm 
down" shortly before the shots were fired. The officers 
who saw Chambers fall testified that they thought he-
was dead but they macle no effort at that time either to 
examine him or to search for the murder weapon. In-
stead they attended to Liberty, who was placed in the 
police car and taken to the hospital \Yhere he was declared 
dcacl on arrival. A subsequent autopsy showed that he 
had been hit with four bullets from a .22-caliLer revolver. 
/ 
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Shortly after the ~:'hooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he was 11ot yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
a car and transported him to tho same hospital. Later 
that night. "·hen the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers was still alive a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers \\'aS subsequently charged with 
Liberty's murder. He pleaded not guilty and has as-
serted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of a11other man, Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of 'Voodville, was in the crowd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day, he left his '"ife in Woodville ancl moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In N'ovember of that 
same year he returned to Woocl ville when his wife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his, knom1 as Rev-
erend Stokes. wanted to see him. Stokes O\Yned a gas 
station in Natchez, :Mississippi, several miles north of 
·woodville and, upon his return, McDonald \Vent to see 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, who maintained 
offices in Natchez. Two days later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his, James Williams, that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his own pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caJiber revolver, which he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession was 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed,. 
1 .Lull('~ 'YilliamH wa~ indirtrd :1lonp; with Chambrr~. The State, 
ho\\'f'l·rr, fail Pel to int roducr ,ut~· r1·idcmr at trial that c•ot!ld implirat0 
'rilliant~ in the 'Jhootin~. At the eonclu~ion of t hr St atr'~ casc-in-
ehit>f the trial court p;r:mtrd a dirrctrd \'rrdirl in his fayor. 
/ 
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signed, and witnessed, McDonald was turned over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of \Voodville. On examination by his 011·n attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had happened. that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year. 2 At trial he endeavored to develop two 
"Upon Chambers' motion, a change of venue was gr:ll1trd and / 
t hr trial was held in Amite County, to the ra~t of Woockillc. The 
change of trial srtting was in rc~pon~e to petitioner's claim that, 
bccau,;c of adverse publicity and the ho~tile attitude of thr polie<' 
::nd ~heriiT's stuffs in Woodville, he could not obtain a fair aud 
impartial trial there. 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he did uot shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no weapon 
was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he was standing in the street near 
where Liberty was shot. that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring before the jury 
the testimony supporting this defense. Sam Hardin, a 
lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that he saw 
McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness, one of 
Liberty's cousiilS, testified that he saw McDonald im-
mediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these t>YO witnesses, 
Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald 
had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers at-
tempted to prove that McDonald had admitted respon-
sibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once 
when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' counsel 
and three other times prior to that occasion in private 
conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to· 
present this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fund amen tally unfair and deprived him 
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of due process of la '"·'l It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the triaL 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought 
3 On the record in this rase, it i~ rlcar that Chamber;;' a:;;~rrted 
clrninl of clur procps:;; is proprrl~· before u". He ob,iectrd clming 
trial to each of the court's ruling~. As to the confrontation claim, 
petitionrr asserted. both before and during trial, his right to treat 
:\1eDonald as an adver~e witnr~s. His mot ion for new trial, filed 
after the jury'~ verdict , Jistrcl as error the trial court's rrfusnl to 
prrmit ero!'s-ex:J.tnination of McDonald and the exdu~ion of rYi-
drncr corrobornti\·e of McDonald's guilt. The motion eonrlmlrd 
tha.t thr tri::~l "\vas not in ::~crord with fund::~mental fnirnes~ gu:tr::ln-
tcrd b:v tlw Fourternth Amendmrnt of thr Constitution." Chnmhrr;; 
rr:1s~er1ed those d::~ims on appral to the State Suprrnw Comt. 
After the affirmance of his conviction h~· that romt. Chambers 
filrd a prtit ion for rrhrnring addressed nlmo~t entire!~.- to thr ria im 
thnt hi~ trial had not hrrn rondnrted in a mnnner romistrnt with 
1 raditional notions of due proce~s. Thr State SuprrmC' Court raif'C'cf 
nn quC'stion th:tt Ch:unbrrs' elnims WC'rC' not proprrl~· fiS"ertrd, :tnd 
no clain: hns. b?en. mnd~ h.\' t br Rtnt~in it~ rC'~ponsr to the pC'tition I 
for rc•rt10ran, 111 1ts bnrf on thC' ment~. or ::~t oral [lrgumC'nt-that 
the (jl!C'~tion~ :ur not propC'r!~· reYiewable b\· t hi8 Court. SeC' Street 
Y. New 1'nrk. 394 U. S. 57G, 5,Sl-!582 (19G9): Douglas v. Alabama, 
380 U. R. 415, 420-423 (19fi.5). 
Unlike' Jfenry v. Mississippi. :379 U. S. 443 (19fi5). this rflsC': 
dorR not im·o]YC' thC' ~t:ttC' proerdurnl rrquirC'nwnt of eontrmporanC'ous 
oujC'rtion to the admiscion of r\·iclrnre. Petitioner's contrntion, a~­
sNted bC'forC' the trial rourt on motion for nrw trial and 8Ub-
Rrqurntl~· brforr thr 1\fi~ . .:is~ippi SuprC'me Court. is that he wns 
drniC'd "funcl:Jmrntal fairnr~~ gnarantrrd b~· thr Fourtrc•nth Amrnd-
mrnt," af' a rrsult of sr\·rrnl e\·ident iar~· ruling~. I-Ii8 claim, thr 
substance of \\·hirh \\'C' nrcrpt in 1hi~ opinion. rrRt~ on thr rmnulntiYC' 
effC'et of tho~C' ruling~ in fru.-dr:tting hi~ rfforts to dr\·rlop an Pxrul-
pat 01·~· drfrnsr. A It hough hr objrrtC'cl to C':trh ruling incliYidunll~.- , 
prtitionC'r'~ ron~titutionnl rlaim-ba~C'cl n~ it i~ on thC' eumul:ttin• 
impart of thC' ruling~-rould not h:1w bC'en raisrd and rulC'd upon 
prior to the roncluRion of Chamhrr~' e\·iciC'nt iary prC'~entntion. Sinre 
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a ruling at that time that. if the State chose not to call 
McDonald itself, he be allowed to call him as an adverse 
witness. Attached to tho motion were copies of Mc-
Donald's sworn confession and of the transcript of his 
preliminary hearing at which he repudiated that con-
fession. The trial court granted the motion requiring 
McDonald to appear but reserved ruling on tho adverse 
witness motion. At trial after the State failed to put 
McDonald on the stand, Chambers called McDonald, 
laid a predicate for the introduction of his sworn out-of-
court confession, had it admitted into evidence, and 
read it to the jury. The State, upon cross-examination, 
elicited from McDonald the fact that he had rejected his 
prior confession. McDonald further testified, as he had 
at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise 
of Reverend Stokes that he would not go to jail and 
would share in a sizable tort recovery from the town. 
He also retold his own story of his actions on the evening 
of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe down the 
street. his absence from the scene during the critical 
period, and his subsequent trip to tho hospital with 
Chambers. 
At tho conclusion of tho State's cross-examination, 
Chambers renewed his motion to examine McDonald as 
an adverse 'vitness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile, but he is not adverse in 
the sense of tho word, so your request will be overruled." 
On appeaL the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling. finding that "McDonald's testimony was 
not adverse to appellant" because "[n]owhere did he 
ns a basis for not rmchinp: the merit~ of petitioner's con8titutionnl \ 
claim. we hnYe no orcn~ion to cleciclc whether-if such n ground 
o:-;i~ts-it~ imposition in thi~ cnoc would scrvc any "Jcgitimntc state 
interest." !d., at 447. Undcr these circumstnnces , we cannot doubt 
the proprict~· of our c:-;crci~o of juri~diction . 
/ 
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point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2d., at 220. 
Defeated in his attempt to challenge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciation of his prior confession, Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three witnesses 
to whom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The first of these. Sam. Hardin, would have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting, he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at. a friend 's house after 
their return from the hospital and that. while driving 
McDonald home later that 11ight, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objected to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection.4 
Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
said he was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, 
was then called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers with 
McDonald. The jury \\·as then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they were riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner 's testimony as to McDonald's self-
1 Il:udin'R testimony, unlike the test imony of the other t ll'o men 
who stated t hat M cDonald hnd confc~scd to them, '"'I ~ ar tually 
given in the jury 's presence. After thr State ',; obj ection to Hardin'<> 
ac('OIIllt. of McDonald '::; stat ement was sustained, the Lri:tl courL 
onlrred thr jury to disregard it. 
/ 
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incriminating remarks should have been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well ncar McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one· 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded.G The jury was not 
allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.6 On appeal, 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
G A gun dealer from Natchez testified that McDonnld had made 
two purchases. The witness' business records indicatrd that 
McDonald purchased a nine-shot .22-calbier revolver about a year 
prior to the murder. He purchased a different style .22 thrrr wrrks 
after Liberty's death. 
nIt is not entirely clear whether the trial court's ruling \Yas 
11remi8ed on the same hearsay rationale undrrlying the oxdu~ion 
of the other testimony. In this instance the State argued that 
Carter's testiruony was an impermissible attempt by IWtitioncr to 
impeach a witncs:> (McDonald) who was not adYerse to him. Thr 
trial court did not state why it was excluding the eYidence but the 
Slate Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hear~ay . 
25:2 So. 2d, at 220. 
/ 
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"·itness" or "voucher'' rule and its hearsay rule, he was 
unable either to cross-examine :McDonald or to present 
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had, ho,Ycvcr, chipped a'i\·ay at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources indicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the 
crime. But all that remained from McDonald's own 
testimony was a single written confes~ion countered by an 
arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense 
was far less persuasive than it might have been had he 
bccn given an opportunity to subject McDonald's state-
ments to cross-examination or had the other confessions 
been admitted. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to clue 
process is, in essence, tl1c right to a fair opportunity to 
defend against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in olle's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to clue process. Mr. Justice Black. \\Titing for 
the Court in In re OlivPr. 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948). 
iclcnti:fiecl these rights as among the minimum eRsentiaJs 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a clwrge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense-a right to his day in court- arc basic 
to our system of jmiRprudencc; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the \Yit-
nesses against you. to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Br·pwer, 408 U. S. 471 (1072); 
Jenkins v. J.11cKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-420 (1969); 
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Specht v. PatlerSOII, 386 e. S. 605 (1067). Both of these 
elements of a fair trial arc implicated in the present case. 
A 
Chambers 'ms denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's damning repudiation and alibi to cross-
exam.ination. He was not allowed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
itself whether McDonald's testimony was worthy of 
belief. Maltox v. United States, 156 V. S. 237. 242-243 
( 1805). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation. and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1070). It is. indeed, 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. 1'e:ras, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965). Of course, 
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 303 U.S. 314 (1969). 
In this case. petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald "·as deni0cl on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may not impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lausford, 191 So. 2d 123, 125 (Miss. 1966) . 
.:\lthough the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
/ 
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purgators" were called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal process.8 It 
might have been logical for the early common law to 
require a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses 
he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having 
selected them especially for that purpose, the party might 
reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are 
rarely able to select their witnesses: they must take 
them where they find them. Moreover, as applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's 9 impact was doubly harm-
ful to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not 011ly 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,' 0 he 'vas also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the 
witness is bound by anything he might say. He \vas, 
7 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 896, at 658-661 (Chadbourn ed. 
1970); C. McCormick, EYidcnce § 38, at 75-78 (1972). 
8 The "voucher" rule ha~ been condemned as arrhai", irrational, 
nnd potentially de~tructivc of the truth gathering prorc.;8. C. Mc-
Cormick, Evidence§ 3R, at 75-78 (1972); E.l\Iorgan, Basir Problems 
of Evidence 70-71 (19li2); 3A .T. Wigmore, EYidence § 808, at 661 
(Chadbourn ed. 1970). 
9 The "voucher'' rulr ha~ been rejected altogether b~· the new 
Rules of Evidence that will ::~p]lly in all federal courts. Hule 607, 
Rules of Evidence for the United State~ Court~ and l\1agistratcs 
(approvcd Nov. 20, 1972 and to become effective July 1, 1973). 
409 U. S. - (1972). 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
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therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the ·written 
confession. 
In this Court Mississippi has not sought to defend 
the rule or explain its underlying rationale. Nor has 
it contended that its rule should override the accused's 
right of confrontation. Instead, it argues that there is 
no incompatability between the rule and Chambers' 
rights because no right of confrontation exists unless the 
testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The 
State's brief asserts that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
Chambers.' 3 And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. It can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seri-
ously adverse to Chambers. The availability of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been 
held to depend on whether the witness was initially put 
on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject 
11 RP~pondp n1. ':; Brief, a1. 9 (cmpha :sis ::;upplird) . 
1 ~ 252 So. 2d, a t 220. 
1 3 SPc Donnelly \" . United States, 228 U. S. 243, 272 (1013) . 
/ 
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the notion that a right of such substance in the crim-
inal process may be governed by that technicality or by 
any narrow and unrealistic definition of the "·ord 
"against." The "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, 
plainly interfered \Yith Chambers' right to defend against 
the State's charges. 
B 
\Ve need not decide, hovvever, whether this error alone 
\Yould occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed denial 
of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
\Yhen viewed in conjunction with the trial court's refusal 
to permit him to call other wit11esses. The trial court 
refused to allow him to introduce the testimony of 
Hardin, Turner, and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on 
three separate occasions shortly after the crime, naming 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it \Yas hearsay. 
The hearsay rule, \Yhich has long beC'n recognized and 
respected by virtually every State, is based on experience 
and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence 
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-
court statements are traditionally excluded because they 
lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they arc 
usually not made under oath or other circumstances that 
impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statement~'; 
the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; 
and he is not available in order that his dcm.eanor and 
credibility may be assessed by the jury. California v. 
Green, 309 U. S. 140. 158 ( 1970). A mnnber of excC'p-
tions have developed over the years to allow admis~ion 
of hearsay statements made under circumstances tha.t 
tend to assure reliability and therC'by compC'nsate for 
the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
examination. Among the most prevalent of those ox-
/ 
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ceptions is the one applicable to declarations against 
interest ''-an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his 
011·n interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizl's 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary interest.'" It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case, that are 
against the penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
Slnte, f)!! Miss. 710. 55 So. 961 (1011). 
This materialistic limitation on the declaration-against-
interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by 
most States in their criminal trial processes,''; although 
a number of States have discarded it.' 7 Prior to the 
changes to be accomplishC'd when the new Federal Rules 
of Evidence beceme effective.'R declarations against penal 
interest \Yere normally excluded in federal courts under 
the authority of Donnelly v. United Slates, 228 U. S. 
243, 272-273 (1913). Exclusion, "·here the limitation 
prevails, is usually premised on the view that admission 
would lead to the frequent presentation of perjured testi-
mony to the jury. It is believed that confessions of 
criminal activity arc ofte1t motivated by extraneous con-
siderations and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable 
as statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest. 
·while that rationale has been the subject of considerable 
11 .Trfirr~on. Derlaration8 Ap;ainl't Interr~1 , .'58 Han·. L. nrl". 1 
(19-!-1-). 
,., H. l.JcElro)·, :\Ti~,;i.~~ippi Eviclrnrr § -W (Hl55). 
'° C. l\IeCormid-:, E1·idrnrr § 27R, at 67:l (2d rd. 1972): 5 .T. 
lri~morr, .E1·idrner § 147G, at 28:3-287 n. 9 (1940). 
17 Srr, e. g., Peopll' v. Swigg.s, ;)(i Cal. Hplr. 841, :)1\9 P. 2d 377, 
GO Cal. 2d Roll (Hl64): People v. Lettl"ich. 41:3 Til. 172, lOS N. R 
2d 4SS (1952); Peoplr "· Bmll'n. 26 N.Y. 2d 88, 308 N.Y. S. 2cl 
82.'5, 257 N. E. 2d lG (Hli'O); !fines Y. Fi1'(Jinia, 1:36 \':1. 728, 117 
R. E. 84:~ ( 192:3). 
' " Hulr .SO+. Hulrs of E1·idrnrr for the Unilrd Statr~ Court:; and 
1\1a~istratr~ (appr01·rd NoY. 20, 1972, :.mel to bcromc r.ffrrtin~ 
July 1, 1973). 409 U.S.- (1972) . 
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scholarly criticif'tn,1" we need not decide in this case 
whether, under other circumstances. it might serve some 
valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony. 
The hearsay statements involved in this case \Yere 
originally made and subsequently offered at trial under 
circumstances that provided considerable assurance of 
their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions 
was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly 
after the murder had occurred. Second, each on<' was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the cnse-
McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eye-
witness to the shooting. the testimony that McDonald 
was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting. and 
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and 
subsequent purchase of a. new weapon. The sheer num-
ber of independent confessions provided additional cor-
roboration for each. Third, whatever may be the 
parameters of the penal-interest rationale."0 each 
confession here was in a very real sense self-incrim-
inatory and unquestionably against interest. See 
'"See, e. g., AdviRor~· Committre Kotes, Rule 80..J., TiulP~ of Evi-
drnrr for the Unitrd Rtatr~ Courts and l\Iagiotratrs (npprowd 
Nov. 20, 1972); 5 .T. 1\'if!:morr, Evidenrr § 147fi, a1 2/H (:3d ed. 
Hl40): Wright, Uniform Tiules of ITearsnv. 26 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 
,'575 (1957); United Stales v. Annunziato, 293 F. 2cl 373, 378 (CA2), 
rert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (10Gl) (Friendly, .T.); Scolair v. United 
States, 406 F. 2d 563, 561 (CAfl), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 981 (1969). 
~0 The Missis::;ippi rase which refusrd to ndopt ::1 he:tr~ay rxc<:'p-
tion for declarations ag:1 in~t penal intere~t concerned ::m out-of-
eourt declarant who pmportedl~· statrd that he had rommirtPd the 
mmdrr with which hi~ brothrr had bc>rn char~ecl. The l\Ii~~i~~ippi 
Suprrmc Court bdie,·ed tl1a1 the declarant ma~· luwe bcc>11 moti-
Yated bra cl<:';.;ire to free hi,; brother rather than b~· an~· compulsion 
of guilt. The Court nbo notrcl that the deelnrnnt had fled, was 
unanilahle for cro~s-exnmination, and may well han· knmYn at 
the time hr mack the ~tateme11t that lw would not ~11l'frr for it. 
B,·own \'. State, 99 1\Ti,;,;. 719, 5<') So. 961 (1911). There is, i11 the 
pre~ent rase, no surh b<tsi,; for doubti11g McDonald'~ ;.;tatements. 
/ 
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United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 473, 484 (1971); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). Mc-
Donald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed. after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner 
not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
tion about tho truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
(1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra, and from the Donnelly-type 
situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavail-
able at the time of trial. 21 
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., 
21 Mr Donald's 11resrnce al~o deprives tho State'~ argumrnt for 
retention of the penal-iutere~t rule of much of its force. In claiming 
that " ftlo change the rule would work a traw·sty of justire," the 
State posited thr following hypothetical: 
"If the rule wrrr changed, A could he rhargrd with thr crime; B 
could tell C and D that he committed the crime; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trinl C and D would testify as to B's admi~sion 
of guilt; A could be rtcquitted and B would rrt urn to stand trial; 
B could then provide several witnc~ses to cstif\ a;; to his whrn'<lbout::; 
aL the time of the crime. The testimony of tlw~r witnrssrs along 
with A's strttement that he rrally committed thr crimr woulcl rr~ult 
in B's acquittal. A would be barrrcl from fmthrr pro.'<reution 
hreausc of the protection ngainst donblr jropardy. Ko one could 
be convictrd of prrjury as A did noL tr:stify at his first trial, B did 
not lie undrr oath, and C and D \\·rrr tmthful in their tr,.;timon~· ." 
Tir,.;pondcnt's Brief, at i n. 3 (rmpha,.;i~ supplird). 
Ob1iouslr, ''B's" absrnce at trial j,.; eritical to tlw l:ntccr~,.; of the 
ju,.;ticc-RttlJI'C'l'ting ploy. 
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Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (19G7); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure 
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence 
has been more respected or more frequently applied in 
jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hear-
say, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of 
evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have 
long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
here bore persuasive assurances of trust"·orthiness and 
thus was 'vell \Yithin the basic rationale of the exception 
for declarations against interest. That testimony also 
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circum-
stances, " ·here constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule 
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice. 
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit 
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a 
trial in accord with traditional aml fundamental stand-
ards of the due process. In reaching this judgment we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor 
does our holding signal any dimunition in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment 
and implementation of their owll criminal trial rules and 
procedures. Rather, '"e hold quite simply that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Leon Chambers, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi . 
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l.ffintlftl'~ -, 1973] 
MR. J usTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisomncnt and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2cl .217 ( 1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two 'reeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order " ·as reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted , 405 
U. S. 987 (1972) , to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. \V e conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for 
murder occurred in the small town of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two \Voodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attempt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated \Yhen 20 
or 25 men in the crowd intervened and \nestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun. a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun. from 
the car. Three deputy sheriffs arrived shortly there-
after and the officers again attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more"t. the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots ,...-ere fired. Forman was looking in a different 
direction ·when the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty had bren shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned arouml and fired both 
barrels of his riot gun into an alley in the area from 
which the shots appeared to have come. The first shot 
was wild and high and scattered the cro\Yd standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot am! hit one 
of the men in the cro,,·d in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran down the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his va11tage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he was 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not see whether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he did sec Chambers "break his arm 
down" shortly before the shots "·ere fired. The officers 
"·ho saw Chambers fall testified that they thought he 
was dead but they made 110 effort at that time either to 
examine him or to search for the murder weapon. In-
stead they attended to Liberty, who "·as placed in the 
police car and taken to the hospital where he \Yas declared 
dead on arrival. A subsequent autopsy showed that he 




CHA!\IBERR v. MTRRlSSIPPI 3 
Shortly after the shooting. three of Chambers' friends 
di1'3covNecl that he vms not yet deacl. James \Villiams.1 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
a car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night, "·hen the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers "·as still aliv~ a guarcl was placed outside 
his room. Chambers wa
1
s suh:::equently charged with 
Liberty's murclcr. He pleaded not guilty and has as-
serted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined "·ith the 
story of another man, Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of \Yoodville. \YaS in the crmYd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
clay...,he left his wife in Woodvill<' and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In Xovember of that 
same year he returned to Woodville when his wife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his, knom1 as Rev-
C'rencl fltokes. "·anted to sec him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in Natchez. Mississippi, several miles north of 
Woodville'-' andt upon hi return~ McDonald \Yent to see 
him. .\.fter talking to Stokes. McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys. '"ho maintained 
offices in )Jatchez. Two days later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his. James Williams, that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his own pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolver, "·hich he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession was 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
'.Ltme~ lrillinm~ wa~ inclirtccl a!Olll!: \\'ith Chamber~. The State, 
f 
ho,w•wr·, f:1 ilc·cl to int rodurc .tny cvidcncr n t trial tJIM"t @~o~uld imt~ 
\Viii i:un~ i11 U1c ~hooting. At i he eo1wlu~ion of i hr Sl:tiP's ra~P-in­
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signC'~ and witnessed, McDonald was turned over to the 
local police authorities and \\"aS placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes hacl promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of ·woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by tho State, McDonald swore 
that he had not boon on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the ::tlley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to tho hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had happened. that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it ·was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not O\VD or possess a \veapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and tho local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year.~ At trial he endeavored to develop two 
"Upon Chambers' motion, a rhan11:e of venue m1s p;rantrd and 
t hr trial was hrld in Amite County, to the ra~t of vVood,·ille. The 
change of trial sct1 ing was in response to petitioner's claim that, 
lJc'c·au-;e of adverse publirit y and the ho~tile attitude of thr policP 
tlllu ~hcriff's staff::; in Woodville, he could not obtain n i':iir and 
impartial trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually savv Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no weapon 
was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he was standing in the street near 
where Liberty was shot. that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald. 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring before the jury 
the testimony supporting this defense. Sam Hardin, a 
lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that he saw 
McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness, one of 
Liberty's cousins, testified that he saw McDonald im-
mediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald 
had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers at-
tempted to prove that McDonald had admitted respon-
sibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once 
when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' counsel 
and three other times prior to that occasion in private 
conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to 
present this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
v. Mississippi, 379 u.s. 443 (1965), this 
His claim rests on the cumulative effect of those 
~ 
rulings in frustrating his efforts to develop ~ 
A 
!fiat olaim obviously gould 
culpatory defense • . l~l#li#ll#llllli~~ii*#~l#~jj#il 
and ruled on 
not have been raised/prior to the conclusion of Chambers' 
lllll##jj##lfiil#lil#illll#ill#i~l#llldl~ll#~id#jljj 
evidentiary presentation. Under these circumstances, 
illll.fild:/i 
and ee~a=ially in the absence of any claim by the State 
that there exists an independent state prodcedural 
ground, we cannot doubt the propriety of our exercise of 
jurisdiction in this case. 
/ 
' . 
{)_JL~"" ?_4-~ .~I..._J__ ""' 
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of dnc process of law.:) 1t is neccE<sary, therefore, to 
C'xamine carefully the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to ordPr McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought r . + /_ e s +-a.+e 
~ lu,cdt. n 
\ 
a ou tllr rrcord in this rasr,rTI i~ rlrar thnt Chambers' a~~rrtrd S Cou1- +s 
d<·ninl of dur process i~ proprrl~· before us. Ile ob.irctrd dmin~r uf ~ e¥>~~ 
tri:tl to each of the court'~ rulin~s. As to the confrontation rlaim, f~ ,/vve. to ~del v~:s.r 
petitiont'r ns~rrtrd, hoth brforr nnd durin~ tri:tl, hi~ rig:ht to treat 1 
~TeDonald Z\S Hll nd\'C'r~(' witnr~:;. Hi~ motion for new trial, filrd rh c:. C.01 ~ tl tr.Jf•I(JI'ltt. 
:~ftrr the jury's Yrrclirt, li~trd :1~ rrror thr tri:~l court's rrfw;nt to 
prrmit cro~s-rxnmimt .ion of l\IeDonald :~net thr rxdu~ion of r,·i-
drncr corroboratiYe of 1\IcDonald's guilt. Thr motion concluded 
that thr trinl "wns not in accord with fundamental fairnrs~ gu::wm-
trrd b,v thr Fomtt'rnth Amendmrnt of thr Constitution." Ch:nnhrrs 
n'nR~ertecl those claims on appeal to the State Suprrmr Comt. 
After thr affirmnnrr of hi,; ronvict ion b~· that comt. Chambrrs 
filrcl n prtition for rrhrarin~ nddrrssed almost rntirrl~· to thr rlaim 
thnt hi,: tri:~l had not brrn ronduc·trd in a manner ron~istrnt with 
traditional not ions of clur prore~s. Thr St:~tr Ruprrmc Court rai~rcl 
no quC'~tion th:~t Chambrrs' rhimf' werr not proprr!~· a~~rrtrcl. :111d 
no claim ha~ hrrn mnd<' h~· thr Stntr--in it~ rP~pon~P to thr prtitionl 
for cPrtiornri. in it~ brief on thr mrrit~. or nt or;il ;ug:umrnt-that 
tlw qur,:tion~ :~rr not J1roprr]Y rr,·irwnblr bY thi,: Court. Srr Street . & . 
\'. New rork. :394 U. R. 576. 5Rl-5S~ (1969); ~tftlf:!8 u......41R/:)(f?rltd..,. N e.w 
~~(.) U. ~- 4H;, 4g()...4.%;t (1-965) -------
Fntikr Ilenry v. 111ississip])i. 879 U. R. 443 (19n5). thi~ rn~r. 
dor~ not itl\'okr. t hr state procrdm:il rrquirrmrnt of rontrmporanrous 
objrrtion to thr :~dmi,:~ion of r\'idrnrr. l'Ptitionrr's rontrntion , as-
~rrtrd brforr thr trint court on motion for nrw trinl ancl ~ub­
~rqurntl_,. hrforr the ~Ii~,:i,:;:ippi Ruprrme Court. i~ that hr \\' :JR 
drnird "fnndampnt al fairnr~" guar;tnt rrd b~· t hr Fomtrrnt h AmPnd-
mrnt" as a rc!'ult of ~eyrral cYidrntim·~· ruling,:. Hi,: claim, thr 
'ub~tnnre of \\'hirh wr nccrpt in thi,: opittion , rr,:t~ on thr rumulatin' 
rfTret of tho~r rutin~" in fru~tr;ttin~ hi~ rffort~ to dr,·rlop nn rxcul-
patOt·~· drfrm'C'. Althoug:h hr objretrd to rnrh rutin~ indi, · idu;lil~· . 
prtit ionC'r'~ ron~t it u tion:d rln im-ba~rd :1' it i~ on thr cmmila ti,·c 
impnct of th<' ruling~-rould not h:l\·r hrrn r:ti~rd :~ncl rulrd upon 
prior to the ronrlu~ion of Chamhr·r,' t'\·iJrntiar~· prr,:entntion. Sinrr 
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a ruling at that time that. if the State chose not to call 
McDonald itself. he be allowed to call him as an adverse 
\\·itness. Attached to the motion were copies of Mc-
Donald's sworn confession and of the transcript of his 
preliminary hearing at '"hich he repudiated that con-
fession. The trial court granted the motion requiring 
::vt:cDonalcl to appear but reserved ruling on the adverse 
witness motion. At tria~after the State failed to put 
) 
McDonald on the stand, Chambers called McDonald, 
laid a predicate for the introduction of his sworn out-of-
court confession, had it admitted into evidence, and 
read it to the jury. The State. upon cross-examination, 
elicited from McDonald the fact that he had rejected his 
prior confession. McDonald fmther testified , as he had 
at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liber·ty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise 
of Reverend Stokes that he would not go to jail and 
would share in a sizable tort recovery from the town. 
He also retold his own story of his actions on the evening 
of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe dom1 the 
street, his absence from the scene during the critical 
period, and his subsequent trip to the hospital with 
Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers renewed his mot.ion to examine McDonald as 
an adverse '"itness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile, but he is not adverse in 
the sense of the '"ord , so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling. finding that "McDonald's testimony was 
not adverse to appellant" because "[n]owhere did he 
as n basiH for not rrarhing thr merit~ of pctitionrr'~ ron~titntional l 
d ni m, we hnw no orrn~ion to dcridr whether-if such a ground 
oxi~t,.:-it ~ impo~ition in thi~ ca,.:r would sriTP nny " lrgitimatc state 
intrre~t." !d., nt 447. Undrr these eircumstnnrr~, m• rmmot doubt 
the propriet~· of ou r exrrei~e of juri~dirtion. 
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point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2cl., at 220. 
Defeated in his attempt to challenge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciation of his prior confession, Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three witnesses 
to whom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The first of these. Sam Hardin, would have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting, he spent the late 
evening hours "·ith McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that. while driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objected to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it \vas hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection! 
Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
said he was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, 
was then called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers with 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they were riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
{lVfcDonald .Q said anything regarding the shooting 
I of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald -8 told him 
\ 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
~·eek later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony as to McDonald's self-
4 Hardin's trstimony, unlike tho testimony of tho othrr two mrn 
who statrd that McDonald had ronfc~sed to thrm, wn~ artually 
giwn in tho jury's presence. After the State'::; ob,irrtion to H::mlin's 
account of MrDonald's ::;t.atrmrnt was sustaill<'d, tho trinl courl 




CHA:-IHERS v. MISSISSIPPI 
i11criminating remarks should have been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well ncar McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one-
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statemellts were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.6 On appeal, 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
"A gun dealer from Natchez testified that McDonald had made 
1 wo purchases. The witness' busine~s record~ indica ted that 
McDonald purchased a nine-shot .22-caij}r revolver about a year 
prior to the murder. He purchased a different style .22 throe wrck~ 
after Liberty's death. 
6 It is not entirely clear whether the trial court';; ruling wa~ 
premised on the same hearsay rationale und0rlying the exc-lu~ion 
of the other te~timony. In thi~ instnnre the StatC' argued that 
Carter's testimony was an impermis~ibl0 attempt by prtitimwr to 
imp0arh a witncs~ (McDonald) who wm; not adven:;e to him. The 
trial court did not state why it was cxeluding the eYidcme but the 
State Supreme CourL indicated that it was excluded as hear~ay . 
252 So. 2d, at 220. 
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\\·itncEs" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule, he was 
unable either to cross-examine :McDonald or to prcsen t 
witnesses in his own behalf who "·ould have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald 's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources indicating that he had not been seen 
in the rafc >vhere he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the 
crime. But all that remained from McDonald's own 
testimony was a single written confession countered by an 
arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense 
was far less persuasive than it might have been had he 
been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's state-
ments to cross-examination or had the other confessions 
been admitted. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to clue 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
defend against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call " ·it-
ncsscs in one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to clue process. Mr. Justice Black. writing for 
the Court in !11 re Olivl'r, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1048), 
idcntifi('cl these rights as among the mi11imum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person 's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense-a right to his day in court--are basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine th(' wit-
. " ' "" ff . d b nesses agamst ~· to o er testimony, an to e 
--- represented by counsel." ~g?~ J 
Sec also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471~ 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411 , 428-429 (lOGO); 
/ 
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~tO 
Specht v. Pallerson, 386 e. S. 605 \0067). Both of these 
elt-mrnts of a fair trial arC' implic~tecl in the present case. 
A 
Chambers 'ms denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's damning repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. He was not allowed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
itself whether McDonald's testimony was worthy of 
belief. 1\fattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-243 
(1805). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
dt-sirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation. and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
r-£011 v. Evm1s, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (HJ70)j (It is, inde"C"C'r,' 
f:----nan essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial "·hich is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400. 405 (1965). Of course, 
tlw right to co11front and to cross-examine is not absolute 
a11cl may. in appropriate cases, bow to acconm1odate 
other lt-gitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" ancl re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berge1· v. California, 393 U.S. 314 'o96'9). 3I.S 
In this case, petitioner's rcqu~st to cross-examine 
McDonald \Vas denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may not im.peach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, HH So. 2cl 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in ·which "oath-takers" or "com-
/3rtJl-on v . 
t)n 1 f-c. J Stcd·C:~ 1 
~ q I (), J , I 2 3
1 
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purgators" were called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal process.8 It 
might have been logical for the early common law to 
require a party to vouch for the credibility of ·witnesses 
he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having 
selected them especially for that purpose. the party might 
reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are 
rarely able to select their witnesses: they must take 
them where they find them. Moreover, as applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's 0 impact was doubly harm-
ful to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,' 0 he 'vas also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the 
witness is bound by anything he might say. He was, 
0 
7 3A J. Wigmore, Eviclcnre § 896, at 658-6~ (Ch:-tclbourn eel. (l 
1970); C. McCormick, Evidence § 38, at 75-78 (li972). -24 ~,Y.. 
8 The "voucher" rule has been conclemnccl as arrhaic , irr:-ttional, 
and potentially destructiw of the truth gathering process. C. Me-
annie(, · ~ ; E. Morgan , Basic Problems 
of Evidence 70-71 (1962); 3A J. Wigmore, J!;vil'i91H!t_§ 898, at 6G~ 
\ (Gh:cdhom n ed. 'I:§T8C,... >.::.f.:!:- '1 · 1 ) 
fn The "voucher'' rule hn s been rejected altogether by the newl"' / 
I;Jc.l-~1 ( Rules of Eviclcncel.\tha1; will npply in o!J fgQQl"Ql @8l:H'te:; Rule 607, 
1 Rules of Evidencc 1 for the United States Courts and M:-tgistrates 
(approved Nov. 2~,. 1972 nnd\.o brcome effcctiYe .July 1, 1973). 
409 U. S. - (19t2) . ""-.. J C,.,-v, 
- 10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at~ t-,.Wif'l$ »u tf<:.cJ.,. to p· es,s 
JS-J 7. 
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therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
confession. 
In this Court Mississippi has not sought to defend 
the rule or explain its underlying rationale. Nor has 
it contended that its rule should override the accused's 
right of confrontation. Instead, it argues that there is 
no incompatability between the rule and Chambers' 
rights because no right of confrontation exists unless the 
testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The 
State's brief asserts that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying-
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more· 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
Chambers.l:l And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. It can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seri-
ously adverse to Chambers. The availability of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been 
held to depend on whether the witness was initially put 
on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject 
11 Rr~pondcnL's Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
~~ 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
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the notion that a right of such substance in the crim-
inal process may be governed by that technicality or by 
any narrO\v and unrealistic definition of the ''rord 
"against." The "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, 
plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against 
the State's charges. 
B 
\Ve need not decide, however, whether this error alone 
"·ould occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed denial 
of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
"·hen viewed in conjunction with the trial court's refusal 
to permit him to call other witnesses. Tho trial court 
refused to allow him to introduce the testimony of 
Hardin, Turnet~ and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on 
three separate occasions shortly after the crime. naming 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it \Yas hearsay. 
The hearsay rule, "·hich has long been recognized and 
respected by virtually every State, is based on experience 
and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence 
should not be presented to tho triers of fact. Out-of-
court statements are traditionally excluded because they 
lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are 
usually not made under oath or other circumstances tha.t 
impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; 
the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; 
and he is not available in order that his demeanor and 
credibility ma.y be assessed by the jury. California v. 
Green, 309 U. S. 149, 158 (1970). A number of excep-
tions have developed over the years to allow achnission 
of hearsay statements made under circumstances that 
tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for 
the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
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ceptions is the one applicable to declarations against 
interest ''-an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his 
mm interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary interest.' " It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like YfcDonalcl 's in this case. that are 
against the penal inter·<'st of the declarant. Brown v. 
Stale, 00 Miss. 710. 55 So. 061 (1911). 
This materialistic limitation on the declaration-against-
interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by 
most States in their eriminal trial processes,'" although 
a number of States have cliscarde~l it.'j Prior to tJ+ 
anges to be accomplished when tl (' new Federal Rules 
f Evidf'nce be't'~me effective.' ' declarations against penal 
interest "·ere normally excluded in federal courts under 
the authority of Donnelly v. United_..E..klt.Qb 228 U. S. 
243, 272-273 Cl m3J./ E;,:clusion' 'There the 1 imitation 
prevails, is usually premised on the view that admission 
would lead to the frequent pr0sentation of perj urcd testi-
mony to the jury. Tt is believed that confessions of 
criminal activity arc often motivated by extraneous con-
siderations and, therefore, arc not as inherently reliable 
@'I 
as statements against pecuniary or proprietary in tercst. tf ..-~"' (l. " k ... 
\Yhile that rationale has been the subject of considerable t.G\ 1 l 
~'A"' f ~t h •"' tc. t-ht:.. 
'~".TrffNson, Drelar:1t ion~ A~:1in~t IntN<'~j\ 58 1:1:1!'\". L. Hr1·. 1 
(194-l-) . VI H 
"'H. ~JrJ~lro~·. :\Ti~si~sippi Evidmrr § -W (HJ5,5)j cqrtc:., + f 'j (.rJo.t!.:_ f~ H'!J V. M c. (.Cl. '!11 
"; C "[ C . 1 1~ .. :.1. .• ". £ •)-o t 6-') ' tv I I ~'Pl'l. 5 T ~. 1\ e onmn, x·' '' • n f·JJ -< d . 11- • - /7(, S ;~J. 2.~7 
" "igmorr, E1·idrnee § 1-l-7Ci , at 283-2R7 11. 9 (Hl-l-0) . 0 · .) 
"Srr, e. g. , Prnple , .. 8wiggs. :w Cal. Rptr. S-l-1, :~."!) P. 2d 377. 2 fslt'f-2 'lrJ (7'1·~~ 
fiO Cal. 2d 86S ( 106-l-) : Pen]Jle \'. Lrttrich. -l-13 111. 172, 101\ N. E . I li'J C, 6). 
~ . ~KS ( 1952) : People Y. Broll'n. 2Ci X . Y. 2d 8R, 308 N. Y. 8. 2d __. __ 
R·)· ')-- " E' ')! 1G (1"-0) !! ' ~:... 1'>(] \ " -·Jo 11~ ( -a, -i)/ ~'· '. _( ) VI ; . 111 f 8 Y. · -~-~-,~~v • •J) :1 . 1- <"'~, _ I 
8. E. 84:~ (1923). ~ ..,.., ct . C01''1H'f1~1NileAI+h, 
' ' Hulr 80-l-, Rulfi!,;-.{;C<C for the Unitrd_&~ Cm.trt....al)9. 
:J.gist rn tos Cnnproy.c.c.L.N..Q"'- 20.,. U}'f.~ne to-hcrtmw 'C'fft"ct~~ 
- (..197i ). 
1® 
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ceptions is the one applicable to declarations against 
interest ''-an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his 
own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognize 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary interest.' " It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations. like .YicDonalcl's in this case. that are 
against the penal in tercst of the declarant. Brown v. 
Slate. 90 Miss. 719. 55 ~o. 061 (lOll). 
Declarations agaiinst penal interest have also been 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of 
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 272-273 (1913), 
although exclusion would not be required under the 
18/ 
newly proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. 
s ~rH·o.... "')'). 1 
) 
o;.;~{.· i\IrJJro~·. :.\Ii~:<i~sippi El·idl'IH'C § -W (~95.5)j C"£rtc:.. ~ C.l-'j C".::f!.:_ A H'!J v 1 M Se (. .(l,Htetl' 
16 C l\1-·C · ·1- 1'-'1 >:0-" t o-·> ' tOI I HP'W. 5 T ~. " ( OIIDH',,',O._Holl~ ~-' ''• n >i•lJ -< t<.l- • • · 7(, S ;,;2.l. 2.~7 
\Yi~morr, E1·iclC'Il<'(' § H7G , :lt 283-287 n. 9 (10·+0). 1 0 · .) 
17 SrC', ('. (/., PN!])/(' \', Swiggs. 3() Cal. Hplr. s -n, :3s9 P. 2d 377. 2 ir't'f-2. 'I(} (711-~~ 
GO Cal. 2d S6S (19o.J.): People v. J,ettril'h, -1-1:3 Ill. 172, lOS :;{. E. I '1 ~ 6). 
~ .488 (19.52); l'Poplc \'. Broll'n. 20 K. Y. 2d SS, :308 N.Y. 8. 2d ~--
R0" ')-- ' r J' '' l 1" (1°-0) [[. ~J;· 1"0 \"· -·)o 11~ < -b, -01 ~'· '.1. _( u OJ/ ; 111l'S Y .. 6Ut, •)) :\. 1-C'1 1 I 
R. E. R4:3 (192:3). ~ '1'1, Cf • c..om ....,~!Nee. l+h) 
' ' Hulr RO.J., Rulfii:H)~c for I he Unilrcl Stajcs Cmu;.l.o...al 
1Top;islwtcti (anproycd~~.m;... 20.,-.U).72""-tuul 1ft· bcrmrrr tfft'rn(.-
Jul~· 1. 1973}. 40Q U~ S.- (.Ul7~). 
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scholarly criticism.'" "·e need not decide in this case 
whether, under other circumstances, it might serve some 
valid state purpose by excluding untrust\vorthy testimony. 
The hearsay statements involved in this case were 
originally made and subsequently offered at trial under 
circumstances that provided considerable assurance of 
their reliability. First. each of McDonald's confessions 
was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly 
after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case-
McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eye-
witness to the shooting. the testimony that McDonald 
was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting. and 
proof of his prior Oivnership of a .22-caliber revolver and 
subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer num-
ber of independent confessions provided additional cor-
roboration for each. Third, whatever may be the 
parameters of the penal-interest rationale,"" each 
confession here was in a very real sense self-incrim-
inatory and unquestionably against interest. See 
Co""""'' tkc. a '7 RvteJ c~f P; ·4c.f1 c tS Pl-()r.,r J IJIC. ~ 
r tn eer, e. g., • . . ·.. . , Rulrt< of EYi-~ Jjp 
m lo I ltll dc·nrr for the United Stnte~ Court:,; and I\Ingi:;tmtr~/ (11]l]lr8YilEtoSIIi?,.- ?l./' 
a '-t') . r - . ~ T \v· ' . § 1 •-" '1 'J"..j.-[.)~ _t..;. J ..... , , u \ .. , 1gtnorr, '1./t1, ct _.c'l .)~ 
~Wright, Uniform Hules Irar~ny , 26 U. Cinn. L. Hev. 
575 (1957); United States Y. Annunziato, 293 F. 2d 373,378 (CA2) , 
rrrt. denied, 368 U. S. 919 (1961) (Friendly, .T.): Scola't{'v. United I rAe_ 
States, 406 F. 2d 563, 564 (C'"\.0), rcrt. denied , 395 U.S. 981 (1969). ., 
"" The Missi~;;ippi r:tsc which rrfusrd to ndopt n he:t r~ay excep-
tion for declarat ion,; :tg;tin~t 1wnal intcrrst comcrned an out-of-
court drclarant who purported[~· statrd thnt he hncl committrd the 
murder with which hi,; brotbrr had brrn charged. The :i\Ti~~i,~ippi 
Supremr Court bclie,·ecl t.hat the declarant ma~· haw bern moti-
,·ated by a dr~irr to frer hiH brotlwr rather than b~· nu~· compubion 
of guilt. The Court abo notrd thnt the derlarnut ktd nc·d , was 
unavailable for cro~::;-rxamination, nnd may well h;tn knmrn at 
the timr he madr the sbtrnwut that hr would not ;;ufft'r for it. 
Brown \'. StalP, 99 l\fi,;s. 719. 5i) So. !)()J (1911). There i:.;, in tho· 
present casr, no such basis for doubting l\IcDonald's ~t:l(ernents. See 
/lo .... J ''"' /}_ 
/ 
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United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 4(Z3, 184 (1971); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). Mc-
Donald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner 
not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
tion about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
( 1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra, and from the Donnelly-type 
situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavail-
able at the time of trial. 21 
Few rights are more fundamental than that 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. 
21 Me Donald ',; pre~rncc al"o deprives the State's argument 
retention of the prnal-intere~t rule of mnch of its forrr. In claiming 
that "[t]o change thr rule would work a travrstr of ju~tirr," the 
State posited the following hypothetical: 
"If the rule were changrd, A rould be chargrd with thr rrime: B 
could tell C and D that hr committed the crime; B rould go into· 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would trstify as to B's admi~sion 
of guilt; A could be acquittrd and B would rrtnrn to ~land trial; 
B could then 11rovicle se\'rral witneHsrs to "tstifY as to hi~ wlwrrnbouts 
at the timr of the crimr. The testimoriy of tho~r witnr~.-;r~ along 
with A's statement that he rrall~· rommittrtl thr rrimr wonld rrHult 
in B's acquit tal. A would be barred from furthrr pro>'eeul imt 
been use of lhr prot ret ion against double jroparcl~ · . 1\ o one roulcl 
be conYicted of perjur~· n;: A did not teHtify al his first trial, B did 
not lie undrr oath, and C and D \H'rr truthful in their te~t imon~·." 
nr~pondrnt.'s Brief, at 7 n. 3 (empha~is r-:upplircl). 
Obl·iou::;l~· , "B's" alJ::;enre at trial i::; critical to the ~ll("('('f'H or the 
j11~tice-suh1·eriing ploy. 
v. T eKfk S 
.) 
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Washington v. 'Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 1!) (1067); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure 
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence 
has been more respected or more frequently applied in 
jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hear-
say, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of 
evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have 
long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and 
thus was "·ell ''"ithin the basic rationale of the exception 
for declarations against interest. That testimony also 
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circum-
stances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt arc implicated, the hearsay rule 
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice. 
\Ye conclude that tho exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit 
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a 
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental stand-
ards of~ clue process. In reaching this judgment we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor 
does our holding signal any climin~ion in the respect 
traditionally accorded to tho States in the establishment 
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and 
procedures. Rather, " ·o hold quito simply that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case tho rulings of 
tho trial court clepri vod Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsiston t with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
'. 
.iu.ptttttt ~ou.rt of tfre ~:nite~ ,itates 
.. nsfringtott, ~. <!f. 2ll&i'!~ 
C H A MBE R S OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . D O UGLAS January 5, 1973 
Dear Lewis: 
In 71-5908, Chambers v . Mississippi 
I am still with you. 
William 0. Douglas 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS January 5, 1973 
Dear Lewis: 
In71-5908, Chambers v. Mississippi 
I am still with you. 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Conf'erence 
/ 
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Rea Chambers v. Mississippi 1 jurisdic.tional issue 
Judge• 
The jurisdictional issue in Chambers, upon which 
Justice Rehnquist rests in his dissenting opinion, 
involves two partially overlapping doctrines. I will 
discuss briefly the contours of each and will show that 
the present case fits well within eiither rationale. 
(1) Jurisdiction under section 1257(3) 
Certiorari will lie to this Court from the final 
judgment of a state court of last resort "where any • • • 
right • • . is specially set up or claimed under the 
Constitution of ••• the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). 
In order to establish that a federal constitutional right 
was "specially set up or claimed" where the state ct 
decision does not address the issue it is necessary to 
look to the record to determine whether the issue was 
raised in the state courts. An issue is considered to have 
been properly raised if the claim has been "brought to 
the attention of the state court with fair precision 
and in due time." Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 
67 (1928). "No particular form of words or phrases is 
essential" and it may appear that the issue was not / 
raised "expressly" but was presented "by clear intend-
ment." Id. 
The inquiry in any case must focus both on (1) the 
clarity with which the claim was raised, and on (2) when 
it was raised. As to the first criteria, it will not 
suffice merely to claim that the state law or practice 
is "unconstitutional." Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 
--2--
(1935): Bryant v. Zimmerman, supra, at 68. The Court 
has never held how much more specific the claim must be 
but the thrust of the cases appears to be that the claim 
must be raised with sufficient specificity to give the 
state cts a fair chance to resolve the question. In 
Bryant, for instance, the party attacking the state law 
apparently did little more than cite the two provisions 
of the f ederal constitution which he fel#t had been 
violated. The Court was satisified that the claim there 
had been properly presented. 
The second factor--when the claim was raised--is also 
not susceptible to any per se brightline rule. It has 
been firmly established · that if the issue is raised for 
the first time on a petn for rehearing from the judgment 
of the Court of last res#ort that is not soon enough. 
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935); Bilby v. Stewart, 
246 U.S. 255 (1918). In one case, Bailey v. Anderson, 
326 U.S. 203 (1945), the Court found no jurisdiction 
where a claim had been raised before the State SC but 
had not been raised in the state TC. Taking Bailey 
as the case pushing the jurisdictional requirement the 
farthest, it might be suggested that the rule is that 
federal claim must be raised in the trial court and 
must be raised at some point at which the court could, 
reasonably, do something about the contention. 
We think that Chambers satisfies both requirements. 
There can be no question that the claim was raised with 
adequate specificity in the State SCs The precise 
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of "fundamental fairness guaranteed by the 14th 
Amendment" because he was "not permitted to develop 
his defense" ("he was not permitted to examine Gable 
McDonald as a hostile witness; he was not permitted to 
show the declarations of Gable McDonald against his penal 
interest") {appellant 0 s state ct brief at 35-36)--is 
specifically set out in his brief. His entire petn for 
rehearing is addressed to this point. If there is a 
problem of adequate specificity ilt is in the presentation 
of that claim in the TC. Undeniably, the claim was not 
raised with the exactitude which you or I might have 
\) 
pf rsued. If we had written the petn for rehearing we 
would have written in more detail about the inrerrelation-
ship between these state ct rulings refiusing to allow 
Pe·tr to put together his defense. But, the language 
used was sufficiently specific in my view. It should be 
emphasized that the new trial motion did not merely 
claim that the trial failed to comport with the 
constitution. It re#ferred to the specific provision 
relied upon• it designated the specific test--fundamnetal 
fairness--under that provision. Justice Rehnquist states 
that "it would have to be an extraordinarily percept'ive 
trial judge who would glean from this motion that the 
third and fourth points . • • were intended to bolster 
the #generalized assertion of a denial of due process." 
(P. 6). A close reading of the transcript is convincing 
that it would not take any extraordinary perception to 
see that Petr 0 s only serious claims revolved around his 
frustated efforts to make out hisd defense. You should 
'. '  
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emphasize that i~ii there is no Supreme Court precedent 
holding that assertion of a federal claim with this 
specificity is inadequate. To so hold in this case 
would be an expansion of the jurisdictional test. 
As to the timeliness of raising, I think it 
sufficient to state that the claim was raised as 
early as reasonably possible under the circumstances. 
By virtue of the nature of the claim it could not have 
been pressed until the drama of the presentation of the 
defense had been played out. As our opinion states, it 
is the joinder of these state TC rulings--each one of 
which was objected to--which deprived him of due process. 
While Petr might have moved for a mdistrial before the 
jury adjourned to render its verdict, at this late point 
it is highly unlikely that, even if the TC agreed with 
Petr, it could have rectified the error short of declaring 
a mistrial and starting over before a new jury. The TC 
would have had to allow Petr, essentially, to start over 
by recalling Mc6onald and three other witnesses. Again, 
I have found no Supreme Court precedent holding that a 
federal constitutional claim was not raised in "due time" 
/ 
where it was raised in the trial court. This Court 
has not gotten into the business of deciding whether 
claims were raised early enough in the trial. The only 
requirement is that the TC have an opportunity to 
rule on the question. Under these circumstances, it sddeems 
an overstatement to note this is an "extraordianrily lenient 
construction of the decisional requirement that the 
constitutional claim be made in due time." (Dissent, p. 5@). 
(2) Independent and adequate state procedural ground 
This is the second, sometimes overlapping and often 
cofused, doctriae seen in these cases. The general rule 
is that where a state ct decision rests on an independent 
and adequate state procedural ground this ct will not 
decide the federal question. In each such case there 
is a necessity to find the operative state procedural 
rule and to decide whether it serves any adequate state 
interests. The seminal case is Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U.S. 443 (1965) inwhich the state rule was the usual 
rule of contemporaneous objection to evide ntiary 
rulings. This is the classic circumstance in which such 
cases arise. The accused has a fdederal c~ilaim but 
violates some state procedural rule in the course of 
raising it. The State higher cts then do not decide the 
federal issue but rest instead on the procedural failing. 
As you know, the State has interposed no such 
independent state ground. Nevertheless, I have searched 
through Mississippi procedure to see whether there is any 
such state rule. I have looked for a rule requiring 
claims of cumulative error--constitutional or not--to 
be raised prior to the jury's adjournment. I have looked 
for any rule requiring cumulative claims to be made / 
before motion for new trial after verdict. I have found 
none. The dissent suggests no such rule other than to 
intimate that Petr should have made a contemporaneous 
objection to each ruling on federal constitutional 
grounds. But we have established that no claim was 
possible until each ruling could be viewed in conjunction 
with6i the others. 
--6--
SUMMARY 
(1) The federal claim was raised with adequate 
specificity to satisfy the statutory requirement. 
(2) It was raised "in due time." 
(3) This case does not involve the independent and 
adequate state rule doctrine. 
NOTE: 
There are a large number of cases which we might 
cite and distinguish on the ground that, in each, the 
claim was not raised at all (See, e.g., Justice White's 
recent opinion in Cradinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 
(1969)) or was raised too imprecisely. But to do so 
would be sim~l~ an exercise in empty scholarship. Our 
theseis must be that this disposition is well within 
the parameters established by the major cases and the 
dissent has been able to cite no cases that have 
taken a more d~restrictive view of this Court's juris-
diction. To a certain extent, every case in this area 
is sui generis and must turn on its peculiar facts. And, 
this case, because of the amorphous nature of the consti-
/ 






Re1 Chambers v. Mississippi, No. 71-5908 
Judge 1 
Rea the proposed headnote and your suggested change. 
I have two problems with your change that, I think, are 
important enough to mention. 
(1) Your paragraph (b) states that it was error for 
the TC to exclude hearsay evidence "when McDonald was 
available in court for the state's cross-examination." 
I think our opinion does not rely alone on the fact that 
llil#~fMcDonald was present. We mentioned other indicia 
of trustworthiness, which are listed in the Putzel draft 
and which appear at page 16 and 17 of our opinion. We 
sacrifice some of the narrowness of the opinion by over-
emphasizing the presence of McDonald. It may be, however, 
that Putzell has underemphasized the presence of McDonald 
by making that factor a parathetical. 
(2} Your last sentence is repetitive of the holding 
itself (at the end of the first paragraph of the syllabus) 
0 
and disrupts the ~rganization of thei headnote I think 
I would delete it. 
/ 
I would suggest the following revisimna 
McDonald's 
The trial court erred in excluding~earsay "(b) 
statementslftifhwere critical to pe~ioner's defense and 
which bore substantial assurances of trustworthiness, in-
eluding that each was made spontaneously to a close 
acquaintance, that each was corroborated by other evidence 
~ 
in the case, tha~ach was in a real sense against McDonald's 
-... --2--
~ 
interest, and that McDonald present ~d available for 
11 
cross-examination by the State. Pp. 13-18." 
LAH 
/ 
~mtt Qfonrlltf tlft ~b ~fattg 
._-Mltittghm. ~. <!f. 2Ll,;t~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 22, 1973 
Re: No. 71-5908 - Chambers v. Mississippi 
Dear Lewis: 
This case is not an easy one so far as the posture of 
this Court is concerned. You have prepared an appropriately 
narrow opinion which meets the issues, and I am glad to join. 
Sincerely, 
11 u. 6. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.:iu:p-rtm:t <!Jcu.d of t!rt ~nittb ;itattg 
Jraglfi:ngttttt. ~. <!J. 2!1~'1-~ 
January26, 1973 
Re: No. 71-5908 - Chambers v. Mississippi 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powe 11 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
/ 
FEB 1 6 1973 ~3 .:.:: PM 
Another ,o~y ot 1-a!:t rrvcf 
of •yil>hu.; •• approved, 
wici. hn<up ad~ed. 
NOTE : Where lt ls deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) wD1 
be released, as Is being done In connection with tWs case, at the time 
the opinion ls Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenienl'e of the reader. See United States v. Detrott Lumber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
CHAMBERS v. MISSISSIPPI 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI 
No. 71-5908. Argurd November 15, 1972-Decided January-, 1973 
After petitioner was arrested for murdrr, another person (McDonald) 
made, but later repudiatrd, a writtl'n conft'ssion. On thrre sep-
arate occa~ions, each timr to u clifferrnt frirncl , McDonald orally 
admitted the killing. Petitioner was convicted of the mmcler in 
a trial that he claimed was lacking in due process becau~c peti-
tioner was not allowed to (1) cro~~-examine l\IcDonald (whom 
petitioner had called ns a witnr~:; whrn the Statr failed to do so), 
since under 1\fi~si~sippi'~ common-law "voucher" rule a j)arty may 
not impeach his own witnr~~ . or (2) introduce the tr:;t imony of 
the t hrec prrsons to whom l\f cDonnld hnd conl'Ps~rd, the trial 
court having ruled tlwir trstimony inadmissible as hrar~ay. The 
Missi~,;ippi Supreme Comt nffirmrcl. Ifeld: Under thr fact s and 
circumstance,; or this casr petitionrr \\':11:> denircl a fair trial, in 
violation of the Due Proce~~ Clause of the Fourteenth Amrndmcnt. 
Pp. 10-18. 
(a) The application of thr "vomher" rule preventrcl petitioner 
through rros<::-examin:1tion of ;\[cDonald from exploring the cir-
cumstances of 1\IcDonnlcl's thrrr prior oral confr~~ion~ and chal-
lenging hi:; rrnumia t ion of 1 he writ t rn confession, and thus de-
prived pet it ioncr of t hr right to contradict trstimony that was 
dearly "adven:;e." Pp. 10- 13. 
(b) The trial court erred in rxduding McDonald'::; hrarsay 
statrmrnt s which wrrc critical to prtitioncr's defense and which 
bore substantial a:;smancr::; of trust worthinrss, inrluding that each 
was made spontanrou~lr to a closr acquaintance, that each was 
corroboratrd b~r other cvidt·nrr in thr ca~e, that each was in a 
real sem;r ngainst l\IcDonald's intrre~t , and that l\IcDonald was 
present and available for cross-examination by the State. Pp. 
13-18. 
252 So. 2cl 217, reversed and remanded. 
I 
H<my Putze•.• jr. 
~porter of Deci¥ion& 
/ 
,... 
II CHAMBERS v. MISSISSIPPI 
Syllabus 
PowELL, J ., delivered the opinion of 1 he Couri, in which BuRGER, 
C. J., and DouGLAs, BRENNAN , STEWAH'l' , \Vnrl'E, l\1AHSHALL, and 
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. WnrTE, J., filed a concurring OJ?inion. 
REIINQUli:i'l', J., filed a di~;;enling opinion. 
I 
·'' 
To: The Chief Justi ce 
Mr. Just i ce Dougla::; 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
J Mr . Justtce Stewart Mr . Justi ce Mar shall ~ustic e Blackmun usti ce Powell 
1st DRAFT 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAfm: White, J · 
Circulated: d- - l'f -/3 
No. 71- 5908 
Rec i rculated : 
Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to· 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
[February - , 1973] 
MR. J u sTICE "\VHITE, concurring. 
\Ve would not ordinarily expect an appellate court 
in the state or federal system to remain silent on a con-
stitutional issue requiring decision in the case before it. 
Normally, a court's silence on an important question 
would simply indicate that it was unnecessary to decide 
the issue because it was not properly before the court or 
for some other reason. As my Brother REHNQUIST 
points out, the Court stated in Street v. N ew York, 394 
U. S. 576, 582 (1969), that "when the highest state 
court has failed to pass upon a federal question it will 
be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper 
presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved 
party in this Court can affirmatively show to the 
contrary." 
Under this rule it becomes the petitioner's burden to 
demonstrate that under the applicable state law his 
claim was properly before the state court and was there-
fore necessarily rejected, although silently, by affirmance 
of the judgment. If he fails to do so, we need not enter-
tain and decide the federal question that he presses. 
It is not our invariable practice, however, that we will 
not ourselves canvass state law to determine whether 
the federal question, presented to but not discussed by 
the state supreme court, was properly raised in ac-
cordance wtih state procedures. The Court surveyed 
71-5008-CONCUH 
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state law .in Street, itself, with little .if any help from 
the appellant; and I think it is appropriate here where 
the State does not contest om jurisdiction and seemingly 
concedes that the question was properly raised below and 
necessarily decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court. 
There is little doubt that Mississippi ordinarily enforces 
a rule of contemporaneous objection with respect to 
evidence; the three opinions in H emy v. Mississippi, 
253 Miss. 263, 154 So. 2d 289 (1963); 253 Miss. 263, 174 
So. 2d 348 (1965); 198 So. 2d 213 (1967), make this 
sufficiently clear. Also, that case came here, and we 
not only noted the existence of the rule but recognized 
that it served a legitimate state interest. The same 
rule obtains where the proponent of evidence claims 
error in its exclusion: 
"The rejection of evidence not apparently admis-
sible is not error, in the absence of an offer or 
sufficient statement of the purpose of its introduc-
tion, by which the court may determine its relevancy 
or admissibility . . . . This Court has consistently 
followed this rule requiring definiteness and suf-
ficiency of an offer of proof . . . ." Freeman v. 
Mississi])pi, 204 So. 2d 842, 847-848 (1967) (dissent-
ing opinion). 
There are Mississippi cases stating that in proper cir-
cumstances the contemporaneous objection rule will not 
be enforced and that the state supreme court in some cir-
cumstances will consider an issue raised there for the 
first time. In Carter Y. Jl!Jississ1·ppi, 198 Miss. 523, 21 
So. 2d 404 (1945), the only issue in the appellate court 
concerned appellant's mental condition at the time of 
the crime, an is8ue not raised at trial. The court said 
"the rule that if the question is not raised in the trial 
court it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, is 
not without exceptions among which are errors 'affect-
ing fundamental rights of the parties ... or affecting 
I 
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public policy' ... if to act on " ·hich will work no in-
.i ustice to any party to the appeal." I d., at 528, 21 So. 
2d, at 404. The court proceeded to consider the issue. 
In Brooks v. Mississippi, 209 Miss. 150, 155, 46 So. 2d 
04, 97 (1950), a convicted defendant asserted in the state 
supreme court for the first time the inadmissibility of 
certain evidence on the grounds of an illegal search and 
seizure, violation of the rule against self-incrimination 
and improper cross-examination. The court considered 
these questions and reversed the conviction saying "er-
rors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the 
rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal. . . . Where fun-
damental and constitutional rights are ignored, due proc-
ess does not obtain and a fair tria.l in contemplation of 
law can not be had." 
The reach of these cases was left in doubt when in 
affirming the judgment in Henry Y. Mississippi, 253 Miss. 
263. 154 So. 2d 289 (1963), the Mississippi Supreme 
Court refused to consider a claim of illegally obtained 
e\·idence because the matter had not been presented to 
the trial court. The case did not come within Brooks v. 
Mississippi, supra, the Court ruled, because Henry's 
counsel were experienced and adequate, and Henry was 
bound by their mistakes. This Court vacated that judg-
ment and remanded for determination whether there had 
been a deliberate bypass, reading Mississippi law as ex-
tending no discretion to give relief from the contempo-
raneous objection rule where "petitioner was reprcsen ted 
by competent counsel familiar with local procedure." 
379 U. S., at 449, n. 5. In its initial opinion on remand, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi reasssertecl the neces-
sity to object at the time testimony is offered in the trial 
court, but it is said "uevertheless if it appears to the trial 
judge that the foregoing rule of procedure would defeat 
justice and bring about results not justified or intended 
I 
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by substantive law, the rule may be relaxed and sub-
ordinated to the primary purpose of the law to enforce 
constitutional rights in the interest of justice." Henry 
v. Mississippi, 253 Miss. 263, 287, 174 So. 2d 348, 351 
(1965) .* 
In King v. State, 237 So. 2d 209 (1970), this statement 
from the 1965 Henry opinion was interpreted as giving 
the supreme court of the State, as well as the trial court, 
sufficient latitude to treat the request for a peremptory 
instruction to the jury after failure to object to the in-
troduction of allegedly illegally obtained evidence as if 
the appellant had made timely objection. 
Moreover, in liVood v. Mississippi, 257 So. 2cl 193, 200 
(1972), where a convicted defendant complained of a 
wide-ranging and allegedly unfair cross-examinatiou of 
aefense witnesses, and where there had been a failure to 
object to part of the prejudicial inquiry, the state su-
preme court nevertheless considered the question, stating 
"we note also that no objection was made to the testi-
mony of Donald Ray Boyd when he was asked whether 
t'J.e had ever been in jail. However it was stated in 
Brooks, supra, that in extreme cases a failure to object 
to questions which were violative of a constitutional 
right did not in all events have to be objected to before 
they would receive consideration by this Court. The 
appellant in this case was being tried for murder and the 
evidence of defendant's guilt was extremely close. A 
shred of evidence one way or the other could have been 
persuasive to the jury. In our opinion this warrants our 
consideration of the questions and responses to which 
repeated objections were made and sustained by the 
·XThc trial court on remand from the 1965 IIenry decision, 253 
Miss. 263, 174 So. 2d 348, found there had bren ddibcrate bypass, 
and affirming on appeal, 198 So. 2d 213 ( 1967), the Mi ·sissippi Su-
preme Court did nol ment.ion Bmoks v. lllississippi, 209 Miss. 150, 
46 So. 2d 94 (1950), or the rule for like cases. 
/ 
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court as well as the consideration of the testimony of 
Donald Ray Boyd wherein he was asked whether he had 
been in jail or not although no formal objections were 
made thereto." 
These cases seemingly preserve some aspects of the 
Brooks rule and hence to anticipate some situations 
where the contemporaneous objection requirement will 
not be enforced, despite Henry. There will be occasions 
where the Supreme Court of Mississippi will consider 
constitutional claims made in that court for the first time. 
Where this leaves the matter of our jurisdiction in 
the light of decisions such as Williams Y. Georgia, 349 
U.S. 375 (1955), is not clear. There, while acknowledg-
ing that motions for a new trial after final judgment 
were not favored in Georgia, the Court recognized that 
such motions had been granted in "exceptional" or "ex-
traordinary" cases, their availability being within the 
well informed discretion of the courts. It was claimed 
that denying Williams' motion was an adequate state 
ground precluding review here, but "since his objection 
was based upon a constitutional objection, and one 
the validity of which has in principle been sustained 
here, the discretionary decision to deny the motion does 
not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to find that the 
substantive issue is properly before us." !d., at 389. 
In the circumstances before us, where there were re-
peated offers of evidence and objections to its exclusion, 
although not on constitutional grounds, where the matter 
was presented in federal due process terms to the state 
supreme court and where the State does not now deny 
that the issue was properly before the state court and 
could have been considered by it, I am inclined, although 
dubitante, to conclude with the Court that we have 
jurisdiction. 
As to the merits, I would join in the Court's opinion 
and judgment. 
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The first shotgun blast mill, one-cotton gin· town [ answered the call but the · up three witnesses. all 
went over the heads . of of 1 ,600, south of Natchez , ; crow cl prevented them · mem bcrs of the Deacons: 
. several persons standmg near the Louisiana border, . from arresting the trou-' who said that a friend and 
in ;m alley next to the t~n- <m area steeped in po\·er- ' hlemaker and they radioed . fellow Deacon, Gable }!c-
:r:oofecl coffee shop, hut t.ne ty, illiteracy and segrega- _ . for help. · Donalrl. 33, an illite rate 
• ~econd struck a flc e1ng f1g- tion. ___ ·Three shefiff's deputies cane field worker, had ad-
,. t<re in the back of the -'. -Herman \V. Anthony. a mt' ttecl to them that he had • Old South Town -1 -
- heacl. Le0n ('h ;jmher:-. a black. anrl Gordon H. Ge- · shot Liberty. 
black civil ri ghts activist The bovhood home of ter and Waldo Welch - "I tole! Gable in the5e 1 
f · h f 11 .Te f ,r ,.. r ~. on ·Da•·t·s a11d the 
. and the father o e1g t, c - ~ answered their call. words'' Samuel Hardin, 
; beneath a mulberry tree birthplace of two Confe- As the crowd milled one of the witnesses, re-
;·next to the shop, critically d2 rate generals. \Voodville about preventing an ar- . centlv told a reporter, 
! woUnded. . w a 
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clescrihecl by the rest. Liberty, accord in;.; to "'Well, '-·ou didn't ha,·e to · · \\'ilkin :;on Countv Civil b' d .; 
[ · ._·_ Charged 1·n Death . 1 c· .t several witnesses. gra oe tell me because I was look-- · War Centenma omm1 • 
: .- _.,. - - · d a shotgun and \'o\\·ed to in' at ' :ou when you done ::: Chambers sur v 1 v e , tee as "the town most typi- scatt~r ";;orne black son of it.' • .; 
~however, and was charged cal of the old South, least a hitches." 
· with murdering Liberty. changed in appearance . G .,, t 11 h k 
'T · 'd - eter. "t .;, a a. . us .·y , hree w1tncsses sa1 an- and tradition." part-time d!?puty and full-
~ other man admitted the Except fot hiring black . time welder. later testified 
killing and that man- Ga- law enforcement officers, that he saw Chambers 
· b'le 1\IcDonald - later primarily to police other ·''shooting :\aron Liberty 
si~ned a confess ion, which b 1 a c k s, Woodville and in the back" and that. 
. still later he repudiated. \Vilkim:on County have L' b h h ' 1 d d 
Chambers was convicted t made little accommoda- t erty t en w tr e an f 
• fired his sh0tgun. ' . and sentenced to a life · tion to the civil rights No other \vitne:::ses, in- : 
term by an all-white jury. movement. ' eluding Anthony. who was · 
The three witne;,;.ses \vere The town's last motion : standing three feet from 
not allowed to testify . picture the:~tcr. the Joy, · Libertv anrl ahout se,·en 
about ?\lcDonnlcl's oral ' !"its deserted a blocl;: from . feet fr~1m Chambers. iden-
confcssion on grounds it - ~ the court1~9~~ sq~a_r~ ·- It tified Chambers as the as- . 
was hear~ay. \\'as closed about fi,·e -years . . sailant. '' l The Chambers case is -
now ori appeal and some ago to avoid admitting I Ncar Liberty . , 
'Jcga-1 observers helic\'e blacks. · - "I was .Stilnding right ' 
that,. the U.S. Supreme . On the outskirts of , beside Liberty when he 
Court will reverse the con- \\'ooclvillc s P raw 1 s the was shot and ·r never saw,: 
· viction. Such a finding· Wilkinson County Chris- Chambers with a gun," · 
coulrl mak~ Chambers \'S, tian Academy, a prcfahri- ·· . Anthony said. ; 
Missilisippi a constitution~ _ cated mcl:Jl complex that \Velch, one o( the white' 
allandm;Jrk thilt wnuld a!- . looks like a garment facto-~ dcputi•'~. a 1 so tl'stifierl· 
trr the bws o( e\'idcnce .' ry. . th.1t h~ rlid not srr Ch:lln-
throur,ltoul the t'llUntry. Whitr:>, faced with a cl~- her.:; with a gun. l111t :;aid 
~;egrcgation dccrre, e:;tab- that Chamilrrs "hrnkr. hi:;' l.fcnrsny Js~uc 
Tht' 'prinl'lp:t! i.''"" th~ 
nppcal r:1b1's Is whr!IH'I' a 
rld<'ntl;lll t h a,; t lw rnnst i-
tution;tl ri~hl. to o(fl'l' any 
rvidrnrr and rnll anv wil-
nf'ss•·~~ that mny hdi't' nn: 
lmp:~rt on hl:-i dl'frnsr, :., 
Jwar::ay r u Irs nntwith- · I 
. r;t11ndln~. ....!'- •~.J'~ , : .. .J 
__ ___.__ 
Jishcrl the ilC<ldrmy t\\'o · rir:hL h:u1d dt~wn and, of 
yrars ago, dc:;t'rting the course, that's wltrn the · 
county's puhlir. school sys- shot-.; bPg:lll, fi\ 'e lH' fix."' 
tem, which now Js all . I'olic'e Ill~ VI' I' rrrn\'Nl'd 
bl k the \W':tpon th ;tt fin•d the ar . i I 
On the cvc.nlng or tho faLl! s lOIS. 
lihooling, ('hamJ,, · r~ .. 1n 11- _ Tlw tnorning nftrr tho 1 
Jll.<:ratc coJ)S1rucllon wor~-... !ihnotlni;._~~~~:_~~~~~~~('IS I 
Shooting Witness 
;Harcli n, who lives a 
-stone's throw from :\IcDo-
nald's hou :.:c on a gravel 
'road nea!' Woodville, said: 
"I saw exact[\· what hap-
pence!. I \',a.:> · sl:111din' out 
in the :.:trect h~side a car 
and Liberty came up to 
the crowd with a double-
barrelcd shotgun and 
Gable l\fcDon0.lcl was stan- · 
din' on the side of t.h~ ~uil 7,j 
din' and began fmn on·; 
him." { 
West hrnught into the , 
case a friend, Clyde W.l 
l\Inllins nf Natchez. a 
while attorney who in-
currer! the \\T3lh of area 
Jaw enforcement officers : 
hv hr;Jding the dcfen ' e for 
Ch<1mhPrs ilnd \\'illi:-tm~ . 
:\nd ~tnkr" brnught into 
thl" ;tl tortlt'\ ~· nffin~ (;;,hie 
J\l,·(),)n;drl. ·who in thf'ir 
prc ~t'IH'c d i c tate d nncl 
~;ignrd a st;Jll'mrnt ~;1_ving 
,that hC' h;1d shot J.il>rrty. 
S t n k c s Lttrr test iftrrl 
that :\1cnon:lld had ri":Hllly · 
ilgr,'ed to rir:n t lit~ i·nnfcs-
. S.hlll :tlld tll.1t the two nt· 
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1 !. voluntarily, without rc-
;·· ward ot' promi~e of re-
ward. 
I However, 1\leDon;)ld, re-
i pucl iZJti ng the t:nn f cssinn 
nl a r.oml }w<Jring bc·fore 
• the trial, testified that) 
Stokes told hi rn that' if he~ 
would sign the confession J 
~~would not ha,·c to go to~ 
Jail and would benefit 
t from a cidl suit West 
f. planned to file ac:;1inst the 
town of Woocl\·ille ' ' 
The defense ('alice! !\Tc- i 
Donald as .a \\'itnes::; at the l 
murder trw! anyway and 1 
. then attempted to cross- i 
I 'examine him as an "ad- 1 
~ verse'' witness. The court . 
· ruled that, since the de- · 
. f~nsc w~s not surprised by · 
his tcstmwny, it was not . 
entitled to cross~examine · 
or impeach him. ,. 
Testimony Hule Out · ..<; 
At the trial Hardin tcsti- · 
fied that he saw l\lcDonald 
sh_oot Liberty. But neither 
Hardin nor the other two · 
witnesses-Berkley Turn-
er and Albert Carter-
1
: 
were permitted to testify 
that 1\lcDo~1alu told them J 
. he had shot the officer. 
\ The evidence ac-rainst 
' C h a m be r s at thee- trial 
' boiled down mainly to 
! Dep. Geter' s testimony 
and the fact that Cham-
• bers was shot while flee-
: ing down the alley. The · 
· state produced virtually 
· no . evidence against the ' 
· ·other ,defendant, James 
. Williams, and the court ' 
: d i ~ nii s ~ e d the charge · 
i agamst htm. ' 
! As evidence that the · 
1 prosecution actuallv did · 
'· not know who shot ·Liber- ; 
~ ty, the defense cites the · 
; ·uns u b s t a n t i a t e ct case · 
f, against \Villiams and the' 
( fact that on the mornincr ' 
~ . after the shooting Dep. c:.. : 
t .ter was asking witnesses if 
:~ they knew who shot the· 
- ~;-officer. . •· · . : __ :_ ,: .. ~ .:,.f.·; 
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!'.lull\ns h c 1 i c v e s In 
Chambers' Innocence and 
so llo two Washington at-
torneys who ;uc handling 
th.c, <•ppcal--formct· Atty. 
. ~~n . Hnmsey C. Clark and 
: ),clcr Westen: They wrre 
: brought into the case by 
·,the' Lawyers' Committee 
, for Civil nights Under 
6 lJ~l\V, 
:·. ·.Clark and Westen won a 
r' l'ircliminary round in the ·: 
~case a year ago by per- ! 
\ d' J , 1 . }" I · ~ua 1ng ust1ce ,cwJs •. ' 
; Powell Jr. that thev were \ 
i rai,;ing substantial "consti- I 
· tutiona\ i:>.sues and that 
:Chambers should be re-
- :- ~ 
f leased on Sl:l ,OOO bond · 
t from Parchman prison , 
1-.pending the court's acceP:-. .' J tance 6! his appeal. ·1 
, ' ln the appeal, the attar- ~ 
~ neys argue that Chambers I 
.: was denied ' a fair tria\ in : 
~ that. he was prevented :. 
~- from presenting his main;, 
:_; defense - that another 
:· party - McDonald - had 
; comrnited the crime. .. ., i-
t _ · Appeal to Liberals 
~· . ~ L~gal obserYcrs say tbe 
.. defense contention that . 
t the oral confessions : 
• should han teen <~cl mi c,' i- l: 
. ~ r ble will appeal to the lihcr- : 
t: als on the Supreme Cot • rt'. 
• ·and leaYes little room fc.1r · 
the conservath·es to nb-
ject. For Chambers \\·as . 
seeking to usc in his de-
fense precisely the kind of 
• confession .that conserva· 
; tives on the court would 
· permit the government to 
1 . ·USe to convict the accused. 
1 Chambers, who has in· 
.. .sisted on his innocence 
··from the outset, still suf· 
: fers headaches and. poor 
~ hearing from the gunshot 
L~<w..n..d. S:.. :~  . '""" __. _. .:. .::: 
... ··~ .. 
., 
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Leon Chambers, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
rFcbruary -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonment and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order was reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405-
U. S. 987 (1972), to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for 
murder occurred in the small town of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
I 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attempt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated when 20 
or 25 men in the crowd intervened and wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Three deputy sheriffs arrived shortly there-
after and the officers again attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more the officers ·were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots were fired. Forman was looking in a different 
direction when the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gun into an alley in the area from 
which the shots appeared to have come. The first shot 
was wild and high and scattered the crowd standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot and hit one 
of the men in the crowd in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran down the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or ·whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he was 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not see whether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he did see Chambers "break his arm 
down" shortly before the shots were fired. The officers 
who saw Chambers fall testified that they thought he 
\Vas dead but they made no effort at that time either to 
examine him or to search for the murder weapon. In-
stead they attended to Liberty, who \vas placed in the 
police car and taken to the hospital where he was declared 
dead on arrival. A subsequent autopsy showed that he 
had been hit with four bullets from a .22-caliber revolver. 
/ 
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Shortly after the shooting. three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he \\"aS not yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonalrl loaded him into 
a car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night, when the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers was still alive. a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
Liberty's murder. Ifp pleaded not guilty and has as-
serted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of another man, Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of \Voodville, was in the crowd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day he left his wife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
same year he returned to Woodville \Yhen his wife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his. known as Rev-
erend Stokes, wanted to sec him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in Natchez, Mississippi, several miles north of 
Woodville, and upon his return McDonald went to see 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, who maintained 
offices in Natchez. Two days later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices ancl gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his, James Williams, that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his own pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolver, which he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession was 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
'Jume~ Williams was indicted along \\"ith Chamber~. The State, 
ho\\"ewr, failed to introduce nnr eYidenee at trial impliriltinc; Wil-
li:l!n~ in the ~hooting. At the ronelu~ion of the State'~ c:~~e-in-chier 
the trial court granted a directrd wn.licl in his fn \ 'Or. 
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signed and witnes~ed, McDonald was turned over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of Woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had 11ot been on the scene when Liberty v1·as 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had happened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year.2 At trial he endeavored to develop two 
2 Upon Chambers' motion, a change of venue was granted nnd 
t.be trial was held in Amite County, to the east of Woodville. The 
change of trial setting was in response to petitioner's claim that,. 
because of adverse publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
nnd sheriff's staffs in Woodville, he could not obtain a fair alld 
impartial trial there. 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no weapon 
was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he was standing in the street ncar 
where Liberty was shot, that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring before the jury 
the testimony supporting this defense. Sam Hardin, a 
lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that he saw 
McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness, one of 
Liberty's cousins, testified that he saw McDonald im-
mediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald 
had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers at-
tempted to prove that McDonald had admitted respon-
sibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once 
when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' counsel 
and three other times prior to that occasion in private 
conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to 
present this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
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of due process of law.~ It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought 
:<On tho rorord in this rnso, clr~pitc tho Stntc Supreme Comt'~ l 
failure to nclclrr~s the con~titutionnl issue, it i~ rlcar that, Chamlwr~' 
:1~~crtecl cloninl of clue proces;:; is properly before u~. He ob.icctrd 
during trinl to oarh of tho court's rulings. Af: to the confrontation 
elnim, petitioner n~~erted, both before nncl during trial, hi~ right to 
trent McDonnld as an ad\'Crsc wit nc8s. Hi~ motion for newt rial, filed 
after the jury's verdict, listed as error the trial court's refusal to 
permit cross-examination of McDonald and the cxdu~ion of rvi-
donce corroborative of McDonald's guilt. The motion concluded 
that the trial "was not in accord with fundamental fairness guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Cons til ution." Chnmbers 
reasserted those claims on appeal to the State Supremr Court. 
After the affirmance of his conviction by that court, Chambers 
filrd a petition for rehraring addressed almost entirrly to the claim 
thnt hi~ trial had not bern conducted in a manner ronsistrnt with 
traditional notions of due proces~. The State Supreme Court rai~od 
no question that Chambers' claims were not proprrl~r H8f<rrtrd, and 
no rhim has bern mncle b~· the State-in its response to the petition 
for certiorari , in its brirf on thr mrrits, or at ornl nrgumrnt-that 
tho questions are not proprrl~' rr,·irw:1ble b~' this Court. See Street 
"· New J"or.k, 394 U. S. 576, 581-5115 (1969); New Vorl.- Px rei., 
Br!fant v. Zzmmerman. 27S U. S. fi3, 67-fiil ( 1928). 
Unlike Henry Y. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), this rase 
dors not involve tho state proerdmal requiremrnt of rontrmporanrous 
object ion to the ndmiR~ion of rYidrme. Pctitionrr's rontrntion, :-ts-
sertod before the trial ronrt on motion for nrw tri:1l :-tncl sub-
sequent]~· before thr l\fi~Hi~~ippi Ruprrmo Court , is tlwt he was 
clrnied "fundnmrntal fnirnr~~ guarantred b~· tho Fourternth Amcncl-
mrnt,'' as a result of sr,·cral C\·iclcntim·~· ruling~. His rlaim, the 
subo;tanco of which we aeecpt in thi,; opinion, rests on the cmnulatin~ 
rffcrt of those rulin~J:R in fru~trating hiH efforts to clr,·rlop an rxrul-
patory defense. Although he objrctcd to each rulin~J: indi,·idually, 
petitioner's constitutional rlnim-b:1scd a.;; it is on the eumulative 
impact of tho rulings-could not h:we been raised and rnled upon 
prior to the conclusion of Clwmbor::;' c\·idontinry presentation. Since 
/ 
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a ruling at that time that, if the State chose not to call 
McDonald itself, he be allowed to call him as an adverse 
witness. Attached to the motion were copies of Mc-
Donald's swom confession and of the transcript of his 
preliminary hearing at which he repudiated that con-
fession. The trial court granted the motion requiring 
McDonald to appear but reserved ruling on the adverse 
witness motion. At trial, after the State failed to put 
McDonald on the stand, Chambers called McDonald, 
laid a predicate for the introduction of his sworn out-of-
court confession, had it admitted into evidence, and 
read it to the jury. The State, upon cross-examination, 
elicited from McDonald the fact that he had rejected his 
prior confession. McDonald further testified, as he had 
at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise 
of Reverend Stokes that he would not go to jail and 
would share in a sizable tort recovery from the town. 
He also retold his own story of his actions on the evening 
of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe clown the 
street, his absence from the scene during the critical 
period, and his subsequent trip to the hospital with 
Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers renewed his motion to examine McDonald as 
an adverse witness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile, Lut he is not adverse in 
the sense of the word, so your request will he overruled." 
On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, finding that "McDonald's testimony was 
the Slate ha~ not a.ssNtrd :lily inclrprndent state procedural ground 
:ts a basis for not reaching thr merits of petitioner's constitutional 
claim, we hnw no occn~ion to drcicle whether-if surh a ground 
exists-its imposition in t hi~ c:t~c would ~crvr any "lrg;itimn te state 
interest." ld., nt 447. Undrr the~e circnmstnnccs, we cannot doubt 
the propriety of our exercise of jm"i:,;diction. 
/ 
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not adverse to appellant" because " [ n] ow here did he 
point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2d., at 220. 
Defeated in his attempt to challenge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciation of his prior confession, Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three witnesses 
to whom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The first of these, Sam Hardin, would have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting, he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that, while driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objected to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection.4 
Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
said he was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, 
was then called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers with 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they ·were riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald said anything regarding the shooting of 
Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald told him that 
he "shot him." Turner further stated that one week 
later, when he met McDonald at a friend 's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony as to McDonald's self-
·l Hardin's testimony, unlike the te~timony of the other two men 
who stated that McDonald had confessed to them, wa~ art unlly 
given in the jury's presence. After t he State's obj ect ion to Hardin ';; 
account of McDonald 's statement was ::;ustaincd, t he t rinl court 
ordered the jury to disregard it. 
/ 
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incriminating remarks should have been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.6 On appeal, 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
5 A gun dealer from Natchez testified that McDonald had made 
two purchases. The witness' business record;; indicated that 
McDonald purchased a nine-shot .22 caliber revolver about a year 
prior to the murder. He purchased a different style .22 three weeks 
after Liberty's death. 
6 It i ~:; not entirely clear whether the trial court's ruling was 
premitied on the same hearsay rationale underlying the exrlu~ion 
of the other testimony. In this instance the State argued that 
Carter's testimony was an impermissible att.empt by petitioner to 
impeach a witness (McDonald) who was not adverse to him. The 
trial courL did not state why it was excluding the evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hear;;ay. 
252 So. 2d, at 220. 
/ 
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witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule, he was 
unable either to cross-examine McDonald or to present 
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources indicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the 
crime. But all that remained from McDonald's own 
testimony was a single written confession countered by an 
arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense 
was far less persuasive than it might have been had he 
been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's state-
ments to cross-examination or had the other confessions 
been admitted. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
defend against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for 
the Court in lu re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), 
identified these rights as among the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense-a right to his day in court- ·are basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 488-489 
(1972); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 
/ 
il-590R-OPINION 
CHAMBERS v. MISSISSIPPI 11 
(1969); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605, 610 (1967). 
Both of these clements of a fair trial are implicated in 
the present case. 
A 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's damning repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. He was not allowed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
itself whether McDonald's testimony was worthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-243 
( 1895). ThC' right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74. 89 (1970); Bruton v. United I 
States, 391 U. S. 123, 135-137 (1968). It is, indeed, 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 405 (1965). Of course, 
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of tho fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314, 315 (1969). 
In this case. petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald was denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may not impeach his own 
witness. Tho rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, 191 So. 2d 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
/ 
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are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators" were called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and , quite unlike witnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal process.8 It 
might have been logical for the early common law to 
require a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses 
he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having 
selected them especially for that purpose, the party might 
reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are 
rarely able to select their witnesses: they must take 
them where they find them. Moreover, as applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's 9 impact was doubly harm-
ful to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,10 he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the 
7 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 896, at 658-660 (Chadbourn ed. 
1970) ; C. McCormick, Evidence § 38, at 75-78 (2d ed. 1972). 
8 The "voucher" rule has been condemned as archaic, irrational, 
and potentially destructive of the truth gathering process. C. Mc-
Cormick, supra, n. 7; E. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 7(}-71 
(1962); 3A J. Wigmore, supra, n. 7, § 898, at 661. 
0 The "voucher" rule has been rejected altogether by the newly 
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 607, Rule:; of EYidcnce for 
the United States Courts and Magist rates (approved Nov. 20, 1972 
and transmitted to Congress to become effective July 1, 1973). 409 
U.S.- (1972). 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 35-37. 
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witness is bound by anything he might say. He was, 
therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
confession. 
In this Court Mississippi has not sought to defend 
the rule or explain its underlying rationale. Nor has 
it contended that its rule should override the accused's 
right of confrontation. Instead, it argues that there is 
no incompatability between the rule and Chambers' 
rights because no right of confrontation exists unless the 
testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The 
State's brief asserts that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 1 2 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
Chambers.13 And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. It can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seri-
ously adverse to Chambers. The availability of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been 
held to depend on whether the witness was initially put 
11 Respondent's Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
1 " 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
1 3 See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 272 (1913) . 
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on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject 
the notion that a right of such substance in the crim-
inal process may be governed by that technicality or by 
any narrow and unrealistic definition of the word 
"against." The "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, 
plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against 
the State's charges. 
B 
'Ve need not decide, however, whether this error alone 
would occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed denial 
of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
when viewed in conjunction with the trial court's refusal 
to permit him to call other witnesses. The trial court 
refused to allow him to introduce the testimony of 
Hardin, Turner and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on 
three separate occasions shortly after the crime. naming 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. 
The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and 
respected by virtually every State, is based on experience 
and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidcncc 
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-
court statements arc traditionally excluded because they 
lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are 
usually not made under oath or other circumstances that 
impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; 
the declarant's \Yord is not subject to cross-examination; 
and he is not available in order tha.t his demeanor and 
credibility may be assessed by the jury. California v. 
Green, 399 U. S. 149, 158 (1970). A number of excep-
tions have developed over the years to allow admission 
of hearsay statements made under circumstances that 
tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for 
the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
/ 
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examination. Among tho most prevalent of these ex-
ceptions is tho one applicable to declarations against 
interest 11-an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his 
own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary intercst.H; It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case, that are 
against tho penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
State, 99 Miss. 710. 55 So. 961 (1911). 
This materialistic limitation on the declaration-against-
interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by 
most States in their criminal trial processes,"; although 
a number of States have discarded it. 1' Declarations 
against penal interest have also been excluded in federal 
courts under the authority of Donnelly v. United States, 
228 U.S. 243, 272-273 (1913), although exclusion would 
not be required under the newly proposed Federal 
Rules of Eviclence.'R Exclusion, where the limitation 
prevails, is usually premised on the view that admission 
would lead to the frequent presentation of perjured testi-
mony to the jury. It is believed that confessions of 
criminal activity arc often motivated by extraneous con-
siderations and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable 
as statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest. 
While that rationale has been the subject of considerable 
11 .Jeffrr~on, Declaration~ Again~t In1Nrst: An Exrrption 1o 1hr-
.Hrnr~a~· Hulr, 58 H~tl'l'. L. Hr1·. 1 (1944). 
1·; H. ::\ff'Eiroy, Mis~i:<l'ippi E1·idrnre § 46 (19.'55); Fm·est City 
Coop . .4.~8 11. 1'. MtCaffrey, 176 So. 2d 2 7. 289-290 (Mi~s. 1965). 
1° C. l\lrCormirk, supra n. 7, § 278, at 67:); 5 .T. Wigmore, Evi-
drnrr § 1476, nt 283-21'7 n.!) (10·J.O). 
17 Sf'r, e. g., PeoplC' v. 8])1'iggs, 3() Cnl. Rptr. R41, 389 1'. 2d 377, 
60 Cal. 2d RGS (1964); PC'oplC' v. Lettrirh, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N. E. 
2d 488 (1952); People v. Brmcn. 26 N. Y. 2d RR. ::lOR N. Y. S. 2d 
~25, 257 N. E. 2d 16 (1970); IlinC's v. Commonwealth. 136 Ya. 728, 
117 S. E. 843 (1923). 
1 ~ Rule 804, supra n. 9. 
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scholarly criticism,' 9 we need not decide in this case 
whether, under other circumstances, it might serve some 
valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony. 
The hearsay statements involved in this case \vere 
originally made and subsequently offered at trial under 
circumstances that provided considerable assurance of 
their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions 
was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly 
after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case-
McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eye-
witness to the shooting, the testimony that McDonald 
was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and 
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and 
subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer num-
ber of independent confessions provided additional cor-
roboration for each. Third, whatever may be the 
parameters of the penal-interest rationale/0 each 
confession here was in a very real sense self-incrim-
inatory and unquestionably against interest. See 
10 See, e. g., Committee on Rules of Practice & Prorrclurr, Rulrs 
of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 129-131 
(Rev. draft, March 1971); 5 J. Wigmore, supra n. 16, § 1476, at 
284; Wright, Uniform Rules and Hearsay, 26 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 
575 (1957); United States v. Annunziato, 293 F. 2d 373, 378 (CA2), 
rert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961) (Friendly, .J.); Scolare v. United 
States, 406 F. 2d 563, 564 (CA9), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969). 
20 The Mississippi case which refused to adopt a hearsay rxcep-
tion for declarations agninst penal interest concerned an out-of-
court declarant who purportedly stated that he had commit1 eel the 
murder with which his brother had been charp;ed. The Mis~i~~ippi 
Supreme Court believed that the declarant may have been moti-
vated by a desire to free his brother rather than b)· any compul~ion 
of guilt. The Court also noted that the declarant had fled, was 
umwailablo for cross-rxamination, and may wrll have known at 
the time he made the statement that he '"ould not suffer for it. 
Brown v. State, 99 l\1iss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911). Thrrr is, in the 
present case, no such basis for doubting McDonald's statements. 
Sec note, 43 Miss. L. J. 122, 127-129 (1972). f 
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United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 584 (1971); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). Mc-
Donald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner 
not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
tion about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
(1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra, and from the Donnelly-type 
situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavail-
able at the time of triaP1 
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., 
21 MeDonald's presl'nce al~o deprives the State's argument for 
retention of the penal-interest rule of much of its force. In claiming 
that " [t]o change the rule would work a travesty of justice," the 
State posited the following hypothetical: 
"If thr rul0 were changed, A could be charged with the cr1me; B 
could tell C and D that he committed the crime; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify as to B's admission 
of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would r0turn to stand trial; 
B could then provide several witnesses to testify as to his whereabouts 
at the time of the crime. The testimony of those witn<.'.;ses along 
with A's statement that he really committed the crime would result 
in B's acquittal. A would be barred from further pro~ccution 
because of the protection against doublr j0opardy. No onr could 
be convicted of perjury as A did not testify at his first trial, B did 
not lie under oath, and C and D were truthful in their testimony." 
Respondent's Brief, at 7 n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
Obviou:sly, "B's" absence at trial is critical to the success of the 
justice-subverting ploy. 
71-5908-0PINION 
18 CHAMBERS v. MISSISSIPPI 
TV ebb v. Texas, 409 U. S. - (1972); ·washington v. 
Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In Te OliveT, supm. In 
the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of 
the State, must comply with established rules of pro-
cedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and 
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. 
Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more 
respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than 
that applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions 
tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which in 
fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The 
testimony rejected by the trial court here borne persua-
sive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well 
within the basic rationale of the exception for declara-
tions a.gainst interest. That testimony also was critical 
to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where 
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment 
of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be ap-
plied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit 
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a 
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental stand-
ards of due process. In reaching this judgment we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor 
does our holding signal any diminution in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment 
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and 
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent ·with this opmwn. 
It is so ordered_ 
LFP, Jr ./psf 2/21/73 
No. 71-5908 Chambers v. Mississippi 
Petitioner was convicted of murde( and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. His principal defense waythat the murder had 
been committed by one McDonalo/- who had signed a written con-
fession/ which he later repudiated. McDonald, it was claimed, 
had also made three prior oral confessions. -
At the tria~cDonald was called by petitioner as a witness, 
when the state failed to call him. But under Mississippi practice, 
petitioner was !!2.t allowed to cross examine McDonalfas to the 
three alleged oral confessions. 
The trial court, applying the hearsay rule, also refused 
to allow testimor rom the three persons to whom McDonald had 
confessed. 
For the reasons set forth in the opinion, we hold that peti-
tioner was denied a fair tria(in violation of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Accordingly the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
is reversed. 
Mr. Justice White has filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist has filed a dissent. 
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Too-St riel Cons I rud ion 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION NOT l'ROPEJ{LY 
CURBED DEFENSE, SUI'REi\lE COUI{T SAYS 
Two widely approved common-law ruks of 
evidence arc thrown into serious question by the 
U.S. Supreme Court as it holds that (hey were 
unconstitutionally applied against a Mississippi 
niurder defendant in a c<tse ch:Jr.tcterized by weak 
prosecution facts and by strong defense testi-
mony that was kept from the jury. Mr. Justice 
Powell's opinion for the Court holds that the 
defendant's right to presen·t evidence in his own 
defense was denied by Mississippi's refusJI to 
treat declarJtions against a penal interest as ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule and its application of 
the "voucher rule" - that a party cannot impeach 
his own witness. (Chambers v. Mississippi, 
2/21/73) 
The opinion ends with an Jvowal that "we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law," 
and an explanation that denial of a fair trial in 
this case rose to the level of Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process deprivation. But even with its 
caveat that "no diminution of respect" for state 
evidentiary rules is intended, the opinion for the 
first time provides a basis for constitutional 
attack on them. 
In dealing with the so-called "voucher rule," 
the Court construes for the first time the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause's phrase "wit-
. nesses against him." R:1ther than limiting the 
phr<Jse io mean only witnesses who directly 
incriminate a defendant, the Court interprets the 
phr.~se to include a witness whose testimony or 
nontcstimony damages the defense in any way. 
The defense at trial askc<.J to have a witness 
dcclarc<.J "a<.Jversc," but the trial court refused on 
· the ground that the witness· testimony didn't 
directly incriminate the <.Jcfendanl 
The so-called "voucher rule" is still the prevail-
• ing rule in the felkral courts and most states, but 
·. the majority notes that it .has been "condemned 
as nrchaic. irrational, and potcnti::~lly destructive 
of the truth g::~thcring process." \VhJtever validity 
it "may have once enjoyed" and may still enjoy 
in civil c~tses, it bears little relationship. the Court 
declares, to the "realities'' of a criminal tri::~l in 
which "defendants arc rarely able to select their 
witnesses." That difficulty is especially apparen~ 
in this case, ' where the defendant waited vainly in 
hopes that the state would cJII a witness who had 
confessed to the crime, and finally h:1d to call 
him as his own witness when the state did not. 
Finding a second abuse th:ll contributed to the 
cumulative due process violation. the Court holds 
that "the hearsay rule may not be applied 
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice" by 
keeping out l'vidcrKe, inadmissible under state 
law. that would tend to prove innocence. The 
defyndant. the Court says. w:1s improperly kept 
from placing on the stand several witnesses who 
would have testified to the witness' admissions to 
them of the homicide. 
Refusing to treat as sacred the majority rule 
that a dl•~o:Lrrat inn :tgainst rwnal inll'rL·st is still 
inadmissihk hl·:ns:ty, thl' Court requirl·s a strong 
stall' showing of ~·ood reason~; for :tpplic:rt ion of a 
ru k that Kl'l' ps out l' xctrl pat ory kst imony. (Page 
3150) 
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Clwmbcr::>, who haL; insisted on hiD innocence 
from the outoct, still suffers headaches and poor hearin~ 
from the gunohot wounds. The World War II veteran, a 
softspoken man who had no prior criminal record, said in 
an interview, "I think they're gonna let me go because 
Mr. Clark and Mr. Westen turned in a good report to the 
Supreme Court." 
But the district attorney who prosecuted Chambers, 
Lennox L. Foreman, now a circuit judge, said, "If he 
gets a new trial and I were prosecuting attorney, I would 
demand the case be tried again. The evidence was so 
strong as to his guilt that I belieye the jury would have 
convicted him even if the court had let the hearsay evidence 
in." 
Foreman called the . allegations about McDonald 
"a frame-up to get Chambers off." "The Sheriff and I 
checked that out," he said. "We had an eyewitness, a 
white police officer, and that was good enough." 
And Deputy Geter, interviewed at a Natchez paper 
mill where he works, vowed to testify again. "It wasn't 
/ 
no mistake about what I said at the trial," said Geter, 
holding up his hand. "That's my right hand to God, if 
anyone killed Aaron Liberty, Chambers killed him because 
my eyes don't fool me. If he gets another trial I'' ask 
that he be prosecuted again. He killed one of his kind 
and yet Liberty was a good man." 
Geter believes the Supreme Court will rule against 
Chambers. "We're putting a little American back in the 
country," he said. "We've been over to the left too long. 
I have enough confidence in the Supreme Court as it is today 
that they arc not gonna turn a murderer loose on the streets. 
I don't believe Ram::wy Clark can steer the Supreme Court." 
,, 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71- 5908 
Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
r January -, 1973] 
MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonment and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner ·was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order >vas reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405 
U. S. 987 ( 1972), to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for 
murder occurred in the small town of Wood ville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
/ 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attentpt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated by 20 or 25 
men in the crowd who intervened and ·wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Three deputy sheriffs arirved shortly there-
after and the officers again attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots were fired. Fonnan was looking in a different 
direction when the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gun into an alley in the area from 
which the shots appeared to have come. The first shot 
vvas wild and high and scattered the crov,·d standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot and hit one 
of the men in the crowd in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran down the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyoue. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he \Yas 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not sec whether Chambers had a 
gun in his ham!, he did see Chambers "break his arm 
clowu" shortly before the shots were fired. The officers 
who saw Chambers fall thought he was dead but they 
made no effort at that time either to examine him or 
to search for the murder weapon. Instead they attended 
to Liberty, who was placed in the police car and taken to 
the hospital where he "·as declared dead on arrival. 
A subsequellt autopsy showed that he had been hit 
with four shells from a .22-caliber revolver. 
71-5908-0PI:'\101\ 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he 'Yas not yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
:1 car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night. \Yhen the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers \\·as still alive a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
the capital offense of murdering Liberty. He pleaded 
not guilty and has asserted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, \\"aS in the crowd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day. he left his wife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
same year he returned to Woodville when his wife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his, known as Rev-
erend Stokes, \\·anted to sec him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in N atchcz, Mississippi, several miles north of 
Woodville and, upon his return. McDonald \Yent to sec 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, who maintained 
offices in Natchez. T\rO clays later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices aml gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his. James Williams. that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his O\Yn pistol, a nille-shot .22-
caliber revolver. which he hacl discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession was 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confessio11 had been transcribed, 
'.J<tmr~ \Yilli:uns \\"as indietrd alou~ \\"ith Chambrn.:. Tlw Stnt.r, 
lwwrvrr, fa ilt>d lo int rod li('C' nn~· C'\ idrncc at trial that roulcl im]ll iea to 
'i'i'ill i:t Ill~ in the ~!toot in~. At the C'Onrlu~ion or t ltr Stat o'::; ca~c-in­
('hid tho trial court ~ranted a directed nrdi('( in his favor. 
/ 
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signed, and witnessed, McDonald was taken over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of \iV oodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not kno·w what had happened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
tim.e. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year." At trial he endeavored to develop two 
~Upon Chambers' motion, a change of venue was granted and 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the cast of Woodville. The 
change of trial setting was in response to !)Clitioner's clnim that, 
because of adver~c publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
and sheriff's staffs in Woodville, he could not obtnin a fnir and 
impartinl trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no weapon 
was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he was standing in the street near 
where Liberty was shot, that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring the facts sur-
rounding this defense to the jury's attention. Samuel 
Hardin, a lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that 
he saw McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness-
one of Liberty's cousins-testified that he saw McDonald 
immediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers' primary goal was to show the jury that 
McDonald had repeatedly confessed to the crime. 
Chambers attempted to prove that McDonald admitted 
responsibility for the murder on four separate occasions, 
once when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' 
counsel and three other times prior to that occasion in 
private conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was th,varted in his attempt to 
present this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi evidence rules. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
/ 
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of due process of la\Y." It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought 
a ruling that, if the State chose not to call McDonald 
itself, he be allowed to call him as an adverse witness. 
Attached to the motion were copies of McDonald's sworn 
confession and of the transcript of his preliminary hear-
ing at \Yhich he repudiated that confession. The trial 
court granted the motion requiri11g McDonald to appear 
but resen·ed ruling on the adverse witness motion. At 
trial, and after the Stat<' had failed to put McDonald on 
the stand, Chambers called McDonald. laid a predicate 
for the introduction of his sworn out-of-court confession, 
had it admitted into evidence, and rend it to the jury. 
The State, upon cross-examination, elicited from Mc-
Dollalcl the fact that he had r<'jerted his prior confee:;:ion. 
'1 On thr record in this ca~e, it i ~ drnr th:lt Chamhrr~' a~~rrtc•cl 
drni:d of dur proc·t'-'' i~; proper!~- bdorr 11~. llr obirrted during 
trial to r:tch of thr rour!'~ ruling~. A~ to tlH' confrontation c·laim, 
prtitimwr a~-<rrtrd both brfore and dming tri;tl, hi~ right to trrnt 
:\IcDonnld as nn ndwr~r \\'itnr~~- IIi~ motion for 11<'11. t ri:tl, filt'd 
aftt'r thr jmy's Yerdirt, liHtcd a~ rrror thr trinl romt's rdus:d to 
prrmit cro~~-rxamination of l\[cDon;tld nnd the rxclu.<ion of f'l·i-
dc•nr·p rorrohor:lt iw of l\TcD~nald's guilt. Thr mot ion ronrlmlrd 
th:\1 the trial "~raR not in nr•r·ord \\'ith fundamrnt:1 l f:tirnr•" ?;u:tr:tn-
trrd h~· thr llourternth Amrndmmt of thr Con~titution." Cb.nnlwr~ 
rr:t~~PrtNI tlto~r cl:tim,.; on npprnl to tltr Rtntr Ruprrmr Comt. 
Aftrr thr nffirm:l!1er of hi' f'onvirtion b~- thnt rourt, Chnmhrrs 
filrd a prtition for rchrnrin~ ndclrrssrd n lmo~t rntirrl ~· to thr rl:lim 
t h:tf hi.; t ri:tl h:1d not bern conduct rd in a n::t ntwr r·on ~ i~t rnt 1\ it h 
tr:ulitionnl notions of clur JH'OCC'""· Thr State Supr<>mr Court rai.;cd 
no qur"t ion t h:1t Chnmbrr,' elaint~ 1\'<'l'(' not proprrl~- n""rrtrd, and 
rhim is made hrrr thnt thr qurstions arr not proprrl~- rrvirw:dllr 
h~- thi" Court. Srr Strrrt \'. 1\"ew }"or!:. 8!).1 LT. R . .'i7r>. 51'1--582 
(1!169); Douglas \'. Alabama, 880 U. R. 41.'\, 420-!28 (l!'lri5). 
/ 
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McDonald further testified, as he had at the preliminary 
hearing. that he clicl not !"hoot Liberty, am! that he con-
fessed to the crime only on the promise of Reverend Stokes 
that he 'yould not go to jail and would share in a sizable 
tort recovery from the town. Ire also retold his own 
story of his actions on the evening of tbe shooting, in-
cluding his vil"it to the cafe down the street, his absence 
from the scene during the critical period, and his sub-
sequent trip to the hospital with Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers renewed his motion to examine McDonald as 
an adverse witness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile, but he is not adverse in 
the ::-eni"e of the word. so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, finding that "lVIcDonald's testimony was 
not adveri"e to appellant" berause "I n·lowhere did he 
point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2d., at 220. 
Defrated in his attempt to chalienge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciation of his prior confession. Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three witnesses 
to "·hom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The first of thel"e, Samuel Hardin. " ·ould have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting. he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that while driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objected to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection! 
'lLtrdin'~ tr,.;timon~·. unlikr thr ir~timon~· of tbr other two nwn 
who ~tatrd that l\[rDonald had confr~-rcl to thrm, \\·n~ aet unlly 
l!:i,·en in thr .im~··~ prr~rm·r. After thr Statr'~ ob.irction to Hardin',; 
account of l\IrDonald'" :-;tatrmrnt was sust a inrcl , thr irinl romt 
ordrrrd thr jmy to cli~rrgard it. 
/ 
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1n Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
had said he was drinking beer \vhen the shooting occurred, 
also was called to testify. In the jury's presence. and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers 'vith 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they \Yere riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony regarding McDonald's 
self-incriminating remarks should have been admitted 
as an exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial 
court sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded.5 The jury was not 
5 A gun dealer from Natchez testified that Mr Donald had made 
two purchases. The witness' busine~s record~ indirn ted that 
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allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.a On appeal 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's rule and 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay ru1c, he was 
witnesses in his O\vn behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers hacl, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources iJJClicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of tho 
crime. But what remained was a single confession and 
an arguably acceptable renunciation. It was far less 
persuasive than Chambers' defense might have been had 
he been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's 
statements to cross-examination or had the other confes-
sions been introduced. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to the murder. IIe purchased a different ~t ylc .22 three ,,·eeks 
after Liberty'~ death. 
0 It is not entirely clear whether the trial court'~ rulilli!: was 
premised on the same hearsay rationale underlying the cxdu~ion 
of the other testimony. In this instance the State argued that 
Carter's testimony was an impermissible attempt by petitioner to 
impeac-h a witness (McDonald) who was not adyerse to him. The 
trial court did not state why it was excluding the evidence but the 
Stale Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hearsay. 
252 So. 2d, at 220 . 
/ 
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defend against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to clue process. Mr. J usticc Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), 
identified these rights as mnong the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense-a right to his day in court-arc basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
Sec also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969); 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of those 
elements of a fair trial are implicated in the present case. 
A 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to sub,icct 
McDonald's clamming repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. lie " ·as not allO\Yed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conseicncc so that the jury might judge for 
itself \Yhethcr McDonald's te~timony was \\'Orthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United Slates, 156 U. S. 237, 242- 243 
( 1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. :-;, 74, 80 (1070). It is. indeed, 
"an e:.;;sential and funclamrntal requirement for the kind 
of fair trial \Yhich is this country's constitutional goal." 




the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may, in appropriate cases. bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interc. ts in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 303 U. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case. petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald was rlcnicd on the basis of a Mississippi coin-
mon la\Y rule that a party may not impeach his own 
\Yitness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party \\·ho calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, 101 S. 2d 123. 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "youchcr" rule 
arc uncertain, .it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators'' \Yere ca1led to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesf:CS in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal process. Crim-
inal defendants do not select their witnesses; they must 
take them where they find them. Moreover. the rule has 
been condemned as archiac. irrational, and potentially 
dcstmctive of the truth-gathering procC'ss.' It recently 
7 3.\ .T. Wigmon' , EYiclrner § S96 , at 6.51\-ofil (Chadbourn rd. 
1070); C. l\IrCormick, EYillrnrc § 38, at 75-78 (J972). 
' C. l\leCormick, E1·idrn('c § :31', at 75-78 (HY/2); E. :\Iorgan, 
H:1~ic Prohlrm~ of E1·iclrncr 70-71 (19G2); 3A .J. Wigmore. El·i-
dcncr ~ SDS, nt 661 (Chadbourn rd. 1!)70). 
/ 
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has been rejected altogether by the new Rules of Evi-
dence applicable in all federal courts.n As applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's impact was douLly harmful 
to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument, 10 he "·as also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
"voucher" rule's corollary requirement that the examiner 
is bound by anything the witness might say. He was, 
therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the \Yritten 
confession. 
Mississippi does not go so far as to contend that its 
rule should override the accused's right of confrontation. 
Instead, it argues that there is no incompatability be-
tween its rule and Chambers' rights because no right 
of confrontation exists unless the testifying witness is 
"adverse" to the accused. The State's brief in this 
Court asserts, therefore, that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
9 Rule 607, Rules of Evidence for the United State8 Courts and 
l\1agistrates (approved Nov. 20, 1972). 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
u BespondenL'" Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
12 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
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Chambers.]:! And . in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald 's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. In these circum-
stances, it can hardly be disputed that McDonald's testi-
mony ·was in fact seriously adverse to Chambers. The 
right to confront and cross-examine one 'vvho gives dam-
aging testimony against an accused is a matter of sub-
stance, and does not turn on technicalities as to whether 
the witness was initially put on the stand by one party 
or the other. \V e conclude that the State's "voucher" 
rule, as applied in this case, impermissibly interfered 
'vith Chambers' constitutional rights. 
B 
Chambers' efforts to present to the jury the full picture· 
of McDonald 's possible responsibility for Liberty's mur-
der was further frustrated by the trial court's refusal 
to allow him to introduce the testimony of Hardin, 
Turner, and Carter. Each would have testified to the 
statements purportedly made by McDonald, on three 
separate occasions shortly after the crime, implicating 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. The hearsay rule is normally respected. 
It is a rule based on long experience and grounded in the 
notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be pre-
sented · to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are· 
traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional 
indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under 
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker· 
with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's 
word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not 
available in order that his demeanor and credibility may 
be assessed by the jury. California v. Green, 399 U. s_ 
149, 158 (1970). 
1 3 See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243,272 (1913) . 
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A number of exceptions have been developed over the 
years to allo"· admisf'ion of hearsay statements made 
u nclcr circumstances that tend to assure reliability and 
thereby compensate for the absence of the oath and 
opportunity for cross-examination. Among the most 
prevalent exceptions arc declarations against interest 14 -
an exception founded on the af'sumption that a person 
is unlikely to fabricate a statcm.ent against his own inter-
est at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes that 
exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary in tcrcst. 1" It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like ~1cDonald's in this case, that are 
against the penal intereFt of the declarant. Brown v. 
State, 00 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911). 
Prior to the changes accomplished by the new Federal 
Rules of Evidence,"' declarations against penal interest 
were normally excluded in federal courts under the au-
thority of Donnelly v. United Stales, 228 U. S. 243, 272-
273 (1013). The exclusion was premised on the belief 
that confessions of criminal act,ivity might be motivated 
by num.erous extraneous considerations and, therefore, 
arc not inherently as reliable as statements against pecu-
niary or proprietary interest. While that rationale has 
been the subject to scholarly criticism," we need not 
decide in this case \Yhether, under other circumstanC'es, 
11 .TrfTrr,llll, DC'cl:t ra 1 ions Ag:tin:-;t lntC'n'.-;1, .')S HalT. L. HC'I '. l 
(10~~). 
1
'' IT. 1\ld-:1 ro.1·, ]\ l is~i:-;sippi E1·idrnrc ~ -Hi ( 19fi.5). 
1
" Hnlr RO-t, Rules of E1·idC'nre for thC' Fnitrd Stair:< Court~ :tnd 
:\Iagi,.:t m IP:< (a pprowd l\ 01·. 20, 1972). 
"SC'C'. r. g .. Ad1·ison· Commillrr i\otC'". Hnlr SO-t. Rulr" of El·i-
dt'!H'(' for the Cnitrd State..: Court" and :\fagislr:t,r..: (:tpprm·pd 
i\oY. 20, Hl72): 5 .T. "'i11:more. E\·idrnee ~1 -m\. at 21'4 (8d rd. 
10-tO): \Yrighl. Fniform Rub of H(>;tr:<n~ ·. 21\ lf. Cimt. L. He1·. 
575 (Hlii7): United States'"· Anmmzinto. 293 F. 2d 37:3, :ns (C.\2), 
rPrl. denircl, 3(i'i U. S. 919 (J!.liH) (Fric'11Cll.1·, .T.): Stolair Y. United 
States, 40G F. 2d .')fi3, 55-1- (C.\9), rc•rl. drnird , 39:3 U. 8. 981 (101l9) .. 
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it might serve some valid state purpose by excluding 
untrustworthy testimony. 
Each of the hearsay statcnwnts involved in this case 
was originally made and subsequently offered at trial 
under circumstances that attested to its reliability. First, 
each of McDonald's confessions "·as made spontaneously 
to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had 
occurred. Second. each one was corroborated by some 
other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn confes-
sion, the testimony of an eyewitness. and other testimony 
consistent with his statement, including prior ownership 
of a .22-caliber revolver and his subsequent purchase 
of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent 
confessions provided additional corroboration for each. 
Third, whatever may be the parameters of the penal-
interest rationale.'' each confession here \Yas in a very 
real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against 
interest. Sec United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 473. 484 
(1971); Dullon v. Rvans, 400 U. R. 74. 89 (1970). 
McDonald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his rolo 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed. after telling 
Turner of his involvement. he subsequently urged Turner 
"not to mecs him up." Finally, if there \Yas any ques-
"Thr :\ Ii,:sis~ippi ra~r \\'hirh rrfu"rd to adopt a hr:~ r,:a~· rxrrp-
tion for dcrlaration" agnin,:t prwll intrrr~t ronrrrnrd nn out-of-
c·omt drrlarant \\'ho pmportrdly stated thnt hr hnd rommittrd the 
:nurdN \\'ith \\'hieh his brotlwr had hr<•n charged. Thr i\Ti""i"sippi 
Ruprrmr Court brlir,wl that thr drdnrant ma~· haYc bern moti-
nted h~· a dr~ire to frre hi~ brother rnthrr th:m b~· nn~· compulsion 
of guilt. Thr Comt ;lbo notre! that thr drrlnrant hnd flrd. \\'ns 
tiiJaYaibblr for cro~s-rxamination, and mn~· \\'ell ban• kno\\'n nt 
t ilr 1imr hr m:tde t hr ~tnt emrnt t hn t he would not ~ttf'f<'r for it. 
Rrozcn "· State. 99 :\Ti,~. 719, 5.5 So. 961 (1011). T!Jrrr is, in thQ 
Jll'<':'<'nt rnse, no suC"il ba~i~ for doubting l\1C"Donald'~ ~tatcmrnts. 
/. 
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tion about the truthfulness of the ext.ra.i udicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
(1970). Tho availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra, and from Donnelly, since in both 
cases the declarant was unavailable at the time of tr.ial.' 9 
Fe"· rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., 
Wa.shington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In re 
Oliver, supra.. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence which are de-
signed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps 
no rule of evidence has been more respected or more 
frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable 
to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow 
tn l\1cDonald's prrsencr nlHo drprives ihr Statr'~ argnmrnt .for 
rrtrntion of the prnal-intere~t rulr of much of its forcr. In claiming 
that "[t]o changr the rnlr would work n travc~ty of ju~ticr," the 
Statr positrd thr following hypothrtical: 
''If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime: B 
could tell C ::mel D that he committed the crimr; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would trstify a~ to B's admission 
of guilt; A could be acquittrd and B would ret mn to stand trial; 
B could then provide sevrrnl witnessrs to cstify as to hi~ wherrabouts 
at. the time of the crime. The testimony of ihosr witnrHsrs along 
with A's statement that he really committrcl thr crime would result 
in B'~ acquittal. A would be barred from fmther pro~ecution 
brcanse of the protrrtion against double jropardy. No onr could 
be convicted of prrjury as A did not trstify at his first tri<tl , B did 
not lie under oath, nncl C nnd D were tmthful in their trst imony." 
Respondent's Brid, at 7 n. 3 ( cm1)ha~is supplied). 
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the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to 
be trustworthy have long existed. Recognition that 
the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to 
defeat the ends of justice is especially appropriate in 
this case. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
as to McDonald's several confessions bore significant 
assurances of trustworthiness. In light of all the facts , 
no interest of the State in enforcing its hearsay rule 
could outweigh Chambers' right to present this evidence 
of critical importance to the jury trying him for a cap-
ital offense. 
We conclude that, taken together, the prevention of 
cross-examination and the exclusion of critical evidence 
deprived Chambers of the fair trial guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
We add that in reaching this judgment, and in setting 
aside Chambers' conviction, we invoke no new prin-
ciples of law. Nor does our holding signal any dimunition 
in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in 
the establishment and implementation of their own 
criminal trial rules and processes. Rather, we hold 
quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of 
this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers 
of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered._ 
JrJ.b 
A t DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES· 
No. 71-5908 
Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
[January -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELl.~ delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonment and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order was reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405 
U. S. 987 ( 1972) , to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for· 
murder occurred in the small town of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
/. 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attempt to handcuff J ad::son was frustrated by 20 or 25 
men in the crowd who intervened a11d wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Three deputy sheriffs al{frNed shortly there-. 
after and the officers again attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots \Yere fired. Forman was looking in a different 
direction when the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gun into an alley in the area from 
which the shots appeared to have come. The first shot 
was wild and high and scattered the cro1vcl standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot ancl hit one 
of the men in the crowd in the back of the head a11d 
neck as he ran clown the alley. That man was Leon 
Chan1bcrs. 
Officer Forman could not sec from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he was 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not see 1vhether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he did sec Chambers "break his arm 
down" shortly before the shots vverc fired. The officers 
w 10 sa1Y Chambers fall thought he \\'as dead but they 
made no effort at that time either to examine him or 
to search for the murder \\'Capon. Instead they attcnclccl 
to Liberty, who \Yas placed in the police car and taken to 
the hospital where he \\'as cleclarecl dead on arrival. 
A subsequent autopsy showed that he had been hit 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he was not yet dead. James vVilliams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
a car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night. "·hen the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers was still alivr a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
1
1 
Jo ~ r- f '/ 's yv~I/Jod 0 . # Hss of muHI-et'i+1-g:-I.i~tz. He plead eel 
not guilty and has asserted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, ,,·as in the crowd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day. he left his \Yife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
same year he returned to ·wood ville when his \Yife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his, known as Rov-
ercml Stokes, ,,·anted to sec him. Stokes om1cd a gas 
station in N atchcz, Mississippi, several miles north of 
\Yoodville and. upon his rctur11. McDonald \\'cnt to sec 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, \Yho maintained 
offices in Katchcz. T\YO clays later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a S\vorn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
tolcl a friend of his, James Williams, that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his own pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolver. \Yhich he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In respon~e to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, :McDonald affirmed that his confession \\'as 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to como 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
1 .Tntn~'~ \Yilli:1m~ \1':1~ indietrd along \\'itb Chambrr."'. Thr Rtnt.r, 
holl'f'l'l' r, fa ikd to int rodnc·e un,v cYidt'IH'r at trial t h:t t could imp I ic·a to 
\Villiam~ in the ~hooting. i\L the em1rlu~ion of thr Slate's (':l~r-in­
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signed, and witnessed, McDonald was ~ over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of Woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had happened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year.2 At trial he endeavored to develop two 
"Upon Chamber::;' motion, a change of venue wns granted and 
the Lrial was held in Amite County, to the cast of Woodville. The 
change of trial setting was in response to petitioner's claim that, 
because of adverse publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
and sheriff's staffs in Wood ville, be could not obtn in a fair and 
impartial trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no weapon 
was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he was standing in the street near 
where Liberty was shot, that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially sue-_.) 
cessful, ho·wever, in his efforts to bring the- facts ~St!.f­
rounding this defense to the jury1~ attentio . Sam~ 
Hardin, a lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that 
he saw McDonald shoot Liberty. A second 'vitnes~ 
one of Liberty's cousin~testified that he saw McDona1d 
immediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers' ]')tj;rl'lftPY goal '>'11¥1 to show the jury that 
- McDonald had repeatedly confessed to the crime. 
Chambers attempted to prove that McDonald admitted 
responsibility for the murder on four separate occasions, 
once when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' 
counsel and three other times prior to that occasion in 
private conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his atteinpt to 
present this portion of his defe11se by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi evidenc rules, Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did u11successfully in his' 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
... 
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of duo process of law>" It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine rareful1y the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requestiug the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chan1bers also sought 
--=a ruling that, if the State chose not to call McDonald 
itself. he be allowed to call him as an adverse witness. 
Attached to the motion were copies of McDonald's sworn 
confession and of the transcript of his preliminary hear-
ing at which he repudiated that confession. The trial 
court granted the motion requiring McDonald to appear 
but reserved ruling on the adverse witness motion. At 
trial~ after the State~ failed to put McDonald on 
the stand, Chambers called McDonald, laid a predieate 
for the introduction of his sworn out-of-court ronfession, 
had it admitted into evidence, and read it to the jury. 
The State, upon cross-examination, elicited from Mc-
Donald the fact that he had rejected his prior confession. 
" On tho record in thi~ case, it i~ dear lh:d Ch:\lubrr"' a~"orled 
drninl of duo proeP~~ i.~ propc•rl.1· before u~. IIr nb.ir('lrcl dming 
lri:1l to rnrh of thr court'" rulings. As to the cnnfrnnl:ilion (']aim, 
prlitioncr n~ .-ortcc~bnth brforr and clming trial , hi~ right to t.reclt 
::\[cDonnlcl a~ a11 ftch·cr"r \Yitnr"~· IIi~ motion for nrw tri:tl, filed 
:t ft rr I he .i my'~ nrd irt, 1 i~t rd n~ <'!Tor t hr 1 rial com I·~ rrfn~:ll to 
permit rro~s-oxnminat ion of l\1cDon:tld nncl the rx('ltl,;ion of rl·i-
dc•nce rorrohomti1·r of 1\Tl'Don:Ilcr~ guilt. Tho motion concluclcd 
tlint tlw trinl "wn.-; not in neconl with fundanwntal f:tirnc~" gu:.ran-
tcrd b~· tho Four I ront h Amondmrnt of thr Con~l ilul ion." Ch:llnhcr:; 
rra~~crtcd thoso clnirnR on appo[tl to thr Slato Suprrmo Comt. 
After tho nffirm:tnrr of hi;; rom·ictio.n h:v th.1t c-ourt, ChamhorR 
filrcl a priilion for rchrariug nclclros~rd almo~l entirrlv to tho daim 
thnt hi~ t1i:Il hncl not bo"n conducted in a manner con~i~tcni with 
imrlilionnl notions of duo prorr~~. Tho Stato Suprrmc Coml r:1i~cd 
no q11rstion th::t Chnmbor::;' da.im~ '"orr not proprrl~· n'~rrtrd, nn~ no 
ri[Illl1 tnado ~that I he qur~l'ions aro nol propNI~· rc,·i<•\\·:lhlo 1\ 
h~· thi., Com. Sro Strrct Y. ll'ew 1'ork, ~0~ F. S . .')/G .. 'i~l-·582 
(HlGO); Do glas v. A/abmna. 380 U. S. 4l."i, 420-+2::\ (HlGii) . 
~; 
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McDonald furthrr testified, as he had at the preliminary 
hearing, that hr did not ~hoot Liberty, and that he con-
fessed to the crime only on the promise of Reverend Stokes 
that he would not go to jail and \Youlcl share in a sizable _ 
tort recovery from thr town. He also retold his own 
story of his actions on the evening of the shooting, in-
cluding his visit to the cafe down the street, his absence 
from the scene clming the critical period. and his sub-
sequent trip to the hospital with Chambers. 
At the conclui"ion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers rrnrwecl his motion to examinr McDonald as 
an advrrse witness. Thr trial court denied the motion. 
stating: "He may be hostile, hut he is not advrrse in 
the se11se of the wore!, so your request will be overruled." 
On appea ~the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruli'ng. finding that "McDonald's testimony was -
not aclvrrse to appellant" because "r n low here did he 
point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2cl., at 220. 
Defeated in his attrmpt to challenge directly Mc-
Do11alcl's renunciation of his prior confession. Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three witnesf'es 
to whom McDonald hacl admitted that hr shot the officer. 
The first of these, Sam.S Hardin, would have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting. he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and tha~ while driviug 
l\fcDonalcl home later that night, McDouald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State ob,iectecl to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it was hearf'ay. The 
trial court sustained the objection! 
1 Hardin'~ tr~timon~·. unlike thr 1r~timon~· of thr othC'r two tnC'Il 
\rho ~l:ttrcl that l\feDon~1ld h:1cl eonfr~..:rcl to lhrm, mt~ actu:illy 
giwn in thr jur~· ';; prr..:rncr. Aftrr t hr Rt!l tr'" oh.irct ion to II:mlin',., 
!tt·c·ount of l\IcT)onald ·~ ~~ :1 trmcnt was sust aitwd, t hr t ri:1l court 
orc!C'rrd t hr jury to cl i~rrgn rd it. 
/. 
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£ Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
~ said he was drillking beer when the shooting occurred, 
~ was called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
Wit 1out objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers 'vith 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they were riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court ( 0 /:(; 
n
atements, Turner's testimony regardi1(g McDonald's 
If-incriminating remarks should have been admitted 
s an exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial 
ourt sustained the State's objection. 
~ The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
lleighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
"A gun dealer from Natchez testified that McDonald hnd mnde 
two purchases. The witness' bu~ine~s record~ indicated that 














i "' - ~
~ 
allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statemeuts were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection." On appeal1 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower C'ourt's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. " ~ 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a ~ i 
eolJEWqnetH'Je ef tJ;tQ e8t¥teiiH'ttiEH'I 8f MiBBi~~it~pi's Fttle andr ~ q 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party ,( ~ 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule, he was ~
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had , however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources i11dicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, p tA.Jd/ 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the f.,.!1"W1 J'nc. CM 
crime. But ~ remaine<.1 1was a smgle ~_Qonfession OW<"~ '~"' ew+h 
an arg_uably accertable renur~ was far I~-. 
persuasive than Gh!!ffi~e~ elden~ might have been had \ 
1e been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's 
statements to cross-examination or had the other confes-
sions been i'lti:98ttce1 
1-cl.,...,,...-e III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to the murder. He purchased a different style .22 three \Yrrks 
after Liberty's death. 
"It is not entirely rlear whether the trial court'::; rulinp; wa::; 
prrmi~rd on the same hea rsay rationale underl~· ing the exelusion 
of the other te::; timony. In t.his instancr the State argut'd that 
Carter's te::;t.imony was an impermissible attrmpl by petitionrr to 
imprach a witnrs::; (McDonald) who was not ad\-crsc to him. The 
Lrial court did noL stale why it was excluding the evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicated that it wu" rxelnded u::; hear:;~1y . 
252 So. 2d, aL 220. 
,. ' 
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defend against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own brhalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. J ust.icc Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), 
idcntifird these rights as among the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a chnrge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense- a right to his clay in court- arc basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude. as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you. to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969); 
Spechl v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of~ +hc t C. 
elements of a fair trial arc implicated in the present rase. 
A 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's dam;ging repudiation and alibi to cross-
exmninat.ion. If e " ·as not allO\Ycd to test the witness' 
recollection. to probe into the details of his alibi. or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
iteclf whether McDonald's testimony "·as ,,·orthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United Slates, 156 U.S. 237, 242- 243 
(1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It .is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74. 80 (1970). It is. indeed. 
"an ce~cntial and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Te:ras, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (Hl63). Of course, 
I 
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the right to co1tfront and to croEs-cxamine is not absolutc 
and may, in ap11ropriate ca~es. bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger V. California, 303 r. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's requcst to cross-examine 
McDonald was denied on the basis of a. Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may not impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the pre~umption-without 
regarc! to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a "·itncss "vouches for his credibility." 
Clarl; v. Lansford, HH S~ 2d 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical O~'igins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in "·hich "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators'' were called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their ass<'rtions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
'Vhatever validity the "voucher" rnle may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-----twnship to the realities of the criminal process." Criny/ 
inal dcfen ants Clo not se1ect their witnes-=es; they yrfist 
take them where they find them. l\1Qreover, th rule has 
been condemned a archiac, irrational, a1itl potentially 
destructive of the truth-gathering process.~ It ree@'fltly 
7 3A .T. Wip;morr, Evidrmr § R9H, at G5R-HG1 (Chadbourn rcL 
1970); C. :\IeCorruiC'k, E1·ic!Pllcc § 38, []( 75-78 (1972). 
'1\C. l\I('Conuirk, E1·idmcr § :3S, at 75-7R (1972): E. l\Torp;an, 
Ba~te Problrm' of Evidrtwr 70-71 (1962); 3A J. vVi11:morr, E,·i-
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the right to c01Ifront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may. in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
clenial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. Calijor11ia, 393 F. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald was denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may 110t impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the presumption-vv·ithout 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party \\'ho calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
CZar/; V. Lansford, 191 s~ 2cl 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical o~·igins of the "voucher" rule 
arc uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators" \\'ere called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike \Yitnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
·whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
r~--.:_toclay in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tiOnship to the realities of the criminal process."} Criry 
inal ClefencraDts co not select their \Yitnesses; the~st 
take them where they fi11d them, Moreov~r.~t~he~~·u~le~h~a~S..J.~~=-
been condemued as archiac. jyr'!'ltj""n 1 - ' b 12/27/72 
A £>CC•---' . - - 'd B . P . 11 Cham ers -
~- The'voucher 
R1 er , · 
} 
~ ndemned as archaic' irrational, 
' has been co 
and potentially destructive 
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the right to co11front and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may, in appropriate cal'es, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal t rial process. 
E. g., .Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger V. California, 393 r. s. 314 (1969). 
In this caFe, petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald \\'as denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon la\\' rule that a party may 110t impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the prcsumption-\Yithout 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Rider A, p. 11 Chambers 12/27/ 72 
It might have been logical for the early common law to require 
a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses he brought before 
the jury to affirm his veracity. Having selected them especially 
for that purpose, the party mightfreasonably be expected to stand 
firmly behind their testimony. But in modern criminal trials 
defendants are rarely able to select their witnesses: they must 
~J()A 
take them where they find them. '- applied in this case, the 
9 
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~
las bee.n rejected altogether b the. new 11ul 6f Evi 
dence a )lica.ble in all federal courts.9 As applied ir 
th's case th e "voucher" ~mp.act was Qg.ubl hm1Trfu 
to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. K ot only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,'" he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the~ 
rule's corollary ~~irement that the Q~EQl;ain~ po. )>.l-1 
by anything -4JlQ untn~ might say. He was, t--
lerefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir- tho 1 1 
cumstances of McDonald 's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
esswn. 
ississippi do s not go so far as t cout.c.w;l ~ _ 
.m.u.~~!H.oWo~~~~e-fi@8~' -rigl om l}~o6. 
Instea~ argues that there is no incompatability be-
t"·een • rule and Chambers' rights because no right 
4\ 
of confrontation exists unless the testifying witness is 
"adverse" to the accused. The State's brief iR t.Rie (' 
~ asserts, ihet~eter~ that the "right of confrontation 
Is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 1 2 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
he argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
u ~ule 607, Rules of Evidence for the United State,; Court~ and 
l\Iagistratrs (approved NO\' . 20, 1972 ,I 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
11 Hespondent's Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
12 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
L 
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~las been re.i ected altogrth or b tb.e. new: l of. Evi lence a licable in all federal ourts. 0 As applied i this case, the "voucher" ~mpa t was~ubl harrrrfu 
to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. l\ ot only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald , but, 
rule's corollary ~~irement that the ~~~u~;lin~ po.-... "J c,tl-1/,,..' fh C. 
as the State conceded at oral argument/" he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the~ 
is bound by anything .l;,RQ uotn~ might say. He was, t--- tS S 
1erefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir- tN 1 
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions --
and from challenging the renunciation of tt-~ 
~ession. 
ht to defend 
. . i has not soug 
·s court Miss~ss~PP ·n rationale· Nor 
In th~explain . ftiid underlY~ g h accused's 
le or 4ilii4 ~ts hould override t e 
ru ru 1e s -------------that itS 
has it contended J ~ -"5 
· on t Cl b " l'' f ontat~ • __ .. 5 cr a 1am ers, · 
right of con r -u uuali Chambers' constitutional right 
.,~:~.::; not involved . .. he argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
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Chambers.' :' And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
~..---.... extent that it exculpated McDonald. In these- cir~w.n-.. 
st.anc~]: can hardly be disputed that McDonald's testi-
~ 
mony was in fact seriously adverse to Chambers. 
· ght fu eonfretltr-and-ercrss=mra1mne one who gives m-
aging testimony again st an accused is a 111,a of sub-
stance, a11d does not turn on technicalities as to whether 
the witness was initially put oh the stand by one party 
or the ot11er. vVe conclude that ti1~tate's "'loucher" 
rule, as 'applied in this case, imperm~terfJre 
~th Chambers' coustitut_ional rights. 
. - / 
~ B 
Chan~' efforts to prQScJ~t to the jury the f&n }3. 
'C.Donald's p~ responsibilij.y-fur-Liberty's mur 
further frustrated e trial court's refus 
to allo;, him to in UQ_Q the testimony of -Han:liL, 
Tumer, ancl · . '"'Each would have testified to the· 
statements purportedly made by McDonald, on three 
separate occasions shortly after the crime, if.Qf)lietttit"'----... . 





proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. I The hearsay rule i'l nOJ::r.;Qally Pes~eet88. 
It i'l a ru~ based on ..a experien~e and grounded in the w~"c.h ho..s lt l't he C.~ ; t r,.q ,~ 'J~j. 
q_.y.J., A..bsp e c. 1- e l notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be pre-sented. to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are· 
traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional 
indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under 
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker 
with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's 
word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not 
available in order that his demeanor and credibility may 
be assessed by the jury. Cal1:jornia v. Green, 399 U. S .. 
149, 158 (1970). L 
..... ../ 
1" Sec Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 272 (1913) . 
I 
b 'I ..., , .. ,., ... 11'1 
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Chambers.::: And. in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same -----
)--
The ava~lability of the right to confront and to cross-
examine those who give damaging testimony against the 
accused has never aeke~ofo5e been held to depend on 
whether the witness was initially ii put on the stand 
by the accused or by the State. We reject the 
notion that a right of such substanc~ in the criminal 
.,.c. 
process may be governed by that tech~ality or by any 
narrow and unrealisitic definition of the word "against'~ 
:b\ut!:Aii s~·l;l MaPSIR8Mu The ~11!8 b& .. "voucher" rule I 
as applied in this case. plainly interfered with 
Chambers 0 right to defend against the State's charges. 
B 
We need not decide, however, whether this error 
alone would occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed 
denial of due process rests on the ultimate impact of 
that erro~~is tria~ when viewed in conjunction with 
call 
the trial court's refusal to permit him to ldiili~ll 
other witnesses. The trial court refused to allow 
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A number of exce]~tions have ~ developed over the 
years to allow admission of hearsay statements made 
under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and 
thereby com.pensate for the absence of the oath and 
opportunity for cross-examination. Among the most 
prevalentlexceptions +laraJ,!oi1s· agahist interest~ 
an exception founded on the assumption that a person 
Hi +h t_ 
--- ___. 
is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own inter- ) • 
est at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes ~ '~-" 1 .l 
~xrcption but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary interest.'" It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like ~cDonald's in this case, that are 
against the penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
/@ 
State, 00 Miss. 719. 55 So. 961 (1911). 
1 lol l 1 ~\~'~lJ~a~r;}:' ~:::!~~=~~!0-~J:.e.t:e;* 
c.•~t•rt•• ~ "":- L _ _ _ 1 _ , 1 
11 .kffcr . ;on. Dcrlarn1 ions Al(:tin,;1 Jn'Prc~1, 5S linn·. L. Hr\'. 1 
(1!H-t). 
"\'"H. l\IdJro~·, l\Ii~ . ;j,," ippi E1·idrncc § 46 (1955) . 
........ "\Hille 804, Tittle~ of u;,·idencc for 1hc Pni1c•d St:tlc'.-< Cour1" :llld 
:\fagi:<1r::-ttc:< (::-tppron:od Xm·. 20. Hl72). 
I~ _..-Sec, c. (/., A(h'i"or~· Commi1 j ('(' :l'o1c~. H nip 80-1, n ulc·:< of l•:,·i-
Jdf'Jl(•(' for the Cnitcd S1:dc" Comt~ and :\f:lgi.;tr;tte"' (:Jpprc,,·ed 
?\'m·. 20. 1972): 5 .T. \Yigmorc. E1·idcnc·c § 1-+76. at 2S-I (:3d cd . 
• q 19-tO): l:rrighi. rniform Hulc~ of IIcar,;t~·. :2() U. ('inn. L. HCI' , 
575 (19.57); United Stairs,., AnnuHziato, 29Cl F. 2d :373.:378 (CA2), 
ecr1. drnicd, 36S LT. ~. !)]!) (19fil) (Fric•1Hll.1·, .T.): Srolair , .. United 
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A number of exce}~tion s have ~ developed over the 
years to allO\Y admission of hearsay statements made 
, , "1 ' ... . 1 ' 1' 1 1 
~~b) 
declaration-against-interest 
This materialistic limitation on the/hearsay 
exception appears to be accepted by most 
16/ 
their criminal trial processes, although 
States in 
a number of 
17/ 
States have discraded it-.- Prior to the changes 
18/ 
accomplished by the new Federal Rules of Evidence-,-
declarations against penal interest were normally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of 
Donnelly v. United Statesp 228 U.S. 243, 272-273 (1913). 
Exclusion, where the limitation prevails, is usually 
premised on the view that admission would lead to 
the frequent presentation id#ijl##41# of perjured 
testimony to the jury. It is believed that confessions 
of criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous 
considerations and, therefore, are not as inherently 
reliable as statements against pecuniary or proprietary 
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r;- A number of exce1~ tion s have~ developed over the 
years to allo\\' ac.lmisf'ion of hearsay statements made 
-1 
declaration-against-interest 
This materialistic limitation on the/hearsay 
exception appears to be accepted by most 
16/ 
their criminal trial processes, although 
States in 
a number of 
17/ 
States have discraded it-.- Prior to the changes 
18/ 
accomplished by the new Federal Rules of Evidence, 
declarations against penal interest were normally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of 
Donnelly v. United Statesp 228 U.S. 243, 272-273 (1913). 
Exclusion, where the limitation n~~ ~ - --
673 (2d. ed. 
Evidence § 278, at 
at 283-287 n.9 
16/ c ~Cormick, 
• Ev·dence § 1476, 
1972); 5 J. Wigmore, ~ 
(1940). 
Cal. Rptr. 841, 
11/ v Spriggs, 36 
See. e.g~• People • o~QQ1l~e~v~~t~L~e~t~t~r~i_ch_, 
~::..a-~- 868 (1964); feop • 
389 P.2d 377, 60 Cal. 2d Brown, 
488 (1952); People v. -
413 Ill. 172, 108 N. E.2d 16 (1970); 825, 257 N. E.2d 
26 N.Y.2d 88, 308 N.Y.S.2d 7 S E 843 (1923). 
136 va. 728, 11 •• 
vlirgini..S• Hines v. 
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15 t CIIA:\JlmHS v. l\TISSlSSII'PI it might serve eo me valid state purpose by excluding u n trnst wor~ testimony. 
·--·.-r-=-•ae>e?~wJ.N-;~~:-~ ~ lhe hean:ay statements involved in this case 
~ originally made and subsequently offered at trial 
under circumstances that '8Jttf8i!if8d .tG..~re1iaoility. First, 
each of McDonald's confessions "·as made spontaneou:::ly 
to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had 
occurred. Second. each one was corroborated by some 
, other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn confes-
sion, the testimony of an eye\ntnes'StJand t~ testimony 
.C.CUl.'ii~ie+il'ii-'w-t&Ft--ffi~~.t.@m.~;~~w.c~~~· prior ownership 
revolver and ~ sequent purchase 
of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent 
confessions provided additional corroboration for each. 
Third, whatever may be the parameters of the penal-
, ( i"i1teres£ rationalc;.t each confession here was in a very 
#f real sense :::elf-incriminatory and unquestionably against 
intere t. See United States v. Harris, 403 U. R. 473. 484 
(1071); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. R. 74. 80 (1070). 
---------~McDonald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. T ndeecl, after telling 
-e; ';/ 
Turner of his involvement. he sub~equently urged Turner 
not to1\11e6s him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
I-f ~hr l\Ii~~i~"ippi ca~r which rrfn"rd to adopt a lw:1r"a~· excrp-
'- " tion for drC'Iaration" ngain~t ]Wnal int<'rr~t ronrrrnrcl an out-of-
C'ourt derbrrmt "·ho pmportrdly st:lted that he had rommitt<'d the 
mmd<'r \Yit h whieh hi~ brot hC'l' had brrn charged. Thr l\Ii"~i,~ippi 
Snprrmr Court brlirwd 1 hat tlw drl'la rnnt ma.'· ha ,.e bern moti-
,·ntecl b~· a clr~irr to frrr hi~ brother rnthrr thnn h~· nn~· compu!o;ion 
of g;uilt'. Thr Court nl~o notre! thnt thr clrclnrnn1 had flrcl , waH 
HllnYH ila ble for ero~~-rxa minn1 ion, :wd ma~· wrll h:1n• known n t 
thr 1imr hr mndr thr ~tatrmrnt that hr would not ~ nfTrr for it. 
Bro1cn , .. Statl' , 99 :\[i~~. 710, 55 So. 9()1 (1911). Tlwrr i~ , in th~ 
prr~rnt ta~r, no ~nC'h basi~ for doubting l\ 'TC'Donald'~ ~tatcmrnts. 
J,(J\IIJ .(...c.t 
1' (.~~.Jt., ~1-!.. 
()...,UtJ). c..~ 
0 .;. + h-tt ·~ 
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tion about tho truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald ·was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his dem.eanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
( 1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from tho pri~r Mississippi precedent 
\ Brown v. State, supra, and frot"lJ~ormell?}', since in both 
L_cases the declarant was unavailaBle at the time of trial.'t 
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., 
TVashington v. Texa.s, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lshed rules of procedure and evidence wl=lieR. ft"t de-
signed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps 
no rule of evidence has been more respected or more 
frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable 
to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow 
l f ""'tl\lcDonald'~:< prrsrnce nl~o drprives the Stat r'~ a rg;umrnt for 
rrtrntion of the penal-inter€'~! rule of much of its forcr. In claiming 
thnt "[t]o change the rule would work a tran'st~· of ju~tice," the 
Stnte posited thr following hypothetical: 
"If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime; B 
could tell C and D that hr rommi1ted the crime; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify ns to B's admission 
of guilt; A could be acquittrd and B would return to stnncl trial; 
B could then proYide several witnrsses to estify as to his whcrenbouts 
at the time of the crime. The testimony of thoRe witnr~sr~ along 
with A's statement that he reallr committed the crime would result 
in B's acquittal. A would be b:ured from further prosecution 
because of the protection against double jE'opardy. No one could 
be convictrd of perjury as A did not testify at his first trill!, B did 
not lie under oath, and C and D were truthful in their testimony." 
Respondent's Brief, at 7 n. 3 (empha~is supplied). 
Obviously, "B's" absenrc at tri:ll is critical to the suece~s of the 
.i UHtirc-subYerting ploy. 
/ 
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The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic 
rationale of the exception as to declarations against interest. 
7 
~testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense. In these 
\ circumstances, where constitutionU rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt Wete implicated, the hearsay rule may not 
be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, 
coupled with the state's refusal to permit Chambers to cross --
examine McDonald, 
~ 
the due proces~li\UiO of tao 14Ut A::Rloadmoilt In reaching this 
-~ 
judgment w~B-e;d te~blish no new principles of constitutional 
law. Nor does our holding signal any dimunition in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the states in the establishment and 
implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. 
Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances 
of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of 
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the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to 
be J!:ustworthy have long exi~te~ecogi~ti_oH-.tb.ai... 
the hearsay rule may not- be'" a})JSlied mechauistiCa~ly to 
defeat the ends of justice is especially appropri~te in 1 
this ' «;:ase. The lcsti~nony rejected by the triqJ court 
~nal€1;;;-~r~~~ bore ~ificant 
assurances o{ trustworthinessrTn light of all tiie f-;cts: 
o interest of' (he State i1\ enforcing its hearsay rule 
ould outweigh Ch~mbcrs' righ.__t to present this evidence 
f critical importance-. to the jury trying.thim for a cap-
ital offense. 
We conclude that, taken togeth«Jt, the prevention of 
dross-examination and the exclu~bn of critical evidence 
deprived Chambers of the fair trial guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of tl)e Fourte~1th Amendment. 
We add that in reaching: this judgment\ and in setting 
aside Chambers~ convi9tion, we invoke ~ n~w prin-
ciples of law. Nor d~s our holding signal an:N;limunition 
in the respect traditi'~ally accorded to the 'f\tates in 
the establishment and · 1plementation of their own 
criminal trial rules and p ~esses. Rather, we hold 
quite simply that under the f~ts and circumstances of 
this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers 
of a fair trial. ------··· 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered .. 
~. l).)tN(I 
)#~' 
~ _q. (/?. 
( cP-v ~{<.A) 
!Z-/&7/7 c. 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71- 5908 
Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
r January -, 1973] 
Mn. JrsTICE PowELL delivered the opnuon of the 
Court. 
Petitioner. Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisomnent and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi , 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-. 
tion , that order was reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari '"as granted , 405-
U. S. 987 (1972) , to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for-
murder occurred in the small tmvn of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14,. 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
/ 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attempt to handcuff Jackf:on "·as frustrated by 20 or 25 
men in tlw crom.l who intervened and wrestled him 
frrr. Forman then racliorcl for assistance and Liberty 
rrmovecl his riot gun. a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Th rec clepu ty f'heriffs arrivrd shortly thcre-
aftrr ancl the officers again attempted to make their 
arrrst. Once more, thr officers wcrr attacked by the 
on lookers ancl during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots \Yere fired. Forman was looking in a different 
direction \Yhrn the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Lib0rty had been f:hot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrrls of his riot gun into an allry in the area from 
"·hich the shot· appeared to have come. The first shot 
\\·as \Yilcl ancl high and scattered the crowd standing at 
the face of the alley. Librrty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot and hit one 
of the men in tlH' crowd in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran clown the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he was 
standing se,wal feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not sec whether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he did see Chambers "break his arm 
down" shortly before the shots \Yere fired. The officers 
\Yho sa\Y Chambers fall testified that they thought he 
\Yas dead but they made no effort at that time either to 
examine him or to search for the murder weapon. In-
stead they attrnclecl to Liberty, "·ho was placed in the 
policr car and taken to the hospital \\'here he was declared 
drad on arrival. A subsequent autopsy showed that he 
had been hit \Yith four bullets front a .22-caliber revolver. 
/ 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he was not yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
a car ancl transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night, when the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers was still alive a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
Liberty's nwrder. Ur pleaded not guilty and has as-
serted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, was in the cro,,·d on the 
evening of Librrty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
clay, he left his wife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
~ame year he returned to \Yoodville when his IYife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his. kno\\·n as Rev-
erend Stokes, wanted to see him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in Natchez. Mississippi, several miles north of 
\Voodvil1e and, upon his return, McDonald went to see 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, who maintained 
offices in Natchez. Two days later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his, James ·williams. that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his O\\·n pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolver, "·hich he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers'· 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession was 
volnntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
1 .JarnC'." 1\'illiams wa~ indictC'd :dong with ChambN~. ThC' Rtatc, 
hmYC'\·C'r, fnilrd io introduce nn~· C'Yiclc·ncr at trial that could implie:1tr 
Will i:1n1" in lhC' ~hooting. .\ t t hr eondu~ion of i hC' St a tC''H ra,r-in-
rhirf thr trial eourt grnnircl n clirPrtrcl ,-C'rclirt .in hi~ l'aYor. 
/ 
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signed, and witnessed. McDonald was turned over to tho 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he vvould not 
go to jail and that lw would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of Woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend. Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had happened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year." At trial he endeavored to develop two 
"1'pon Chambers' motion, a change of venue was graniPd ;md 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the east of WoodYille. The 
change of trinl setting was in response to petitioner'::; claim that, 
],ec·aw.;e of adYer::;e publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
:~ml sheriff's staff:o in Wood1·illc, he could Jlot obtain a fair nnd 
impartial trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he clid not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually sa"· Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, 110 weapon 
was ever recovered from the srene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever O\vned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he \Vas standing in the street near 
" ·here Liberty was shot, that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring before the jury 
the testimony supporting this defense. Sam Hardin, a 
lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that he saw 
McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness, one of 
Liberty's cousins, testified that he saw McDonald im-
mediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In adclit.ion to the testimony of these two \Yitnesses, 
Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald 
had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers at-
tempted to prove that McDonald had admitted respon-
sibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once 
when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' counsel 
and three other times prior to that occasion in private 
conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to 
pre~ent this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
/ 
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of dur process of ]aw.'1 It is necessary, therC'fore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the triaL 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought 
a ruling at that time that. if the State chose not to call 
McDonald itself. he be allowed to call him as an adverse 
witness. Attached to the motion were copies of Mc-
Donald's S\YOrll confession and of the transcript of his 
preliminary hearing at "·hich he repudiated that con-
fession. The trial court granted the motion requiring 
:McDonald to appear but reserved ruling on the adverse 
\Yitness motion. At trial after the State failed to put 
McDonald on the stand. Chambers called McDonald. 
laid a predicate for the introduction of his sworn out-of-
comt confession, had it aclmittrd illto evidence, and 
read it to the jury. The Statr, upon cross-examination, 
elicited from McDonald the fact that he had rejected his 
" 011 thr rrcord in this raHr, it i~ rlr:lr that Clwmbrr~' nsserlrd 
drni:1l of dw· prort'·'" i:-; propNl~· hrforr u~. He ob.i<'rtrd dminQ; 
tri:tl to r:t<'h of thr court'~ ruling~. As to tlw confrontation claim, 
prtilionrr a~~rrtrd. both brforr :mel during lri:d, hi~ righl to trmt 
::\TcDonald as 1111 nch·rr~r wilne,~. !lis motion for nrw trial, fi!C'd 
nftrr thr jtnfs wrclicl, li~trd a~ error lhr !rial court's rC'I'us:d to 
prrmil cro~s-C''i:aminnlion of l\TcDonald :mel thr rxch1.•ion of evi-
drnrr rorrobornt iw of M cDonnld's guill. The· mol ion condudrd 
that thr lri:ll ''m1~ not in accord ll'ith fundamrntal fairnr~s p:twran-
trrcl b.1· thr .Fourtrrnlh Amrndmrnl of lhr Con~tilntion." Chnmhrr.-; 
rra~~rrlrcl tho~r elaimf' on npprnl io thr Rlntr Suprrmr Coml. 
Aftrr thr n ffirmancr of hi~ rom·iction b~· i hnt court. Chambrn:; 
fllrll a prlilion for rrhrnring ndclrr~~<'cl :dnwsl rntirrl~· to thr claim 
that hi.; trial had not hrm concluctrd in a mnnnrr ron~i~trnt wilh 
traditional notion~ of dur prorr~~. Thr Stair Suprrmr Court rni,rd 
no qur~l ion 1 hat Chambrr~' rlaim~ wrrc not proprrl~· n""rrl rd. :lll<l 
no claim has hrrn madr h.1· lh!' Stntr that thr qnr~tion~ arc not 
propNI~· r~'Yirw:l bit' bY t hi" Conrl. Rrr 8t?·('et \'. N 1'10 York, 894 
U. R. 570, .')~1-liS2 (1969); Douglas v. Alaba111a, 3SO U. S. 415, 
420-423 ( 19().')). 
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prior confession. McDonald further testified. as he had 
at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise 
of Reverend Stokes that he " ·oulcl not go to jail and 
" ·ould share in a sizable tort recovery from the tovY11. 
Hr also retold his own story of his actions on the evening 
of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe down the 
street, his absrnce from the scene during the critical 
period , and his subsrquent trip to the hospital with 
Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the fltate's cross-examination, 
Chambers rene\Yed his motion to examine McDo1lald as 
an adverse witness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile. but he is not adverse in 
the sense of the word, so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, finding that "MeJ)otwlcl's testimony was 
not acl ver e to appellant" because "[nl ow here clid he 
point the finger at Chambers.'' 2.12 So. 2cl., at 220. 
Defeated in his attempt to challenge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciation of his prior confe,sion. Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three \Yitnesses 
to \Yhom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The fir t of these, Sam Hardin, would have testified 
that, 011 the night of the shooti11g. he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that. \Yhile driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objrctccl to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it ;ms hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection. 1 
1 Hardin'~ tr,;timon~·. unlikt' tlw tr~timo11~ · of ilw otlwr two mrn 
who sl atPd thnt :\IrDonalcl hncl c·onfe,.,rd to t lwm, wm' a1·t unlly 
gi,·rn in tlw jUI·~··,., prPHPII('P. AftN tlw Stntr'~ oh.irciion to Il:mlin'~ 
account of l\IrDonnld's ~tatrmrnt \1':1~ ~u~t:linrd, thr trial eomt 
onkrrd the jm~· to clisrrp;nrd it. 
/ 
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Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
said he was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, 
\YUS then called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday ancl had not had any beers with 
McDonald. The jury "·as then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they vvere riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, vvhen he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony as to McDonald's self-
incriminating remarks should have been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told hin1 that he had disposed of the .22--caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral '\Yeeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
5 .\ gun denier from Natchrz testified that ]\[cDonald had m:1de 
two pnrchaHcs. The witness' bu~ine~s record~ indicntrcl that 
McDonald purchased a nine-shot .22-calbier revolver about a year 
/ 
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allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.(; On appeal, 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule, he was 
Ullable either to cross-examine McDonald or to present 
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources iudicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
aud that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the 
cnme. But all that remained from McDonald's own 
mouth was a single written confession countered by an 
arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense 
was far less persuasive than it might have been had he 
been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's state-
ments to cross-examination or had the other confessions 
been admitted. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to the murder. He purchased a different style .2:2 thrre week;; 
after Liberty's death. 
(I It is not entirdy clear whethrr the trial court'~ ruliug was 
premi~ed on the same hear~ay r::ltionalc underlying 1 he exdnsion 
of the other testimony. In thi~ instance the State argurd that 
Carter's t cstimony was an impermissible attempt by prt it ionrr to 
imprach a witness (McDonald) who was noL adver~C' to him. Tho 
tri::tl court did not state why it was excluding tho evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicaled that it was excluded as ho::trsay. 
252 So. 2cl, at 220. 
/ 
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clefencl against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confro11t aml cross-examine witnei"ses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948). 
identified these rights as among the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a. charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense-a right to his day in court-·are basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Rretoer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969); 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of these 
elements of a fair trial are implicated in the present case. 
A 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's damning repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. He was not allmYed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
itself whether McDonald's testimony was worthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-243 
(1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
tho "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). It is. indeed, 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. A. 400. 405 (1965). Of course, 
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
/. 
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and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald \Yas denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may not impeach his own 
\Yitness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party \Yho calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, HH So. 2cl 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators" \Yere called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts.' 
·whatever validity the "voucher'' rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal process.' It 
might have been logical for the early common la\\· to 
require a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses 
he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having 
selected them especially for that purpose, the party might 
7 :3A .T. 'Yigmore, Evidence § 89G. at G58-Gfl1 (Chnclbourn eel. 
1970); C. l\lcCormiek, Evidence § 38, at 75-78 (1972). 
8 The "nmcher" rule has bct'n condemned ns arelwic, irrational, 
nne! potrntiniJ~· cle.-tructivc of 1hc 1rnth gathering procr~~- C. 1\fc-
Cormiek, Evidence§ 38, nt 75-78 (1972); E. :\forgan. Basic Problems 
of E1·iclcnre 70-71 (1902): :n .J. "Tigmorr, E,·idcncc § 898, at 6()1 
(Chadbourn eel. 1970). 
/ 
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reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are 
rarely able to select their witnesses: they must take 
them where they find them. Moreover, as applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's" impact was doubly harm-
ful to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,' 0 he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the 
witness is bound by anything he might say. He was, 
therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
confession. 
In this Court Mississippi has not sought to defend 
the rule or explain its underlying rationale. Nor has 
it contended that its rule should override the accused's 
right of confrontation. Instead, it argues that there is 
no incompatability between the rule and Chambers' 
rights because no right of confrontation exists unless the 
testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The 
State's brief asserts that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
0 The "voucher'' rule has been rejected altogether by the new ) 
Rule:; of Evidence that will apply in all federal courts. Rule 607, 
Rule:; of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates 
(approved Nov. 20, 1972 and to become effective July 1, 1973) . 
.to Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
11 Re,.;pondcnL'::; Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
'" 252 So. 2cl, at 220. 
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The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
Chambers. 1 ~ And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. It can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seri-
ously adverse to Chambers. The availability of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been 
held to depend on whether the witness was initially put 
on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject 
the notion that a right of such substance in the crim-
inal process may be governed by that technicality or by 
a11y narrow and unrealistic definition of the word 
"against." The "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, 
plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against 
the State's charges. 
B 
We need not decide, however, whether this error alone 
would occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed denial 
of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
when viewed in conjunction with the trial court's refusal 
to permit him to call other witnesses. The trial court 
refused to allow him to introduce the testimony of 
Hardin, Turner, and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on 
three separate occasions shortly after the crime, naming 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. 
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The hearsay rule, "·hich has long been recognized and 
respected by virtually every State, is based on experience 
and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence 
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-
court statements are traditionally excluded because thry 
lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are 
usually not made under oath or other circumstances that 
impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; 
the declarant's word if' not subject to cross-examination; 
and he is not available in order that his demeanor and 
credibility may be a.f'sessed by the jury. California v. 
Green, 390 U. S. 149, 158 (1970). A number of excep-
tions have developed over the years to allow admission 
of hearsay statements made under circumstances that 
tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for 
the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
examination. Atuong the most prevalent of these ex-
ceptions is the one applicable to declarations against 
interest 1 '- an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his 
own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizrs 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary interrst.'" It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case, that are· 
against the penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
State, 99 Miss. 710, 55 So. 961 (1911). 
This materialistic limitation on the declaration-against-
interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by 
most States in their criminal trial procrsses.1 n although 
a number of States have cliscardecl it. 17 Prior to the· 
'' Jrffrr~on, Drrlamtion~ Ap;:tinst Intrrr.-t, 5S HmT. L. Rrl". 1 
( 19-lA ). 
.. , H.l\1cEiro~·, J\fi~~i~sippi E\·idrncr §-Hi (19.5.5). 
11 ' C . l\1rC'ormi('k, E\·idrncc § 278, at ()7:~ (2d eel. HJ72); 5 .T.. 
\Vi~morr, E\·idrnrr § 1-t7G, :1! 283-2S7 n. 9 (1940). 
17 Srr, P. (! .• People v. Spriggs, 3G Cal. Hptr. 1'-+1 , 3~9 P. 2d 377, 
GO Cal. 2d SGS (19G.f); J>eop/e v. Lettrich, .f13 Ill. 172, lOS N. E .. 
/ 
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changcs accomplished by the new Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,'' declarations against penal interest were normally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of Don-
nelly Y. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 272- 273 (1913). 
Exclusion, where the limitation prevails, is usually prem-
ised on the view that admission would lead to the fre-
quent presentation of perjured testimony to the jury. 
It is believed that confessions of criminal activity are 
often motivated by extraneous considerations and, thcre-
fore, are not as inherently reliable as statements against 
pecuniary or proprietary interest. \Vhile that rationale 
has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism,'n 
we need not decide in this case \\·hether , under other 
circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose 
by excluding untrusbYorthy testimony. 
The hearsay statements i11volvecl in this case werc 
originally made and subsequently offered at trial under 
circumstances that provided considerable assurance of 
thcir rcliability. First. each of McDonald's confessions 
" ·as made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly 
after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case-
McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eye-
'"itncss to the shooting. the testimony that McDonald 
was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting. and 
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and 
2d -+~~ (19ii:2): l'('ople v. Broten. 2G ); . Y . 2d ~~. ao~ 1\. Y. S. 2d 
82;i, 2.')7 K. E. 2d 10 ( 1970) ; flin es , .. !'iroinia, 1:36 Ya. 72~. 117 
S. E. 8-t~ (192~). 
1 ' Hul r , O.t, Rulr8 of b·idrncr for thr l'nitrd State~ Court~ :tnd 
:\Ltg:i,;tratr..: (npprtl\'C'CI XoY. 20. 197:2). 
tn ~rr , e. (! .. Ach·i~or~· C'ommil teP Xo1r,;. Hnlr 80-t, HulP~ of El'i-
drncr for the Pnitecl Stair~ Court,; and :\[agi~tmtrs (nppro,·rd 
Xo1·. 20, 197:2); 5 .T. Wigmore•, E1·idencr § 1.t76, n1 2f'.t {:"lrl rd. 
19-W) ; \Yrighl, 1"nifonn Rnlr~ of lTP:tr"a''· 2G F. Cinn. L. Hr1·. 
575 (19.37) ; United States Y. Annunziato, 29:! F. 2d 378, ~7R (CA2), 
cwt. dcniccl. :3G8 U. S. 919 (19Gl) (Fric·ndl.v, .T .); Scolair ,., United 
States, 406 F. 2d 5G~, 5G-l (CA9), crrl. dc•nicd , 395 U. S. 9S1 (1909) .. 
' . 
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subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer num-
ber of independent confessions provided additional cor-
roboration for each. Third, whatever may be the 
parameters of the penal-interest rationale,20 each 
confession here was in a very real sense self-incrim-
inatory and unquestionably against interest. See 
United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 473, 484 (1971); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). Mc-
Donald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution . Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner 
not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
tion about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
( 1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra., and from the Donnelly-type 
situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavail-
able at the time of triaJ.2 1 
" 0 The Mississippi case which refused to adopt a hearsay excep-
tion for declarations fl{l;ninst penal interest concerned an out-of-
court declarant who purportedly stated that he had committed the 
murder with which his brother bad been charged. The Mis~ i~Rippi 
Supreme Court believed that the declarant may have been moti-
vated by a desire to free his brother rather than by any compubion 
of guilt. The Court abo noted that the declarant had fled , was 
unavailable for cro~s-examination , and ma~· well ha,·e known at 
1 he time he made the statement that he would not ~ufTer for it. 
Bro1vn Y. State, 99 l\Ii~s. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911) . There i:-;, in the 
prC'~cnt case, no such bnsis for doubtin{l; l\IcDonald 's ~t atements. 
~ 1 M c Donn lei's pre~c·nce n l~o depri,·cH the Stat c's nr{l;umcnt for 
retention of the pennl-interc~ t rule of much of its force. In elniming 
/ 
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Few rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g .• 
TV ashington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 ( 1967); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right. the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure 
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence 
has been more respected or more frequently applied in 
jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hear-
say, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of 
evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have 
long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
here bore persuasive assurances of trust\vorthiness and 
thus was well ".:ithin the basic rationale of the exception 
for declarations against interest. That testimony also 
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circum-
stances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule 
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice. 
that "Lt]o change the rule would work a trave~ty of juHtire," the 
State posited the following hypothetical: 
"If the rule wen' changed, A could be charged with the crime; B 
could tell C and D tha,t h<:> committed the crime; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify as to B'~ admi~~ion 
of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would return to stand trial; 
B could lhen provide several witnes::;es to estify as to hi~ whrrrabouts 
at the time of the crime. The testimony of those witnr~sr~ along 
with A's statement that he reall~· committed tlw crime would rrsult 
in B's arquittal. A would be barrrcl from furthrr ])ro~ecution 
hecause of the protection against double jeopardy. No onr could 
be convicted of perjury as A did not testify at his fir::>t trial, B did 
not lie under oath, and C and D werr truthful in their trstimony." 
Respondent's Brief, at 7 n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
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We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit 
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a 
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental stand-
ards of the clue process. In reaching this judgment we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor 
does our holding signal any dimunition in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment 
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and 
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opmwn. 
It is so ordered. 
,. 
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Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississip11i. 
r January - , 1973] 
Mn. JL:STICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers. "·as tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonmcn t and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed , 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice elated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order was reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405 
U. S. 987 (1972) , to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. \\Te conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for 
murder occurred in the small town of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
tS 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 1 
...-:~-......... - wne n 
attempt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated~ 20 or 25 
men in the crmnl e intervened and wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge :::awed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Threc> deputy :::heriffs arrived shortly there-
after and the officers agai11 attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots were fired. Forman \vas looking in a different 
direction \\·hen the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty hacl been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gu11 into an alley in the area from 
\vhich the shot appeared to have come. The first shot 
was "·ild and high and scattered the cro\\·d standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, hO\vever. to take 
more deliberate aim lwfore the second shot and hit one 
of the men in the cro\\'Cl in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran dom1 the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not sec from his vantage point 
who :::hot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he \vas 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chn:mbers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not sec "·hether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he dicl see Chambers "break his arm 
clown" shortly before the shots \\'ere fired. The officers 
\vho saw Chambers fall testified that they thought he-
was dead but they 1nade no effort at that time either to 
examine him or to search for the murder vvcapon. In-
stead they attended to Liberty, who was placed in the 
police car and taken to the hospital where he was declared 
cleacl on arrival. A subsequent autopsy showed that he 
had been hit with four bullets from a .22-caliber revol vcr. 
I 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he was not yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded hin1 into 
a car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night, when the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers "·as still alive a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
Liberty's murder. He pleaded not gnilty and has as-
serted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is interbYinecl with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald. a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, vYas in the crO\Yd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day, he left his wife in Woodville anclmoved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
san1e year he returned to ·wood ville when his ''"ife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his. knO\m as Rev-
erend ~tokes, wanted to sec him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in Natchez, Mississippi, several miles north of 
·woodville and, upon his return, McDonald went to see 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, "·ho maintained 
offices in K a tchez. Two days later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his, James ,.rilliams, that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his own pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolYer, which he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession ''"as 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
'.Ltm,.,~ Willian!;.; was inrliclcJ along with ChambN~. The Slate, 
howe1·er, fai!Pcl to inlrodurc nn)· c1·idellrc at trinl ihat could implicate 
'i'i'illinms in the ~lwoting. ,\t tlw rondu.,iou of lhe Rlalc':-; ra~c-in­
rhid thr trial court granted a dircrtccl 1·crdiet in his fa 1·or. 
/ 
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signed, and witnessed, McDonald was turned over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
laYvsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of ·woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had hn,ppened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year." At trial he endeavored to develop two 
~Upon Chamber:l' motion, a change of Yeuuc wa.· granted and 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the ea~t of WoodYille. The 
change of trial sett ing w~L' in re~pon~e to petitioner's claim that, 
becau~e of uch'cr,;e publicity :mel the hostile attitude of the police 
mul shcriiT',; :;taff:> in Woodville, he could not obtain a fair aud 
impartial trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he clicl not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually sa\Y Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers sa\Y Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he \Yas shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no "·capon 
\Yas ever recovered from the scene and there was 110 proof 
that Chambers had ever O\vned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he "·as standing in the street near 
where Liberty \Yas shot. that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring before the jury 
the testimony supporting this defense. Sam I-I ardin, a 
lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that he saw 
McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness. one of 
Liberty's cousius, testified that he saw McDonald im-
mediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald 
had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers at-
tempted to prove that McDonald had admitted respon-
sibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once 
when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' counsel 
and three other times prior to that occasion in private 
conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to 
present this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-






of clue process of law.~ It 1s necef'sary, therefore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial nwtion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought.,........ 
a ruling at that time that, if the Rtate chose not to call 
McDonald itself, he be allo,,·ed to call him as an adverse 
witness. Attarhrcl to the motion \\"ere copies of Mc-
Donald's S\YOrll confession and of the transcript of his 
preliminary hearing at \Yhich hr repudiated that con-
fession. The trial court granted the motion requiring 
McDonald to appear but reserved ruling on the aclven:e 
\vitness motion. At trial after the State ~ailed to put 
McDonald on the stand. Chambers called McDonald, 
luicl a predicate for the introduction of his sworn out-of-
court confesf'ion, had it admitted into evidence, and 
read it to the jury. The State, upon cross-examination, 
elicited from l\1cDonald the fact that he had rejected his 
/ 
"On thr rrrord in this easr, it i.~ clrar that Chamber~· ns~rrtrd 
drnial of clnr proe!'~ . .; i~ proprrl.1· brl'orr u~. Jir ob.iPrtrd during 
trial to raC"b of thr romt'~ ruling~. ,\~ to thr rtmt'rontntion claim, 
pctitionc·r :l~~c·rtrd. both brforr and clming trial, hi~ right to trrat 
::\1rDonald a~ an ach·rr"r witnr~s. His motion for nrw !rial, filrcl 
aftrr thr jur.1·'~ Yrrdirt, listrd :1~ rrror tbr trial court's rrfusal to 
prnnit rro~"-rxmninat ion of '!\I r Donald n ncl thr rxrlu,ion of rYi-
dc•nrr corrohorati1·r of l\fc-Donalcl's guilt. Tlw mot ion rondndrcl 
that thr trial "was not in arrord with fnnclamrntal fairnr.':' guamn-
trrcl h~· tbr FomtrPntb Amrndmrnt of thr Con,titution." Chnmhrr~ 
rra~~rrtrcl thosr cl:tim~ ou nppral to thr Statr fluprrmr Court. 
.\ftrr thr affirmnnrc' of hi' ronvietim1 b~· that comt. ChnmbrrR 
Glrrl a pc•tition for rrhrarin~ nddrr,~rd :dmo~t rntirrl~· to thr rl:lim 
that hi,; trial had not brrn romlurtrd in a m:wnrr consi,trnt ll'ith 
t r:1di1ionnl noti011' of due prorrss. The Rtntr Suprc•mr Comt r:<i,rd 
no qur 't ion t hn t Ch:unbrr;-;' claims wrrr not proprrl~· a""rrt rcl, n ncl 
no rlnim ha~ brr·n 111:1dr b~ · thr Statrfthat thr qnr,tion~ are not 
proprrl~· rr1·irll"ahlc• b)· thi~ Court. flrr Street v. New York, 39-l 
U. S .. ')70. 5~1-5~2 (1069); Dow;las "· Alabama, U. S. 415, 
-- 1'1 !1-.s )-e spCf)?>e. ro 
-r.J,'( p~ filim J.. c, y. co -.+ -
4 20-423 ( 1955). 
/r;J-} i Yl i fJ h 1- i (.. J.. (/?1 
) 
t- h{.. Jnerifs CJI- ()....+ 
J 
ora. I o... r/jfltn~+-- _ 
Unlike Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), 
this case does not involve the state procedural 
requirement of contemporaneous objection to the admission 
of evidence. Petitioner's contention, asserted before 
the trial court on motion for new trial and subsequently 
before the Mississippi Supreme Court, is that he was 
denied "fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amebdment" as a result of several evidentiary rulings • 
.. His claim, the substance of which we accept in this 
opinion, rests on the cumulative effect of those 
rulings in frustrating his efforts to develop an excul-
patory defense. Although he objected to each ruling 
.. -
individually, petitioner 0 s constitutional claim--based 
as it is on the cumulative impact of the rulings--could . 
not have been raised and ruled upon prior to the c9nclusion 
of Chambers' evidentiary presentation. Since the State 
I 
has not asserted any independent state procedural ground 
jas a basis for not reaching the merits of petitioner's 
constitutional claim, we have no occasion to decide 
whether--if such a ground exists--its imposition in 
this case would serve any "legitimate state interest." 
fj Id. at 447. Under these circumstances, we cannot 
doubt the priopriety of our exercise of jurisdiction. 
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prior confession. McDonald further testified, as he had 
at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise 
of Reverend Stokes that he would not go to jail and 
would share in a sizable tort recovery from the town. 
He also retold his own story of his actions on the evening 
of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe dmm the 
street, his absence from the scene during the critical 
period, and his subsequent trip to the hospital with 
Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers renewed his motion to examine McDonald as 
an adverse \\·itness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile, but he is not adverse in 
the sense of the word, so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, finding that "McDonald's testimony was 
not adverse to appellant" because "rn -lowhere did he_... 
point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2d., at 220. 
Defeated in his attempt to challenge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciatio11 of his prior confession, Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three \\·itnesses 
to whom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The first of these, Sam Hardin, would have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting, he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that, while driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objected to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it "·as hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection.4 
1 Hardin'~ tr~timon~·, unlikr the te~timon~· of the otlwr two mrn 
"·ho ~fated that l\IcDonalcl had ronfr~~rd to thrm, wa~ actunlly 
gil"('ll in thr jnr.1·'H prrNrncr. Al'trr thr St:1tr'~ oh.irl'lion to Hardin's 
arcount of l\feDonnld'~ ~tatrmrnt was ~nstninrd, thr trial court 
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Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
said he was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, 
was then called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers \vith 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they ·were riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony as to McDonald's self-
incriminating remarks should have been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same clay he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
G A gun dealer from Nat chez te~tified that J\Il'Donald had made 
two purchase::; . The witnesti ' bu~inc~s rccordti inclicatccl that 
McDonald purchased a nine-shot .22-calbier rcYolver about a year 
/ 
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allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.n On appeal, 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2cl, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rulr, he was 
unable either to cross-examine McDonald or to present 
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources illdicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the 
cnme. But all that remained from McDonald's own 
~ was a single written confession counterrd by an 
arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense 
was far less persuasive than it might have been had he 
been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's state-
ments to cross-examination or had the other confessions 
been admitted. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to thr murder. He purchased a difTprent st~·lc .~:2 tlm'r wrrks 
after Liberty's death. 
HIt is not entirPly clear whethrr the trial court'~ rulin11; wa~ 
prpmi~rd on the same hcar;:;ay rationale underlying thr !'xrlu~ion 
of the othrr testimony. In thi::; itmtnme the State arg11rd that 
Cartrr's testimony was an impermi::;~ible attempt by petiticmrr to 
impeach a witness (MrDonnld) who was not adverse to him. The 
tri:1l court did not state why it was excluding the evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hearsay. 
252 So. 2d, at 220. 
/ 
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defend against the State's accu13ations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf have long beC'Il recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), 
identified these rights as among the minimum essential 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense- a right to his clay in court-·are basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Rre'wer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. JYicKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969) ;/ 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of these 
elemC'nts of a fair trial are implicated in the present case_ 
A 
Chambers IYas denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's damning repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. lie was not allowed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the dC'tails of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
itself whether McDonald's tC'stimony was IYOrthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-243 
(1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74. 89 (1970). It is, indeed, 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 405 (1965). Of course, 
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
/ 
' . ' 
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and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 3!)3 F. S. 314 (Hl69). 
In this case. petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald ''"as denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party n1ay not impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a 'vitness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, Hll So. 2cl 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com"/" 
purgators'' were called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions ''"ere 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike "·itnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
·whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal procrss.H It 
might have been logical for the early common law to 
require a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses 
he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having 
selected them especially for that purpose, the party might 
1 3A J . Wigmore, E\·idenl'e § R96. at 6.'iR-661 (Chadbourn rd .. 
1970); C. l\IcCormirk, EYidenee § :3~, ~~ 75-7~ (1972). 
R The "yourhrr" rule h:t~ been eondrmnecl as archaic, irrntional, 
:1nd potentially de~trnrtiYc of thP truth gnthering proce~~. C. 1\Tr--
Cormirk, EYidenrc § :38, nt 75-78 (1972); R ':\Jorgnn, Ba~ic Problems 
of E\·idcncc 70-71 (196::!); :u .T. Wigmore, E\·idencc § S98, at 661 
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reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are 
rarely able to select their witnesses: they must take 
them where they find them. Moreover, as applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's u impact was doubly harm-
ful to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,' 0 he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the 
witness is bound by anything he might say. He "·as,, 
therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
confession. 
In this Court Mississippi has not sought to defend 
the rule or explain its underlying rationale. Nor has 
it contended that its rule should override the accused's 
right of confrontation. Instead, it argues that there is 
no incompatability between the rule and Chambers' 
rights because no right of confrontation exists unless the 
testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The 
State 's brief asserts that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
u The "voucher'' rule ha~ been rejrrted altogether by the new 
Rules of Evidrnre that will apply in all federal courts. Rule 607, 
Hulcs of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistral~ 
(a.pprowd Nov. 20, 1972 and to be(·ome effec1i'e July 1, 19i3). '/0 'f 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
11 llr~ponclcnL'.:; Brief, at 9 (emphasis :::upplird). 
1 " 252 So . 2d, at 220. 
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The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him , it tended also to exculpate 
Chambers.1 3 And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. It can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seri-
ously adverse to Chambers. The availability of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been 
held to depend on whether the witness was initially put 
on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject/ 
the notion that a right of such substance in the crim-
inal process may be governed by that technicality or by 
any narrow and unrealistic definition of the word 
"against." The "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, 
plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against 
the State's charges. 
B 
We need not decide, however, whether this error alone 
w·ould occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed denial 
of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
when viewed in conjunction with the trial court's refusal 
to permit him to call other witnesses. The trial court 
refused to allow him to introduce the testimony of 
Hardin, Turner, and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on 
three separate occasions shortly after the crime, naming 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. 
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The hearsay rule, which has long been rccogni~ed and 
respected by virtually every State, is based on experience 
ancl grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence 
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-
court statements arc traditionally excluded because they 
lack the convrntional indicia of reliability: they are 
usually not m.ade under oath or other circumstances that 
impress the speaker " ·ith the solemnity of his statements; 
the declarant 's \\"Ord is not subject to cross-examination; 
and he is not available in order that his demeanor and 
credibility ma.y be assessed by the jury. Cal1"jorrzia Y. 
Green, 3!)9 U. S. 140, 158 (1970). A number of excep-
tions have developed over the years to allow admis~:"ion 
of hearsay statements made under circumstances that 
tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for 
the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
examination. Among the most prevalent of these ex;:.--
ceptions is the one applicable to declarations against 
interest ''- an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a. statement against his 
own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary intere~t.' " It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case. that are· 
against the penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
State, 99 Miss. 719. 55 So. 961 (1011). 
This materialistic limitation on the declaration-again~t­
interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by 
most States in their criminal trial processes.' 0 although 
a number of States have discarded it. 17 Prior to the-
11 .frffrr8oJl, Drdamiion~ Again;.;t Intrrr~ t , 5S Han·. L. Rrl'. 1 
( 1!).1.~). 
'"H. l\1rEiroy, l\fiH8i:<~ippi E1·idrnrr § ~6 (1955). 
'"C. l\1rCormick, E1·idrnrc § 27R, at 67:~ (2d rd. 197:2) ; 5 .J.. 
\Yi!!morr , E1·iclrnrr § 1~76 , at 2~:~-2S7 n. !) (19~0). 
17 Srr, e. (!., People v. Sprigos, ;)6 Cal. Hptr. ~~1 , ;3,1;9 P. 2d 377, 
GO Cal. 2d 8G8 (106~); People v. Letlrich, 413 111. 172, 108 N. E. 
/ 
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changes accomplished,.,.. the new Federal Rules of Evi-
c~'" declarations against pellal interest were lJOnnally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of Don-
nelly v. United Sta.tes, 228 U. S. 243, 272-273 (1!)13). 
Exclusion, where the limitation prevails. is usually prem-
ised on the view that admission would lead to the fre-
quent presentation of perjured testimony to the jury. 
It is believed that confessions of criminal activity are 
often motivated by extraneous considerations and, there-
fore, are not as inherently reliable as statements against 
pecuniary or proprietary interest. While that rationale 
has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism,' 0 
we need not decide in this case whether, under other 
circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose 
by excluding untrustworthy testimony. 
The hearsay statements involved in this case \\'Crc 
originally made and subsequently offered at trial under 
circumstances that provided considerable assurance of 
their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confe~:"sions 
"·as made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly 
after the murder had occurred. Second. each one was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case-
McDonald's sworn confession. the testimony of a.n eye-
witness to the shooting. the testimony that McDonald 
\vas seen \vith a gun immediately after the shooting, and 
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and 
2d 4SS (10.52): Proplc , .. Brmcn. 2G X Y. 2d SS, :308 X. Y. 8. 2d 
S25, 2:37 X. K 2d 16 (1970): Hinrs Y. l'ir(linia, 1:3() 'i'n. 72S, 117 
S. R 8+~ (1923). 
. .. 
, ,. Rulr 80-t, Hulr;; of E,·idrne<' for thr 1'nitrd Statr~ Comt~ nnd tcc.tl 
11 
(; "'S u/'1 {, Jf7J \• 
-:\[agi~tr:ltC'." (appro,wl Xo\'. 20. 19727l b e 1 , :/. 
'n Src·, c. (!., AdYi~or~· Commiti<'C' :\otr~. llulr SO+. Hulr~ of E,·i-
drnrr for thr Unitrd fltatr~ Court~ and -:\[:tgi~tmtr,.; (:tpprnwd "/ () f.J• 
:\To\·. ~0, 1972); 5 .T. Wigmorr. E,·iclrncP § HiG. nt 2S.J. (:)d rd. / ;! \ 
Hl..J.O); \\'right, (Tniform Rulr>< of Hr:tr.•a~·. 26 U. Cinn. L. Hrv. {, J 1 ;1, 
575 (Hl57); United States, .. Amnmzioto, 293 F. 2d 373,378 (CA2), 
rrrt. denied, 3G8 P. S. 019 (19Gl) (Friencll.'·· .T.): Sr.olail' "· United' 
States, 40G F. 2d 5G3, 5G4 (CAO), rrrt. clrniecl, 391) U. S. 981 (19G9) _ 
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subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer num-
ber of independent confessions provided additional cor-
roboration for each. Third, whatever may be the 
parameters of the penal-interest rationale,~0 each 
confession here was in a very real sense self-incrim-
inatory and unquestionably against interest. Sec / 
Un ·ited States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 473, 484 (1971); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). Mc-
Donald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aKare of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner 
not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
tion about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
(1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra, and from the Donnelly-type 
situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavail-
able at the time of triaF1 
~ 0 The Mississippi rase which refused to adopt a hearsay excep-
tion for declarations aga inot penal int crest concerned an out-of::.. 
eourt declarant who purportedly stated that he had committrd the 
murdrr with which his brother had been charged. The lVIi::;~i~~ippi 
Supreme Court believed that the declarant mn~· have bren moti-
vntrd by a desire to free his brother rather thnn by any compulsion 
of guilt. The Court nl::;o noted that the derlarant hnd flrd, waH 
unaYailable for cro;,;s-examination, and may wrll have known at 
thr time he made the statement that he would not suffer for it. 
Broll'JI v. State, 99 Mi,;s. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911). There i~, in the 
prr~ent case, no such baRis for doubting McDonald'::; ~l:llemcnts. 
2 l McDonald's pre~ence a]~o drpriYes the State's argument for 
rrtrntion of the penal-interest rule of much of ito force. In claiming 
/ 
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Fe>v rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g.,/ 
Washington v. Texa.s, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply ""ith estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure· 
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence 
has been more respected or more frequently applied in 
jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hear-
say, exceptions tailored to allow the in trocluction of 
evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have 
long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and 
thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception 
for declarations against interest. That testimony also 
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circum-
stances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule 
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice. 
ilml "ft]o change the rule would work a traveHty of jn~tice," the 
State posited the following hypothetical: 
"If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime; B 
could tell C and D that he committed the crime; B could go into 
hiding and nt A's trial C and D would testify as to B's admission 
of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would return to stand trial; 
B could then provide several witnesses to estify as to hi::; where:1bouts 
at the time of the crime. The testimony of tho::<e wit ne:-;se~ :1long 
with A's statement that he really committed thr crime would result 
in B'.:> acquittal. A would be barred from further prosecution 
because of the protection against double jeopardy. No one could 
be convicted of perjury a A did not testify at his fir:-;t trial, B did 
not lie under oath, and C :1nd D were truthful in their testimony." 
Respondent's Brief, at 7 n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
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We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit 
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a 
tr.ial in accord with traditional and fundamental stand-
ards of the due process. In reaching this judgment we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor 
does our holding signal any dimunition in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment 
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and 
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
I 
lfp/ss lee 12/27/72 
MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Powell, .Jr. 
Chambers 
reflects your suggested changes. 
I have reviewed these carefully and, as modified in minor part 
(as you will note), they have my approval. The one exception is Rider A 
on page 17. This page has been troublesome for both of us. I have 
suggested a revision - attached to this memorandum as Rider X. I have 
-~ indicated to you (in our brief discussion yesterday afternoon) why I 
'0\ll 
suggest this as a substitute for your rider. 
I also deliver to you herewith my copy of the first draft, 
' 
I have noted a number of stylistic changes. None is really vital, and 
some are unnecessary in light of your changes. I do suggest, however, 
that you take a look at them . 
. : ,~;I think you have improved the draft, and suggest that you get it 
to the printer today. Unless you have some point you wish to discuss' 
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G~ 
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Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion 
for the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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RE: No. 71-5908 - Chambers v. 
Mississippi 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your fine opinion 
in the above. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
I 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71- 5908 
Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
r January -, 1973] 
MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonment and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner ·was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order >vas reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405 
U. S. 987 ( 1972), to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for 
murder occurred in the small town of Wood ville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attentpt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated by 20 or 25 
men in the crowd who intervened and ·wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Three deputy sheriffs arirved shortly there-
after and the officers again attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots were fired. Fonnan was looking in a different 
direction when the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gun into an alley in the area from 
which the shots appeared to have come. The first shot 
vvas wild and high and scattered the crov,·d standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot and hit one 
of the men in the crowd in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran down the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyoue. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he \Yas 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not sec whether Chambers had a 
gun in his ham!, he did see Chambers "break his arm 
clowu" shortly before the shots were fired. The officers 
who saw Chambers fall thought he was dead but they 
made no effort at that time either to examine him or 
to search for the murder weapon. Instead they attended 
to Liberty, who was placed in the police car and taken to 
the hospital where he "·as declared dead on arrival. 
A subsequellt autopsy showed that he had been hit 
with four shells from a .22-caliber revolver. 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he 'Yas not yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
:1 car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night. \Yhen the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers \\·as still alive a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
the capital offense of murdering Liberty. He pleaded 
not guilty and has asserted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, \\"aS in the crowd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day. he left his wife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
same year he returned to Woodville when his wife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his, known as Rev-
erend Stokes, \\·anted to sec him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in N atchcz, Mississippi, several miles north of 
Woodville and, upon his return. McDonald \Yent to sec 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, who maintained 
offices in Natchez. T\rO clays later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices aml gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his. James Williams. that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his O\Yn pistol, a nille-shot .22-
caliber revolver. which he hacl discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession was 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confessio11 had been transcribed, 
'.J<tmr~ \Yilli:uns \\"as indietrd alou~ \\"ith Chambrn.:. Tlw Stnt.r, 
lwwrvrr, fa ilt>d lo int rod li('C' nn~· C'\ idrncc at trial that roulcl im]ll iea to 
'i'i'ill i:t Ill~ in the ~!toot in~. At the C'Onrlu~ion or t ltr Stat o'::; ca~c-in­
('hid tho trial court ~ranted a directed nrdi('( in his favor. 
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signed, and witnessed, McDonald was taken over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of \iV oodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not kno·w what had happened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
tim.e. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year." At trial he endeavored to develop two 
~Upon Chambers' motion, a change of venue was granted and 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the cast of Woodville. The 
change of trial setting was in response to !)Clitioner's clnim that, 
because of adver~c publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
and sheriff's staffs in Woodville, he could not obtnin a fnir and 
impartinl trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no weapon 
was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he was standing in the street near 
where Liberty was shot, that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring the facts sur-
rounding this defense to the jury's attention. Samuel 
Hardin, a lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that 
he saw McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness-
one of Liberty's cousins-testified that he saw McDonald 
immediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers' primary goal was to show the jury that 
McDonald had repeatedly confessed to the crime. 
Chambers attempted to prove that McDonald admitted 
responsibility for the murder on four separate occasions, 
once when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' 
counsel and three other times prior to that occasion in 
private conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was th,varted in his attempt to 
present this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi evidence rules. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
/ 
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of due process of la\Y." It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought 
a ruling that, if the State chose not to call McDonald 
itself, he be allowed to call him as an adverse witness. 
Attached to the motion were copies of McDonald's sworn 
confession and of the transcript of his preliminary hear-
ing at \Yhich he repudiated that confession. The trial 
court granted the motion requiri11g McDonald to appear 
but resen·ed ruling on the adverse witness motion. At 
trial, and after the Stat<' had failed to put McDonald on 
the stand, Chambers called McDonald. laid a predicate 
for the introduction of his sworn out-of-court confession, 
had it admitted into evidence, and rend it to the jury. 
The State, upon cross-examination, elicited from Mc-
Dollalcl the fact that he had r<'jerted his prior confee:;:ion. 
'1 On thr record in this ca~e, it i ~ drnr th:lt Chamhrr~' a~~rrtc•cl 
drni:d of dur proc·t'-'' i~; proper!~- bdorr 11~. llr obirrted during 
trial to r:tch of thr rour!'~ ruling~. A~ to tlH' confrontation c·laim, 
prtitimwr a~-<rrtrd both brfore and dming tri;tl, hi~ right to trrnt 
:\IcDonnld as nn ndwr~r \\'itnr~~- IIi~ motion for 11<'11. t ri:tl, filt'd 
aftt'r thr jmy's Yerdirt, liHtcd a~ rrror thr trinl romt's rdus:d to 
prrmit cro~~-rxamination of l\[cDon;tld nnd the rxclu.<ion of f'l·i-
dc•nr·p rorrohor:lt iw of l\TcD~nald's guilt. Thr mot ion ronrlmlrd 
th:\1 the trial "~raR not in nr•r·ord \\'ith fundamrnt:1 l f:tirnr•" ?;u:tr:tn-
trrd h~· thr llourternth Amrndmmt of thr Con~titution." Cb.nnlwr~ 
rr:t~~PrtNI tlto~r cl:tim,.; on npprnl to tltr Rtntr Ruprrmr Comt. 
Aftrr thr nffirm:l!1er of hi' f'onvirtion b~- thnt rourt, Chnmhrrs 
filrd a prtition for rchrnrin~ ndclrrssrd n lmo~t rntirrl ~· to thr rl:lim 
t h:tf hi.; t ri:tl h:1d not bern conduct rd in a n::t ntwr r·on ~ i~t rnt 1\ it h 
tr:ulitionnl notions of clur JH'OCC'""· Thr State Supr<>mr Court rai.;cd 
no qur"t ion t h:1t Chnmbrr,' elaint~ 1\'<'l'(' not proprrl~- n""rrtrd, and 
rhim is made hrrr thnt thr qurstions arr not proprrl~- rrvirw:dllr 
h~- thi" Court. Srr Strrrt \'. 1\"ew }"or!:. 8!).1 LT. R . .'i7r>. 51'1--582 
(1!169); Douglas \'. Alabama, 880 U. R. 41.'\, 420-!28 (l!'lri5). 
/ 
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McDonald further testified, as he had at the preliminary 
hearing. that he clicl not !"hoot Liberty, am! that he con-
fessed to the crime only on the promise of Reverend Stokes 
that he 'yould not go to jail and would share in a sizable 
tort recovery from the town. Ire also retold his own 
story of his actions on the evening of tbe shooting, in-
cluding his vil"it to the cafe down the street, his absence 
from the scene during the critical period, and his sub-
sequent trip to the hospital with Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers renewed his motion to examine McDonald as 
an adverse witness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile, but he is not adverse in 
the ::-eni"e of the word. so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, finding that "lVIcDonald's testimony was 
not adveri"e to appellant" berause "I n·lowhere did he 
point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2d., at 220. 
Defrated in his attempt to chalienge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciation of his prior confession. Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three witnesses 
to "·hom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The first of thel"e, Samuel Hardin. " ·ould have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting. he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that while driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objected to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection! 
'lLtrdin'~ tr,.;timon~·. unlikr thr ir~timon~· of tbr other two nwn 
who ~tatrd that l\[rDonald had confr~-rcl to thrm, \\·n~ aet unlly 
l!:i,·en in thr .im~··~ prr~rm·r. After thr Statr'~ ob.irction to Hardin',; 
account of l\IrDonald'" :-;tatrmrnt was sust a inrcl , thr irinl romt 
ordrrrd thr jmy to cli~rrgard it. 
/ 
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1n Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
had said he was drinking beer \vhen the shooting occurred, 
also was called to testify. In the jury's presence. and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers 'vith 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they \Yere riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony regarding McDonald's 
self-incriminating remarks should have been admitted 
as an exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial 
court sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded.5 The jury was not 
5 A gun dealer from Natchez testified that Mr Donald had made 
two purchases. The witness' busine~s record~ indirn ted that 
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allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.a On appeal 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's rule and 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay ru1c, he was 
witnesses in his O\vn behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers hacl, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources iJJClicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of tho 
crime. But what remained was a single confession and 
an arguably acceptable renunciation. It was far less 
persuasive than Chambers' defense might have been had 
he been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's 
statements to cross-examination or had the other confes-
sions been introduced. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to the murder. IIe purchased a different ~t ylc .22 three ,,·eeks 
after Liberty'~ death. 
0 It is not entirely clear whether the trial court'~ rulilli!: was 
premised on the same hearsay rationale underlying the cxdu~ion 
of the other testimony. In this instance the State argued that 
Carter's testimony was an impermissible attempt by petitioner to 
impeac-h a witness (McDonald) who was not adyerse to him. The 
trial court did not state why it was excluding the evidence but the 
Stale Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hearsay. 
252 So. 2d, at 220 . 
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defend against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to clue process. Mr. J usticc Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), 
identified these rights as mnong the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense-a right to his day in court-arc basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
Sec also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969); 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of those 
elements of a fair trial are implicated in the present case. 
A 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to sub,icct 
McDonald's clamming repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. lie " ·as not allO\Yed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conseicncc so that the jury might judge for 
itself \Yhethcr McDonald's te~timony was \\'Orthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United Slates, 156 U. S. 237, 242- 243 
( 1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. :-;, 74, 80 (1070). It is. indeed, 
"an e:.;;sential and funclamrntal requirement for the kind 
of fair trial \Yhich is this country's constitutional goal." 




the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may, in appropriate cases. bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interc. ts in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 303 U. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case. petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald was rlcnicd on the basis of a Mississippi coin-
mon la\Y rule that a party may not impeach his own 
\Yitness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party \\·ho calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, 101 S. 2d 123. 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "youchcr" rule 
arc uncertain, .it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators'' \Yere ca1led to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesf:CS in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal process. Crim-
inal defendants do not select their witnesses; they must 
take them where they find them. Moreover. the rule has 
been condemned as archiac. irrational, and potentially 
dcstmctive of the truth-gathering procC'ss.' It recently 
7 3.\ .T. Wigmon' , EYiclrner § S96 , at 6.51\-ofil (Chadbourn rd. 
1070); C. l\IrCormick, EYillrnrc § 38, at 75-78 (J972). 
' C. l\leCormick, E1·idrn('c § :31', at 75-78 (HY/2); E. :\Iorgan, 
H:1~ic Prohlrm~ of E1·iclrncr 70-71 (19G2); 3A .J. Wigmore. El·i-
dcncr ~ SDS, nt 661 (Chadbourn rd. 1!)70). 
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has been rejected altogether by the new Rules of Evi-
dence applicable in all federal courts.n As applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's impact was douLly harmful 
to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument, 10 he "·as also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
"voucher" rule's corollary requirement that the examiner 
is bound by anything the witness might say. He was, 
therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the \Yritten 
confession. 
Mississippi does not go so far as to contend that its 
rule should override the accused's right of confrontation. 
Instead, it argues that there is no incompatability be-
tween its rule and Chambers' rights because no right 
of confrontation exists unless the testifying witness is 
"adverse" to the accused. The State's brief in this 
Court asserts, therefore, that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
9 Rule 607, Rules of Evidence for the United State8 Courts and 
l\1agistrates (approved Nov. 20, 1972). 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
u BespondenL'" Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
12 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
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Chambers.]:! And . in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald 's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. In these circum-
stances, it can hardly be disputed that McDonald's testi-
mony ·was in fact seriously adverse to Chambers. The 
right to confront and cross-examine one 'vvho gives dam-
aging testimony against an accused is a matter of sub-
stance, and does not turn on technicalities as to whether 
the witness was initially put on the stand by one party 
or the other. \V e conclude that the State's "voucher" 
rule, as applied in this case, impermissibly interfered 
'vith Chambers' constitutional rights. 
B 
Chambers' efforts to present to the jury the full picture· 
of McDonald 's possible responsibility for Liberty's mur-
der was further frustrated by the trial court's refusal 
to allow him to introduce the testimony of Hardin, 
Turner, and Carter. Each would have testified to the 
statements purportedly made by McDonald, on three 
separate occasions shortly after the crime, implicating 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. The hearsay rule is normally respected. 
It is a rule based on long experience and grounded in the 
notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be pre-
sented · to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are· 
traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional 
indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under 
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker· 
with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's 
word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not 
available in order that his demeanor and credibility may 
be assessed by the jury. California v. Green, 399 U. s_ 
149, 158 (1970). 
1 3 See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243,272 (1913) . 
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A number of exceptions have been developed over the 
years to allo"· admisf'ion of hearsay statements made 
u nclcr circumstances that tend to assure reliability and 
thereby compensate for the absence of the oath and 
opportunity for cross-examination. Among the most 
prevalent exceptions arc declarations against interest 14 -
an exception founded on the af'sumption that a person 
is unlikely to fabricate a statcm.ent against his own inter-
est at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes that 
exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary in tcrcst. 1" It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like ~1cDonald's in this case, that are 
against the penal intereFt of the declarant. Brown v. 
State, 00 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911). 
Prior to the changes accomplished by the new Federal 
Rules of Evidence,"' declarations against penal interest 
were normally excluded in federal courts under the au-
thority of Donnelly v. United Stales, 228 U. S. 243, 272-
273 (1013). The exclusion was premised on the belief 
that confessions of criminal act,ivity might be motivated 
by num.erous extraneous considerations and, therefore, 
arc not inherently as reliable as statements against pecu-
niary or proprietary interest. While that rationale has 
been the subject to scholarly criticism," we need not 
decide in this case \Yhether, under other circumstanC'es, 
11 .TrfTrr,llll, DC'cl:t ra 1 ions Ag:tin:-;t lntC'n'.-;1, .')S HalT. L. HC'I '. l 
(10~~). 
1
'' IT. 1\ld-:1 ro.1·, ]\ l is~i:-;sippi E1·idrnrc ~ -Hi ( 19fi.5). 
1
" Hnlr RO-t, Rules of E1·idC'nre for thC' Fnitrd Stair:< Court~ :tnd 
:\Iagi,.:t m IP:< (a pprowd l\ 01·. 20, 1972). 
"SC'C'. r. g .. Ad1·ison· Commillrr i\otC'". Hnlr SO-t. Rulr" of El·i-
dt'!H'(' for the Cnitrd State..: Court" and :\fagislr:t,r..: (:tpprm·pd 
i\oY. 20, Hl72): 5 .T. "'i11:more. E\·idrnee ~1 -m\. at 21'4 (8d rd. 
10-tO): \Yrighl. Fniform Rub of H(>;tr:<n~ ·. 21\ lf. Cimt. L. He1·. 
575 (Hlii7): United States'"· Anmmzinto. 293 F. 2d 37:3, :ns (C.\2), 
rPrl. denircl, 3(i'i U. S. 919 (J!.liH) (Fric'11Cll.1·, .T.): Stolair Y. United 
States, 40G F. 2d .')fi3, 55-1- (C.\9), rc•rl. drnird , 39:3 U. 8. 981 (101l9) .. 
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it might serve some valid state purpose by excluding 
untrustworthy testimony. 
Each of the hearsay statcnwnts involved in this case 
was originally made and subsequently offered at trial 
under circumstances that attested to its reliability. First, 
each of McDonald's confessions "·as made spontaneously 
to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had 
occurred. Second. each one was corroborated by some 
other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn confes-
sion, the testimony of an eyewitness. and other testimony 
consistent with his statement, including prior ownership 
of a .22-caliber revolver and his subsequent purchase 
of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent 
confessions provided additional corroboration for each. 
Third, whatever may be the parameters of the penal-
interest rationale.'' each confession here \Yas in a very 
real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against 
interest. Sec United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 473. 484 
(1971); Dullon v. Rvans, 400 U. R. 74. 89 (1970). 
McDonald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his rolo 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed. after telling 
Turner of his involvement. he subsequently urged Turner 
"not to mecs him up." Finally, if there \Yas any ques-
"Thr :\ Ii,:sis~ippi ra~r \\'hirh rrfu"rd to adopt a hr:~ r,:a~· rxrrp-
tion for dcrlaration" agnin,:t prwll intrrr~t ronrrrnrd nn out-of-
c·omt drrlarant \\'ho pmportrdly stated thnt hr hnd rommittrd the 
:nurdN \\'ith \\'hieh his brotlwr had hr<•n charged. Thr i\Ti""i"sippi 
Ruprrmr Court brlir,wl that thr drdnrant ma~· haYc bern moti-
nted h~· a dr~ire to frre hi~ brother rnthrr th:m b~· nn~· compulsion 
of guilt. Thr Comt ;lbo notre! that thr drrlnrant hnd flrd. \\'ns 
tiiJaYaibblr for cro~s-rxamination, and mn~· \\'ell ban• kno\\'n nt 
t ilr 1imr hr m:tde t hr ~tnt emrnt t hn t he would not ~ttf'f<'r for it. 
Rrozcn "· State. 99 :\Ti,~. 719, 5.5 So. 961 (1011). T!Jrrr is, in thQ 
Jll'<':'<'nt rnse, no suC"il ba~i~ for doubting l\1C"Donald'~ ~tatcmrnts. 
/. 
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tion about the truthfulness of the ext.ra.i udicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
(1970). Tho availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra, and from Donnelly, since in both 
cases the declarant was unavailable at the time of tr.ial.' 9 
Fe"· rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., 
Wa.shington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In re 
Oliver, supra.. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence which are de-
signed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps 
no rule of evidence has been more respected or more 
frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable 
to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow 
tn l\1cDonald's prrsencr nlHo drprives ihr Statr'~ argnmrnt .for 
rrtrntion of the prnal-intere~t rulr of much of its forcr. In claiming 
that "[t]o changr the rnlr would work n travc~ty of ju~ticr," the 
Statr positrd thr following hypothrtical: 
''If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime: B 
could tell C ::mel D that he committed the crimr; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would trstify a~ to B's admission 
of guilt; A could be acquittrd and B would ret mn to stand trial; 
B could then provide sevrrnl witnessrs to cstify as to hi~ wherrabouts 
at. the time of the crime. The testimony of ihosr witnrHsrs along 
with A's statement that he really committrcl thr crime would result 
in B'~ acquittal. A would be barred from fmther pro~ecution 
brcanse of the protrrtion against double jropardy. No onr could 
be convicted of prrjury as A did not trstify at his first tri<tl , B did 
not lie under oath, nncl C nnd D were tmthful in their trst imony." 
Respondent's Brid, at 7 n. 3 ( cm1)ha~is supplied). 
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the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to 
be trustworthy have long existed. Recognition that 
the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to 
defeat the ends of justice is especially appropriate in 
this case. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
as to McDonald's several confessions bore significant 
assurances of trustworthiness. In light of all the facts , 
no interest of the State in enforcing its hearsay rule 
could outweigh Chambers' right to present this evidence 
of critical importance to the jury trying him for a cap-
ital offense. 
We conclude that, taken together, the prevention of 
cross-examination and the exclusion of critical evidence 
deprived Chambers of the fair trial guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
We add that in reaching this judgment, and in setting 
aside Chambers' conviction, we invoke no new prin-
ciples of law. Nor does our holding signal any dimunition 
in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in 
the establishment and implementation of their own 
criminal trial rules and processes. Rather, we hold 
quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of 
this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers 
of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered._ 
JrJ.b 
A t DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES· 
No. 71-5908 
Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
[January -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELl.~ delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonment and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order was reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405 
U. S. 987 ( 1972) , to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for· 
murder occurred in the small town of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
/. 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attempt to handcuff J ad::son was frustrated by 20 or 25 
men in the crowd who intervened a11d wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Three deputy sheriffs al{frNed shortly there-. 
after and the officers again attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots \Yere fired. Forman was looking in a different 
direction when the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty had been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gun into an alley in the area from 
which the shots appeared to have come. The first shot 
was wild and high and scattered the cro1vcl standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot ancl hit one 
of the men in the crowd in the back of the head a11d 
neck as he ran clown the alley. That man was Leon 
Chan1bcrs. 
Officer Forman could not sec from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he was 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not see 1vhether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he did sec Chambers "break his arm 
down" shortly before the shots vverc fired. The officers 
w 10 sa1Y Chambers fall thought he \\'as dead but they 
made no effort at that time either to examine him or 
to search for the murder \\'Capon. Instead they attcnclccl 
to Liberty, who \Yas placed in the police car and taken to 
the hospital where he \\'as cleclarecl dead on arrival. 
A subsequent autopsy showed that he had been hit 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he was not yet dead. James vVilliams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
a car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night. "·hen the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers was still alivr a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
1
1 
Jo ~ r- f '/ 's yv~I/Jod 0 . # Hss of muHI-et'i+1-g:-I.i~tz. He plead eel 
not guilty and has asserted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, ,,·as in the crowd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day. he left his \Yife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
same year he returned to ·wood ville when his \Yife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his, known as Rov-
ercml Stokes, ,,·anted to sec him. Stokes om1cd a gas 
station in N atchcz, Mississippi, several miles north of 
\Yoodville and. upon his rctur11. McDonald \\'cnt to sec 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, \Yho maintained 
offices in Katchcz. T\YO clays later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a S\vorn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
tolcl a friend of his, James Williams, that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his own pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolver. \Yhich he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In respon~e to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, :McDonald affirmed that his confession \\'as 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to como 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
1 .Tntn~'~ \Yilli:1m~ \1':1~ indietrd along \\'itb Chambrr."'. Thr Rtnt.r, 
holl'f'l'l' r, fa ikd to int rodnc·e un,v cYidt'IH'r at trial t h:t t could imp I ic·a to 
\Villiam~ in the ~hooting. i\L the em1rlu~ion of thr Slate's (':l~r-in­
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signed, and witnessed, McDonald was ~ over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of Woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had happened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year.2 At trial he endeavored to develop two 
"Upon Chamber::;' motion, a change of venue wns granted and 
the Lrial was held in Amite County, to the cast of Woodville. The 
change of trial setting was in response to petitioner's claim that, 
because of adverse publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
and sheriff's staffs in Wood ville, be could not obtn in a fair and 
impartial trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he did not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no weapon 
was ever recovered from the scene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever owned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he was standing in the street near 
where Liberty was shot, that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially sue-_.) 
cessful, ho·wever, in his efforts to bring the- facts ~St!.f­
rounding this defense to the jury1~ attentio . Sam~ 
Hardin, a lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that 
he saw McDonald shoot Liberty. A second 'vitnes~ 
one of Liberty's cousin~testified that he saw McDona1d 
immediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers' ]')tj;rl'lftPY goal '>'11¥1 to show the jury that 
- McDonald had repeatedly confessed to the crime. 
Chambers attempted to prove that McDonald admitted 
responsibility for the murder on four separate occasions, 
once when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' 
counsel and three other times prior to that occasion in 
private conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his atteinpt to 
present this portion of his defe11se by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi evidenc rules, Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did u11successfully in his' 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
... 
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of duo process of law>" It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine rareful1y the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requestiug the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chan1bers also sought 
--=a ruling that, if the State chose not to call McDonald 
itself. he be allowed to call him as an adverse witness. 
Attached to the motion were copies of McDonald's sworn 
confession and of the transcript of his preliminary hear-
ing at which he repudiated that confession. The trial 
court granted the motion requiring McDonald to appear 
but reserved ruling on the adverse witness motion. At 
trial~ after the State~ failed to put McDonald on 
the stand, Chambers called McDonald, laid a predieate 
for the introduction of his sworn out-of-court ronfession, 
had it admitted into evidence, and read it to the jury. 
The State, upon cross-examination, elicited from Mc-
Donald the fact that he had rejected his prior confession. 
" On tho record in thi~ case, it i~ dear lh:d Ch:\lubrr"' a~"orled 
drninl of duo proeP~~ i.~ propc•rl.1· before u~. IIr nb.ir('lrcl dming 
lri:1l to rnrh of thr court'" rulings. As to the cnnfrnnl:ilion (']aim, 
prlitioncr n~ .-ortcc~bnth brforr and clming trial , hi~ right to t.reclt 
::\[cDonnlcl a~ a11 ftch·cr"r \Yitnr"~· IIi~ motion for nrw tri:tl, filed 
:t ft rr I he .i my'~ nrd irt, 1 i~t rd n~ <'!Tor t hr 1 rial com I·~ rrfn~:ll to 
permit rro~s-oxnminat ion of l\1cDon:tld nncl the rx('ltl,;ion of rl·i-
dc•nce rorrohomti1·r of 1\Tl'Don:Ilcr~ guilt. Tho motion concluclcd 
tlint tlw trinl "wn.-; not in neconl with fundanwntal f:tirnc~" gu:.ran-
tcrd b~· tho Four I ront h Amondmrnt of thr Con~l ilul ion." Ch:llnhcr:; 
rra~~crtcd thoso clnirnR on appo[tl to thr Slato Suprrmo Comt. 
After tho nffirm:tnrr of hi;; rom·ictio.n h:v th.1t c-ourt, ChamhorR 
filrcl a priilion for rchrariug nclclros~rd almo~l entirrlv to tho daim 
thnt hi~ t1i:Il hncl not bo"n conducted in a manner con~i~tcni with 
imrlilionnl notions of duo prorr~~. Tho Stato Suprrmc Coml r:1i~cd 
no q11rstion th::t Chnmbor::;' da.im~ '"orr not proprrl~· n'~rrtrd, nn~ no 
ri[Illl1 tnado ~that I he qur~l'ions aro nol propNI~· rc,·i<•\\·:lhlo 1\ 
h~· thi., Com. Sro Strrct Y. ll'ew 1'ork, ~0~ F. S . .')/G .. 'i~l-·582 
(HlGO); Do glas v. A/abmna. 380 U. S. 4l."i, 420-+2::\ (HlGii) . 
~; 
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McDonald furthrr testified, as he had at the preliminary 
hearing, that hr did not ~hoot Liberty, and that he con-
fessed to the crime only on the promise of Reverend Stokes 
that he would not go to jail and \Youlcl share in a sizable _ 
tort recovery from thr town. He also retold his own 
story of his actions on the evening of the shooting, in-
cluding his visit to the cafe down the street, his absence 
from the scene clming the critical period. and his sub-
sequent trip to the hospital with Chambers. 
At the conclui"ion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers rrnrwecl his motion to examinr McDonald as 
an advrrse witness. Thr trial court denied the motion. 
stating: "He may be hostile, hut he is not advrrse in 
the se11se of the wore!, so your request will be overruled." 
On appea ~the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruli'ng. finding that "McDonald's testimony was -
not aclvrrse to appellant" because "r n low here did he 
point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2cl., at 220. 
Defeated in his attrmpt to challenge directly Mc-
Do11alcl's renunciation of his prior confession. Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three witnesf'es 
to whom McDonald hacl admitted that hr shot the officer. 
The first of these, Sam.S Hardin, would have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting. he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and tha~ while driviug 
l\fcDonalcl home later that night, McDouald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State ob,iectecl to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it was hearf'ay. The 
trial court sustained the objection! 
1 Hardin'~ tr~timon~·. unlike thr 1r~timon~· of thr othC'r two tnC'Il 
\rho ~l:ttrcl that l\feDon~1ld h:1cl eonfr~..:rcl to lhrm, mt~ actu:illy 
giwn in thr jur~· ';; prr..:rncr. Aftrr t hr Rt!l tr'" oh.irct ion to II:mlin',., 
!tt·c·ount of l\IcT)onald ·~ ~~ :1 trmcnt was sust aitwd, t hr t ri:1l court 
orc!C'rrd t hr jury to cl i~rrgn rd it. 
/. 
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£ Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
~ said he was drillking beer when the shooting occurred, 
~ was called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
Wit 1out objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers 'vith 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they were riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court ( 0 /:(; 
n
atements, Turner's testimony regardi1(g McDonald's 
If-incriminating remarks should have been admitted 
s an exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial 
ourt sustained the State's objection. 
~ The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
lleighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
"A gun dealer from Natchez testified that McDonald hnd mnde 
two purchases. The witness' bu~ine~s record~ indicated that 
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allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statemeuts were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection." On appeal1 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower C'ourt's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. " ~ 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a ~ i 
eolJEWqnetH'Je ef tJ;tQ e8t¥teiiH'ttiEH'I 8f MiBBi~~it~pi's Fttle andr ~ q 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party ,( ~ 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule, he was ~
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had , however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources i11dicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, p tA.Jd/ 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the f.,.!1"W1 J'nc. CM 
crime. But ~ remaine<.1 1was a smgle ~_Qonfession OW<"~ '~"' ew+h 
an arg_uably accertable renur~ was far I~-. 
persuasive than Gh!!ffi~e~ elden~ might have been had \ 
1e been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's 
statements to cross-examination or had the other confes-
sions been i'lti:98ttce1 
1-cl.,...,,...-e III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to the murder. He purchased a different style .22 three \Yrrks 
after Liberty's death. 
"It is not entirely rlear whether the trial court'::; rulinp; wa::; 
prrmi~rd on the same hea rsay rationale underl~· ing the exelusion 
of the other te::; timony. In t.his instancr the State argut'd that 
Carter's te::;t.imony was an impermissible attrmpl by petitionrr to 
imprach a witnrs::; (McDonald) who was not ad\-crsc to him. The 
Lrial court did noL stale why it was excluding the evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicated that it wu" rxelnded u::; hear:;~1y . 
252 So. 2d, aL 220. 
,. ' 
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defend against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own brhalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. J ust.icc Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), 
idcntifird these rights as among the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a chnrge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense- a right to his clay in court- arc basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude. as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you. to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969); 
Spechl v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of~ +hc t C. 
elements of a fair trial arc implicated in the present rase. 
A 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's dam;ging repudiation and alibi to cross-
exmninat.ion. If e " ·as not allO\Ycd to test the witness' 
recollection. to probe into the details of his alibi. or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
iteclf whether McDonald's testimony "·as ,,·orthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United Slates, 156 U.S. 237, 242- 243 
(1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It .is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74. 80 (1970). It is. indeed. 
"an ce~cntial and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Te:ras, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (Hl63). Of course, 
I 
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the right to co1tfront and to croEs-cxamine is not absolutc 
and may, in ap11ropriate ca~es. bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger V. California, 303 r. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's requcst to cross-examine 
McDonald was denied on the basis of a. Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may not impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the pre~umption-without 
regarc! to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a "·itncss "vouches for his credibility." 
Clarl; v. Lansford, HH S~ 2d 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical O~'igins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in "·hich "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators'' were called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their ass<'rtions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
'Vhatever validity the "voucher" rnle may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-----twnship to the realities of the criminal process." Criny/ 
inal dcfen ants Clo not se1ect their witnes-=es; they yrfist 
take them where they find them. l\1Qreover, th rule has 
been condemned a archiac, irrational, a1itl potentially 
destructive of the truth-gathering process.~ It ree@'fltly 
7 3A .T. Wip;morr, Evidrmr § R9H, at G5R-HG1 (Chadbourn rcL 
1970); C. :\IeCorruiC'k, E1·ic!Pllcc § 38, []( 75-78 (1972). 
'1\C. l\I('Conuirk, E1·idmcr § :3S, at 75-7R (1972): E. l\Torp;an, 
Ba~te Problrm' of Evidrtwr 70-71 (1962); 3A J. vVi11:morr, E,·i-
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the right to c01Ifront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may. in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
clenial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. Calijor11ia, 393 F. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald was denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may 110t impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the presumption-vv·ithout 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party \\'ho calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
CZar/; V. Lansford, 191 s~ 2cl 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical o~·igins of the "voucher" rule 
arc uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators" \\'ere called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike \Yitnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
·whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
r~--.:_toclay in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tiOnship to the realities of the criminal process."} Criry 
inal ClefencraDts co not select their \Yitnesses; the~st 
take them where they fi11d them, Moreov~r.~t~he~~·u~le~h~a~S..J.~~=-
been condemued as archiac. jyr'!'ltj""n 1 - ' b 12/27/72 
A £>CC•---' . - - 'd B . P . 11 Cham ers -
~- The'voucher 
R1 er , · 
} 
~ ndemned as archaic' irrational, 
' has been co 
and potentially destructive 




CHA:\IBETIS v. l\IU·VISSIPPI 11 
the right to co11front and to cross-examine is not absolute 
and may, in appropriate cal'es, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal t rial process. 
E. g., .Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger V. California, 393 r. s. 314 (1969). 
In this caFe, petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald \\'as denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon la\\' rule that a party may 110t impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the prcsumption-\Yithout 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Rider A, p. 11 Chambers 12/27/ 72 
It might have been logical for the early common law to require 
a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses he brought before 
the jury to affirm his veracity. Having selected them especially 
for that purpose, the party mightfreasonably be expected to stand 
firmly behind their testimony. But in modern criminal trials 
defendants are rarely able to select their witnesses: they must 
~J()A 
take them where they find them. '- applied in this case, the 
9 
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~
las bee.n rejected altogether b the. new 11ul 6f Evi 
dence a )lica.ble in all federal courts.9 As applied ir 
th's case th e "voucher" ~mp.act was Qg.ubl hm1Trfu 
to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. K ot only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,'" he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the~ 
rule's corollary ~~irement that the Q~EQl;ain~ po. )>.l-1 
by anything -4JlQ untn~ might say. He was, t--
lerefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir- tho 1 1 
cumstances of McDonald 's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
esswn. 
ississippi do s not go so far as t cout.c.w;l ~ _ 
.m.u.~~!H.oWo~~~~e-fi@8~' -rigl om l}~o6. 
Instea~ argues that there is no incompatability be-
t"·een • rule and Chambers' rights because no right 
4\ 
of confrontation exists unless the testifying witness is 
"adverse" to the accused. The State's brief iR t.Rie (' 
~ asserts, ihet~eter~ that the "right of confrontation 
Is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 1 2 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
he argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
u ~ule 607, Rules of Evidence for the United State,; Court~ and 
l\Iagistratrs (approved NO\' . 20, 1972 ,I 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
11 Hespondent's Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
12 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
L 
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~las been re.i ected altogrth or b tb.e. new: l of. Evi lence a licable in all federal ourts. 0 As applied i this case, the "voucher" ~mpa t was~ubl harrrrfu 
to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. l\ ot only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald , but, 
rule's corollary ~~irement that the ~~~u~;lin~ po.-... "J c,tl-1/,,..' fh C. 
as the State conceded at oral argument/" he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the~ 
is bound by anything .l;,RQ uotn~ might say. He was, t--- tS S 
1erefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir- tN 1 
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions --
and from challenging the renunciation of tt-~ 
~ession. 
ht to defend 
. . i has not soug 
·s court Miss~ss~PP ·n rationale· Nor 
In th~explain . ftiid underlY~ g h accused's 
le or 4ilii4 ~ts hould override t e 
ru ru 1e s -------------that itS 
has it contended J ~ -"5 
· on t Cl b " l'' f ontat~ • __ .. 5 cr a 1am ers, · 
right of con r -u uuali Chambers' constitutional right 
.,~:~.::; not involved . .. he argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
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Chambers.' :' And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
~..---.... extent that it exculpated McDonald. In these- cir~w.n-.. 
st.anc~]: can hardly be disputed that McDonald's testi-
~ 
mony was in fact seriously adverse to Chambers. 
· ght fu eonfretltr-and-ercrss=mra1mne one who gives m-
aging testimony again st an accused is a 111,a of sub-
stance, a11d does not turn on technicalities as to whether 
the witness was initially put oh the stand by one party 
or the ot11er. vVe conclude that ti1~tate's "'loucher" 
rule, as 'applied in this case, imperm~terfJre 
~th Chambers' coustitut_ional rights. 
. - / 
~ B 
Chan~' efforts to prQScJ~t to the jury the f&n }3. 
'C.Donald's p~ responsibilij.y-fur-Liberty's mur 
further frustrated e trial court's refus 
to allo;, him to in UQ_Q the testimony of -Han:liL, 
Tumer, ancl · . '"'Each would have testified to the· 
statements purportedly made by McDonald, on three 
separate occasions shortly after the crime, if.Qf)lietttit"'----... . 





proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. I The hearsay rule i'l nOJ::r.;Qally Pes~eet88. 
It i'l a ru~ based on ..a experien~e and grounded in the w~"c.h ho..s lt l't he C.~ ; t r,.q ,~ 'J~j. 
q_.y.J., A..bsp e c. 1- e l notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be pre-sented. to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are· 
traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional 
indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under 
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker 
with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's 
word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not 
available in order that his demeanor and credibility may 
be assessed by the jury. Cal1:jornia v. Green, 399 U. S .. 
149, 158 (1970). L 
..... ../ 
1" Sec Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 272 (1913) . 
I 
b 'I ..., , .. ,., ... 11'1 
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Chambers.::: And. in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same -----
)--
The ava~lability of the right to confront and to cross-
examine those who give damaging testimony against the 
accused has never aeke~ofo5e been held to depend on 
whether the witness was initially ii put on the stand 
by the accused or by the State. We reject the 
notion that a right of such substanc~ in the criminal 
.,.c. 
process may be governed by that tech~ality or by any 
narrow and unrealisitic definition of the word "against'~ 
:b\ut!:Aii s~·l;l MaPSIR8Mu The ~11!8 b& .. "voucher" rule I 
as applied in this case. plainly interfered with 
Chambers 0 right to defend against the State's charges. 
B 
We need not decide, however, whether this error 
alone would occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed 
denial of due process rests on the ultimate impact of 
that erro~~is tria~ when viewed in conjunction with 
call 
the trial court's refusal to permit him to ldiili~ll 
other witnesses. The trial court refused to allow 
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A number of exce]~tions have ~ developed over the 
years to allow admission of hearsay statements made 
under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and 
thereby com.pensate for the absence of the oath and 
opportunity for cross-examination. Among the most 
prevalentlexceptions +laraJ,!oi1s· agahist interest~ 
an exception founded on the assumption that a person 
Hi +h t_ 
--- ___. 
is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own inter- ) • 
est at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes ~ '~-" 1 .l 
~xrcption but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary interest.'" It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like ~cDonald's in this case, that are 
against the penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
/@ 
State, 00 Miss. 719. 55 So. 961 (1911). 
1 lol l 1 ~\~'~lJ~a~r;}:' ~:::!~~=~~!0-~J:.e.t:e;* 
c.•~t•rt•• ~ "":- L _ _ _ 1 _ , 1 
11 .kffcr . ;on. Dcrlarn1 ions Al(:tin,;1 Jn'Prc~1, 5S linn·. L. Hr\'. 1 
(1!H-t). 
"\'"H. l\IdJro~·, l\Ii~ . ;j,," ippi E1·idrncc § 46 (1955) . 
........ "\Hille 804, Tittle~ of u;,·idencc for 1hc Pni1c•d St:tlc'.-< Cour1" :llld 
:\fagi:<1r::-ttc:< (::-tppron:od Xm·. 20. Hl72). 
I~ _..-Sec, c. (/., A(h'i"or~· Commi1 j ('(' :l'o1c~. H nip 80-1, n ulc·:< of l•:,·i-
Jdf'Jl(•(' for the Cnitcd S1:dc" Comt~ and :\f:lgi.;tr;tte"' (:Jpprc,,·ed 
?\'m·. 20. 1972): 5 .T. \Yigmorc. E1·idcnc·c § 1-+76. at 2S-I (:3d cd . 
• q 19-tO): l:rrighi. rniform Hulc~ of IIcar,;t~·. :2() U. ('inn. L. HCI' , 
575 (19.57); United Stairs,., AnnuHziato, 29Cl F. 2d :373.:378 (CA2), 
ecr1. drnicd, 36S LT. ~. !)]!) (19fil) (Fric•1Hll.1·, .T.): Srolair , .. United 
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A number of exce}~tion s have ~ developed over the 
years to allO\Y admission of hearsay statements made 
, , "1 ' ... . 1 ' 1' 1 1 
~~b) 
declaration-against-interest 
This materialistic limitation on the/hearsay 
exception appears to be accepted by most 
16/ 
their criminal trial processes, although 
States in 
a number of 
17/ 
States have discraded it-.- Prior to the changes 
18/ 
accomplished by the new Federal Rules of Evidence-,-
declarations against penal interest were normally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of 
Donnelly v. United Statesp 228 U.S. 243, 272-273 (1913). 
Exclusion, where the limitation prevails, is usually 
premised on the view that admission would lead to 
the frequent presentation id#ijl##41# of perjured 
testimony to the jury. It is believed that confessions 
of criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous 
considerations and, therefore, are not as inherently 
reliable as statements against pecuniary or proprietary 
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r;- A number of exce1~ tion s have~ developed over the 
years to allo\\' ac.lmisf'ion of hearsay statements made 
-1 
declaration-against-interest 
This materialistic limitation on the/hearsay 
exception appears to be accepted by most 
16/ 
their criminal trial processes, although 
States in 
a number of 
17/ 
States have discraded it-.- Prior to the changes 
18/ 
accomplished by the new Federal Rules of Evidence, 
declarations against penal interest were normally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of 
Donnelly v. United Statesp 228 U.S. 243, 272-273 (1913). 
Exclusion, where the limitation n~~ ~ - --
673 (2d. ed. 
Evidence § 278, at 
at 283-287 n.9 
16/ c ~Cormick, 
• Ev·dence § 1476, 
1972); 5 J. Wigmore, ~ 
(1940). 
Cal. Rptr. 841, 
11/ v Spriggs, 36 
See. e.g~• People • o~QQ1l~e~v~~t~L~e~t~t~r~i_ch_, 
~::..a-~- 868 (1964); feop • 
389 P.2d 377, 60 Cal. 2d Brown, 
488 (1952); People v. -
413 Ill. 172, 108 N. E.2d 16 (1970); 825, 257 N. E.2d 
26 N.Y.2d 88, 308 N.Y.S.2d 7 S E 843 (1923). 
136 va. 728, 11 •• 
vlirgini..S• Hines v. 
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15 t CIIA:\JlmHS v. l\TISSlSSII'PI it might serve eo me valid state purpose by excluding u n trnst wor~ testimony. 
·--·.-r-=-•ae>e?~wJ.N-;~~:-~ ~ lhe hean:ay statements involved in this case 
~ originally made and subsequently offered at trial 
under circumstances that '8Jttf8i!if8d .tG..~re1iaoility. First, 
each of McDonald's confessions "·as made spontaneou:::ly 
to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had 
occurred. Second. each one was corroborated by some 
, other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn confes-
sion, the testimony of an eye\ntnes'StJand t~ testimony 
.C.CUl.'ii~ie+il'ii-'w-t&Ft--ffi~~.t.@m.~;~~w.c~~~· prior ownership 
revolver and ~ sequent purchase 
of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent 
confessions provided additional corroboration for each. 
Third, whatever may be the parameters of the penal-
, ( i"i1teres£ rationalc;.t each confession here was in a very 
#f real sense :::elf-incriminatory and unquestionably against 
intere t. See United States v. Harris, 403 U. R. 473. 484 
(1071); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. R. 74. 80 (1070). 
---------~McDonald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. T ndeecl, after telling 
-e; ';/ 
Turner of his involvement. he sub~equently urged Turner 
not to1\11e6s him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
I-f ~hr l\Ii~~i~"ippi ca~r which rrfn"rd to adopt a lw:1r"a~· excrp-
'- " tion for drC'Iaration" ngain~t ]Wnal int<'rr~t ronrrrnrcl an out-of-
C'ourt derbrrmt "·ho pmportrdly st:lted that he had rommitt<'d the 
mmd<'r \Yit h whieh hi~ brot hC'l' had brrn charged. Thr l\Ii"~i,~ippi 
Snprrmr Court brlirwd 1 hat tlw drl'la rnnt ma.'· ha ,.e bern moti-
,·ntecl b~· a clr~irr to frrr hi~ brother rnthrr thnn h~· nn~· compu!o;ion 
of g;uilt'. Thr Court nl~o notre! thnt thr clrclnrnn1 had flrcl , waH 
HllnYH ila ble for ero~~-rxa minn1 ion, :wd ma~· wrll h:1n• known n t 
thr 1imr hr mndr thr ~tatrmrnt that hr would not ~ nfTrr for it. 
Bro1cn , .. Statl' , 99 :\[i~~. 710, 55 So. 9()1 (1911). Tlwrr i~ , in th~ 
prr~rnt ta~r, no ~nC'h basi~ for doubting l\ 'TC'Donald'~ ~tatcmrnts. 
J,(J\IIJ .(...c.t 
1' (.~~.Jt., ~1-!.. 
()...,UtJ). c..~ 
0 .;. + h-tt ·~ 
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tion about tho truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald ·was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his dem.eanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
( 1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from tho pri~r Mississippi precedent 
\ Brown v. State, supra, and frot"lJ~ormell?}', since in both 
L_cases the declarant was unavailaBle at the time of trial.'t 
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., 
TVashington v. Texa.s, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lshed rules of procedure and evidence wl=lieR. ft"t de-
signed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps 
no rule of evidence has been more respected or more 
frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable 
to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow 
l f ""'tl\lcDonald'~:< prrsrnce nl~o drprives the Stat r'~ a rg;umrnt for 
rrtrntion of the penal-inter€'~! rule of much of its forcr. In claiming 
thnt "[t]o change the rule would work a tran'st~· of ju~tice," the 
Stnte posited thr following hypothetical: 
"If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime; B 
could tell C and D that hr rommi1ted the crime; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify ns to B's admission 
of guilt; A could be acquittrd and B would return to stnncl trial; 
B could then proYide several witnrsses to estify as to his whcrenbouts 
at the time of the crime. The testimony of thoRe witnr~sr~ along 
with A's statement that he reallr committed the crime would result 
in B's acquittal. A would be b:ured from further prosecution 
because of the protection against double jE'opardy. No one could 
be convictrd of perjury as A did not testify at his first trill!, B did 
not lie under oath, and C and D were truthful in their testimony." 
Respondent's Brief, at 7 n. 3 (empha~is supplied). 
Obviously, "B's" absenrc at tri:ll is critical to the suece~s of the 
.i UHtirc-subYerting ploy. 
/ 
Rider X, p. 17 Chambers 12/27/72 
The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic 
rationale of the exception as to declarations against interest. 
7 
~testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense. In these 
\ circumstances, where constitutionU rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt Wete implicated, the hearsay rule may not 
be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, 
coupled with the state's refusal to permit Chambers to cross --
examine McDonald, 
~ 
the due proces~li\UiO of tao 14Ut A::Rloadmoilt In reaching this 
-~ 
judgment w~B-e;d te~blish no new principles of constitutional 
law. Nor does our holding signal any dimunition in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the states in the establishment and 
implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. 
Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances 
of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of 
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the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to 
be J!:ustworthy have long exi~te~ecogi~ti_oH-.tb.ai... 
the hearsay rule may not- be'" a})JSlied mechauistiCa~ly to 
defeat the ends of justice is especially appropri~te in 1 
this ' «;:ase. The lcsti~nony rejected by the triqJ court 
~nal€1;;;-~r~~~ bore ~ificant 
assurances o{ trustworthinessrTn light of all tiie f-;cts: 
o interest of' (he State i1\ enforcing its hearsay rule 
ould outweigh Ch~mbcrs' righ.__t to present this evidence 
f critical importance-. to the jury trying.thim for a cap-
ital offense. 
We conclude that, taken togeth«Jt, the prevention of 
dross-examination and the exclu~bn of critical evidence 
deprived Chambers of the fair trial guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of tl)e Fourte~1th Amendment. 
We add that in reaching: this judgment\ and in setting 
aside Chambers~ convi9tion, we invoke ~ n~w prin-
ciples of law. Nor d~s our holding signal an:N;limunition 
in the respect traditi'~ally accorded to the 'f\tates in 
the establishment and · 1plementation of their own 
criminal trial rules and p ~esses. Rather, we hold 
quite simply that under the f~ts and circumstances of 
this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers 
of a fair trial. ------··· 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered .. 
~. l).)tN(I 
)#~' 
~ _q. (/?. 
( cP-v ~{<.A) 
!Z-/&7/7 c. 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71- 5908 
Leon Chambers, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Mississippi. Mississippi. 
r January -, 1973] 
Mn. JrsTICE PowELL delivered the opnuon of the 
Court. 
Petitioner. Leon Chambers, was tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisomnent and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi , 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice dated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-. 
tion , that order was reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari '"as granted , 405-
U. S. 987 (1972) , to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for-
murder occurred in the small tmvn of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14,. 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
/ 
71-590K-01'L\10~ 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 
attempt to handcuff Jackf:on "·as frustrated by 20 or 25 
men in tlw crom.l who intervened and wrestled him 
frrr. Forman then racliorcl for assistance and Liberty 
rrmovecl his riot gun. a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Th rec clepu ty f'heriffs arrivrd shortly thcre-
aftrr ancl the officers again attempted to make their 
arrrst. Once more, thr officers wcrr attacked by the 
on lookers ancl during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots \Yere fired. Forman was looking in a different 
direction \Yhrn the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Lib0rty had been f:hot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrrls of his riot gun into an allry in the area from 
"·hich the shot· appeared to have come. The first shot 
\\·as \Yilcl ancl high and scattered the crowd standing at 
the face of the alley. Librrty appeared, however, to take 
more deliberate aim before the second shot and hit one 
of the men in tlH' crowd in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran clown the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not see from his vantage point 
who shot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he was 
standing se,wal feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chambers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not sec whether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he did see Chambers "break his arm 
down" shortly before the shots \Yere fired. The officers 
\Yho sa\Y Chambers fall testified that they thought he 
\Yas dead but they made no effort at that time either to 
examine him or to search for the murder weapon. In-
stead they attrnclecl to Liberty, "·ho was placed in the 
policr car and taken to the hospital \\'here he was declared 
drad on arrival. A subsequent autopsy showed that he 
had been hit \Yith four bullets front a .22-caliber revolver. 
/ 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he was not yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded him into 
a car ancl transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night, when the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers was still alive a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
Liberty's nwrder. Ur pleaded not guilty and has as-
serted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is intertwined with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald, a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, was in the cro,,·d on the 
evening of Librrty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
clay, he left his wife in Woodville and moved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
~ame year he returned to \Yoodville when his IYife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his. kno\\·n as Rev-
erend Stokes, wanted to see him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in Natchez. Mississippi, several miles north of 
\Voodvil1e and, upon his return, McDonald went to see 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, who maintained 
offices in Natchez. Two days later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his, James ·williams. that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his O\\·n pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolver, "·hich he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers'· 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession was 
volnntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
1 .JarnC'." 1\'illiams wa~ indictC'd :dong with ChambN~. ThC' Rtatc, 
hmYC'\·C'r, fnilrd io introduce nn~· C'Yiclc·ncr at trial that could implie:1tr 
Will i:1n1" in lhC' ~hooting. .\ t t hr eondu~ion of i hC' St a tC''H ra,r-in-
rhirf thr trial eourt grnnircl n clirPrtrcl ,-C'rclirt .in hi~ l'aYor. 
/ 
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signed, and witnessed. McDonald was turned over to tho 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he vvould not 
go to jail and that lw would share in the proceeds of a 
lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of Woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend. Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had happened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year." At trial he endeavored to develop two 
"1'pon Chambers' motion, a change of venue was graniPd ;md 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the east of WoodYille. The 
change of trinl setting was in response to petitioner'::; claim that, 
],ec·aw.;e of adYer::;e publicity and the hostile attitude of the police 
:~ml sheriff's staff:o in Wood1·illc, he could Jlot obtain a fair nnd 
impartial trial there. 
/ 
71-590R-OPii\ION 
CHA:\JBERS v. l\IISSI~SIPPI 
grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he clid not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually sa"· Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers saw Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he was shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, 110 weapon 
was ever recovered from the srene and there was no proof 
that Chambers had ever O\vned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he \Vas standing in the street near 
" ·here Liberty was shot, that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring before the jury 
the testimony supporting this defense. Sam Hardin, a 
lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that he saw 
McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness, one of 
Liberty's cousins, testified that he saw McDonald im-
mediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In adclit.ion to the testimony of these two \Yitnesses, 
Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald 
had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers at-
tempted to prove that McDonald had admitted respon-
sibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once 
when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' counsel 
and three other times prior to that occasion in private 
conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to 
pre~ent this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
/ 
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of dur process of ]aw.'1 It is necessary, therC'fore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the triaL 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought 
a ruling at that time that. if the State chose not to call 
McDonald itself. he be allowed to call him as an adverse 
witness. Attached to the motion were copies of Mc-
Donald's S\YOrll confession and of the transcript of his 
preliminary hearing at "·hich he repudiated that con-
fession. The trial court granted the motion requiring 
:McDonald to appear but reserved ruling on the adverse 
\Yitness motion. At trial after the State failed to put 
McDonald on the stand. Chambers called McDonald. 
laid a predicate for the introduction of his sworn out-of-
comt confession, had it aclmittrd illto evidence, and 
read it to the jury. The Statr, upon cross-examination, 
elicited from McDonald the fact that he had rejected his 
" 011 thr rrcord in this raHr, it i~ rlr:lr that Clwmbrr~' nsserlrd 
drni:1l of dw· prort'·'" i:-; propNl~· hrforr u~. He ob.i<'rtrd dminQ; 
tri:tl to r:t<'h of thr court'~ ruling~. As to tlw confrontation claim, 
prtilionrr a~~rrtrd. both brforr :mel during lri:d, hi~ righl to trmt 
::\TcDonald as 1111 nch·rr~r wilne,~. !lis motion for nrw trial, fi!C'd 
nftrr thr jtnfs wrclicl, li~trd a~ error lhr !rial court's rC'I'us:d to 
prrmil cro~s-C''i:aminnlion of l\TcDonald :mel thr rxch1.•ion of evi-
drnrr rorrobornt iw of M cDonnld's guill. The· mol ion condudrd 
that thr lri:ll ''m1~ not in accord ll'ith fundamrntal fairnr~s p:twran-
trrcl b.1· thr .Fourtrrnlh Amrndmrnl of lhr Con~tilntion." Chnmhrr.-; 
rra~~rrlrcl tho~r elaimf' on npprnl io thr Rlntr Suprrmr Coml. 
Aftrr thr n ffirmancr of hi~ rom·iction b~· i hnt court. Chambrn:; 
fllrll a prlilion for rrhrnring ndclrr~~<'cl :dnwsl rntirrl~· to thr claim 
that hi.; trial had not hrm concluctrd in a mnnnrr ron~i~trnt wilh 
traditional notion~ of dur prorr~~. Thr Stair Suprrmr Court rni,rd 
no qur~l ion 1 hat Chambrr~' rlaim~ wrrc not proprrl~· n""rrl rd. :lll<l 
no claim has hrrn madr h.1· lh!' Stntr that thr qnr~tion~ arc not 
propNI~· r~'Yirw:l bit' bY t hi" Conrl. Rrr 8t?·('et \'. N 1'10 York, 894 
U. R. 570, .')~1-liS2 (1969); Douglas v. Alaba111a, 3SO U. S. 415, 
420-423 ( 19().')). 
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prior confession. McDonald further testified. as he had 
at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise 
of Reverend Stokes that he " ·oulcl not go to jail and 
" ·ould share in a sizable tort recovery from the tovY11. 
Hr also retold his own story of his actions on the evening 
of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe down the 
street, his absrnce from the scene during the critical 
period , and his subsrquent trip to the hospital with 
Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the fltate's cross-examination, 
Chambers rene\Yed his motion to examine McDo1lald as 
an adverse witness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile. but he is not adverse in 
the sense of the word, so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, finding that "MeJ)otwlcl's testimony was 
not acl ver e to appellant" because "[nl ow here clid he 
point the finger at Chambers.'' 2.12 So. 2cl., at 220. 
Defeated in his attempt to challenge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciation of his prior confe,sion. Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three \Yitnesses 
to \Yhom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The fir t of these, Sam Hardin, would have testified 
that, 011 the night of the shooti11g. he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that. \Yhile driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objrctccl to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it ;ms hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection. 1 
1 Hardin'~ tr,;timon~·. unlikt' tlw tr~timo11~ · of ilw otlwr two mrn 
who sl atPd thnt :\IrDonalcl hncl c·onfe,.,rd to t lwm, wm' a1·t unlly 
gi,·rn in tlw jUI·~··,., prPHPII('P. AftN tlw Stntr'~ oh.irciion to Il:mlin'~ 
account of l\IrDonnld's ~tatrmrnt \1':1~ ~u~t:linrd, thr trial eomt 
onkrrd the jm~· to clisrrp;nrd it. 
/ 
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Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
said he was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, 
\YUS then called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday ancl had not had any beers with 
McDonald. The jury "·as then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they vvere riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, vvhen he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony as to McDonald's self-
incriminating remarks should have been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same day he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told hin1 that he had disposed of the .22--caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral '\Yeeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
5 .\ gun denier from Natchrz testified that ]\[cDonald had m:1de 
two pnrchaHcs. The witness' bu~ine~s record~ indicntrcl that 
McDonald purchased a nine-shot .22-calbier revolver about a year 
/ 
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allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.(; On appeal, 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2d, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule, he was 
Ullable either to cross-examine McDonald or to present 
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources iudicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
aud that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the 
cnme. But all that remained from McDonald's own 
mouth was a single written confession countered by an 
arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense 
was far less persuasive than it might have been had he 
been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's state-
ments to cross-examination or had the other confessions 
been admitted. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to the murder. He purchased a different style .2:2 thrre week;; 
after Liberty's death. 
(I It is not entirdy clear whethrr the trial court'~ ruliug was 
premi~ed on the same hear~ay r::ltionalc underlying 1 he exdnsion 
of the other testimony. In thi~ instance the State argurd that 
Carter's t cstimony was an impermissible attempt by prt it ionrr to 
imprach a witness (McDonald) who was noL adver~C' to him. Tho 
tri::tl court did not state why it was excluding tho evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicaled that it was excluded as ho::trsay. 
252 So. 2cl, at 220. 
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clefencl against the State's accusations. The rights to 
confro11t aml cross-examine witnei"ses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948). 
identified these rights as among the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a. charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense-a right to his day in court-·are basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Rretoer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969); 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of these 
elements of a fair trial are implicated in the present case. 
A 
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's damning repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. He was not allmYed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
itself whether McDonald's testimony was worthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-243 
(1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
tho "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). It is. indeed, 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. A. 400. 405 (1965). Of course, 
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
/. 
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and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314 (1969). 
In this case, petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald \Yas denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party may not impeach his own 
\Yitness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party \Yho calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, HH So. 2cl 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com-
purgators" \Yere called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions were 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike witnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts.' 
·whatever validity the "voucher'' rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal process.' It 
might have been logical for the early common la\\· to 
require a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses 
he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having 
selected them especially for that purpose, the party might 
7 :3A .T. 'Yigmore, Evidence § 89G. at G58-Gfl1 (Chnclbourn eel. 
1970); C. l\lcCormiek, Evidence § 38, at 75-78 (1972). 
8 The "nmcher" rule has bct'n condemned ns arelwic, irrational, 
nne! potrntiniJ~· cle.-tructivc of 1hc 1rnth gathering procr~~- C. 1\fc-
Cormiek, Evidence§ 38, nt 75-78 (1972); E. :\forgan. Basic Problems 
of E1·iclcnre 70-71 (1902): :n .J. "Tigmorr, E,·idcncc § 898, at 6()1 
(Chadbourn eel. 1970). 
/ 
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reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are 
rarely able to select their witnesses: they must take 
them where they find them. Moreover, as applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's" impact was doubly harm-
ful to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,' 0 he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the 
witness is bound by anything he might say. He was, 
therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
confession. 
In this Court Mississippi has not sought to defend 
the rule or explain its underlying rationale. Nor has 
it contended that its rule should override the accused's 
right of confrontation. Instead, it argues that there is 
no incompatability between the rule and Chambers' 
rights because no right of confrontation exists unless the 
testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The 
State's brief asserts that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
0 The "voucher'' rule has been rejected altogether by the new ) 
Rule:; of Evidence that will apply in all federal courts. Rule 607, 
Rule:; of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates 
(approved Nov. 20, 1972 and to become effective July 1, 1973) . 
.to Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
11 Re,.;pondcnL'::; Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). 
'" 252 So. 2cl, at 220. 
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The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate 
Chambers. 1 ~ And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. It can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seri-
ously adverse to Chambers. The availability of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been 
held to depend on whether the witness was initially put 
on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject 
the notion that a right of such substance in the crim-
inal process may be governed by that technicality or by 
a11y narrow and unrealistic definition of the word 
"against." The "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, 
plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against 
the State's charges. 
B 
We need not decide, however, whether this error alone 
would occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed denial 
of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
when viewed in conjunction with the trial court's refusal 
to permit him to call other witnesses. The trial court 
refused to allow him to introduce the testimony of 
Hardin, Turner, and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on 
three separate occasions shortly after the crime, naming 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. 
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The hearsay rule, "·hich has long been recognized and 
respected by virtually every State, is based on experience 
and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence 
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-
court statements are traditionally excluded because thry 
lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are 
usually not made under oath or other circumstances that 
impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; 
the declarant's word if' not subject to cross-examination; 
and he is not available in order that his demeanor and 
credibility may be a.f'sessed by the jury. California v. 
Green, 390 U. S. 149, 158 (1970). A number of excep-
tions have developed over the years to allow admission 
of hearsay statements made under circumstances that 
tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for 
the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
examination. Atuong the most prevalent of these ex-
ceptions is the one applicable to declarations against 
interest 1 '- an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his 
own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizrs 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary interrst.'" It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case, that are· 
against the penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
State, 99 Miss. 710, 55 So. 961 (1911). 
This materialistic limitation on the declaration-against-
interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by 
most States in their criminal trial procrsses.1 n although 
a number of States have cliscardecl it. 17 Prior to the· 
'' Jrffrr~on, Drrlamtion~ Ap;:tinst Intrrr.-t, 5S HmT. L. Rrl". 1 
( 19-lA ). 
.. , H.l\1cEiro~·, J\fi~~i~sippi E\·idrncr §-Hi (19.5.5). 
11 ' C . l\1rC'ormi('k, E\·idrncc § 278, at ()7:~ (2d eel. HJ72); 5 .T.. 
\Vi~morr, E\·idrnrr § 1-t7G, :1! 283-2S7 n. 9 (1940). 
17 Srr, P. (! .• People v. Spriggs, 3G Cal. Hptr. 1'-+1 , 3~9 P. 2d 377, 
GO Cal. 2d SGS (19G.f); J>eop/e v. Lettrich, .f13 Ill. 172, lOS N. E .. 
/ 
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changcs accomplished by the new Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,'' declarations against penal interest were normally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of Don-
nelly Y. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 272- 273 (1913). 
Exclusion, where the limitation prevails, is usually prem-
ised on the view that admission would lead to the fre-
quent presentation of perjured testimony to the jury. 
It is believed that confessions of criminal activity are 
often motivated by extraneous considerations and, thcre-
fore, are not as inherently reliable as statements against 
pecuniary or proprietary interest. \Vhile that rationale 
has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism,'n 
we need not decide in this case \\·hether , under other 
circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose 
by excluding untrusbYorthy testimony. 
The hearsay statements i11volvecl in this case werc 
originally made and subsequently offered at trial under 
circumstances that provided considerable assurance of 
thcir rcliability. First. each of McDonald's confessions 
" ·as made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly 
after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case-
McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eye-
'"itncss to the shooting. the testimony that McDonald 
was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting. and 
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and 
2d -+~~ (19ii:2): l'('ople v. Broten. 2G ); . Y . 2d ~~. ao~ 1\. Y. S. 2d 
82;i, 2.')7 K. E. 2d 10 ( 1970) ; flin es , .. !'iroinia, 1:36 Ya. 72~. 117 
S. E. 8-t~ (192~). 
1 ' Hul r , O.t, Rulr8 of b·idrncr for thr l'nitrd State~ Court~ :tnd 
:\Ltg:i,;tratr..: (npprtl\'C'CI XoY. 20. 197:2). 
tn ~rr , e. (! .. Ach·i~or~· C'ommil teP Xo1r,;. Hnlr 80-t, HulP~ of El'i-
drncr for the Pnitecl Stair~ Court,; and :\[agi~tmtrs (nppro,·rd 
Xo1·. 20, 197:2); 5 .T. Wigmore•, E1·idencr § 1.t76, n1 2f'.t {:"lrl rd. 
19-W) ; \Yrighl, 1"nifonn Rnlr~ of lTP:tr"a''· 2G F. Cinn. L. Hr1·. 
575 (19.37) ; United States Y. Annunziato, 29:! F. 2d 378, ~7R (CA2), 
cwt. dcniccl. :3G8 U. S. 919 (19Gl) (Fric·ndl.v, .T .); Scolair ,., United 
States, 406 F. 2d 5G~, 5G-l (CA9), crrl. dc•nicd , 395 U. S. 9S1 (1909) .. 
' . 
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subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer num-
ber of independent confessions provided additional cor-
roboration for each. Third, whatever may be the 
parameters of the penal-interest rationale,20 each 
confession here was in a very real sense self-incrim-
inatory and unquestionably against interest. See 
United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 473, 484 (1971); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). Mc-
Donald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution . Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner 
not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
tion about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
( 1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra., and from the Donnelly-type 
situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavail-
able at the time of triaJ.2 1 
" 0 The Mississippi case which refused to adopt a hearsay excep-
tion for declarations fl{l;ninst penal interest concerned an out-of-
court declarant who purportedly stated that he had committed the 
murder with which his brother bad been charged. The Mis~ i~Rippi 
Supreme Court believed that the declarant may have been moti-
vated by a desire to free his brother rather than by any compubion 
of guilt. The Court abo noted that the declarant had fled , was 
unavailable for cro~s-examination , and ma~· well ha,·e known at 
1 he time he made the statement that he would not ~ufTer for it. 
Bro1vn Y. State, 99 l\Ii~s. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911) . There i:-;, in the 
prC'~cnt case, no such bnsis for doubtin{l; l\IcDonald 's ~t atements. 
~ 1 M c Donn lei's pre~c·nce n l~o depri,·cH the Stat c's nr{l;umcnt for 
retention of the pennl-interc~ t rule of much of its force. In elniming 
/ 
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Few rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g .• 
TV ashington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 ( 1967); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right. the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure 
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence 
has been more respected or more frequently applied in 
jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hear-
say, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of 
evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have 
long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
here bore persuasive assurances of trust\vorthiness and 
thus was well ".:ithin the basic rationale of the exception 
for declarations against interest. That testimony also 
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circum-
stances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule 
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice. 
that "Lt]o change the rule would work a trave~ty of juHtire," the 
State posited the following hypothetical: 
"If the rule wen' changed, A could be charged with the crime; B 
could tell C and D tha,t h<:> committed the crime; B could go into 
hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify as to B'~ admi~~ion 
of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would return to stand trial; 
B could lhen provide several witnes::;es to estify as to hi~ whrrrabouts 
at the time of the crime. The testimony of those witnr~sr~ along 
with A's statement that he reall~· committed tlw crime would rrsult 
in B's arquittal. A would be barrrcl from furthrr ])ro~ecution 
hecause of the protection against double jeopardy. No onr could 
be convicted of perjury as A did not testify at his fir::>t trial, B did 
not lie under oath, and C and D werr truthful in their trstimony." 
Respondent's Brief, at 7 n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
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We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit 
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a 
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental stand-
ards of the clue process. In reaching this judgment we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor 
does our holding signal any dimunition in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment 
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and 
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opmwn. 
It is so ordered. 
,. 
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v. the Supreme Court of 
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Mn. JL:STICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, Leon Chambers. "·as tried by a jury in a 
Mississippi trial court and convicted of murdering a 
policeman. The jury assessed punishment at life im-
prisonmcn t and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed , 
one justice dissenting. Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 
2d 217 (1971). Pending disposition of his application 
for certiorari to this Court, petitioner was granted bail 
by order of the Circuit Justice elated February 1, 1972. 
Two weeks later, on the State's request for reconsidera-
tion, that order was reaffirmed. 405 U. S. 1205 (1972). 
Subsequently the petition for certiorari was granted, 405 
U. S. 987 (1972) , to consider whether petitioner's trial 
was conducted in accord with principles of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. \\Te conclude that 
it was not. 
I 
The events that led to petitioner's prosecution for 
murder occurred in the small town of Woodville in 
southern Mississippi. On Saturday evening, June 14, 
1969, two Woodville policemen, James Forman and 
Aaron "Sonny" Liberty, entered a local bar and pool 
hall to execute a warrant for the arrest of a youth named 
C. C. Jackson. Jackson resisted and a hostile crowd 
tS 
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of some 50 or 60 persons gathered. The officers' first 1 
...-:~-......... - wne n 
attempt to handcuff Jackson was frustrated~ 20 or 25 
men in the crmnl e intervened and wrestled him 
free. Forman then radioed for assistance and Liberty 
removed his riot gun, a 12-gauge :::awed-off shotgun, from 
the car. Threc> deputy :::heriffs arrived shortly there-
after and the officers agai11 attempted to make their 
arrest. Once more, the officers were attacked by the 
onlookers and during the commotion five or six pistol 
shots were fired. Forman \vas looking in a different 
direction \\·hen the shooting began, but immediately saw 
that Liberty hacl been shot several times in the back. 
Before Liberty died he turned around and fired both 
barrels of his riot gu11 into an alley in the area from 
\vhich the shot appeared to have come. The first shot 
was "·ild and high and scattered the cro\\·d standing at 
the face of the alley. Liberty appeared, hO\vever. to take 
more deliberate aim lwfore the second shot and hit one 
of the men in the cro\\'Cl in the back of the head and 
neck as he ran dom1 the alley. That man was Leon 
Chambers. 
Officer Forman could not sec from his vantage point 
who :::hot Liberty or whether Liberty's shots hit anyone. 
One of the deputy sheriffs testified at trial that he \vas 
standing several feet from Liberty and that he saw 
Chn:mbers shoot him. Another deputy sheriff stated that, 
although he could not sec "·hether Chambers had a 
gun in his hand, he dicl see Chambers "break his arm 
clown" shortly before the shots \\'ere fired. The officers 
\vho saw Chambers fall testified that they thought he-
was dead but they 1nade no effort at that time either to 
examine him or to search for the murder vvcapon. In-
stead they attended to Liberty, who was placed in the 
police car and taken to the hospital where he was declared 
cleacl on arrival. A subsequent autopsy showed that he 
had been hit with four bullets from a .22-caliber revol vcr. 
I 
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Shortly after the shooting, three of Chambers' friends 
discovered that he was not yet dead. James Williams,' 
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald loaded hin1 into 
a car and transported him to the same hospital. Later 
that night, when the county sheriff discovered that 
Chambers "·as still alive a guard was placed outside 
his room. Chambers was subsequently charged with 
Liberty's murder. He pleaded not gnilty and has as-
serted his innocence throughout. 
The story of Leon Chambers is interbYinecl with the 
story of another man. Gable McDonald. McDonald. a 
lifelong resident of Woodville, vYas in the crO\Yd on the 
evening of Liberty's death. Sometime shortly after that 
day, he left his wife in Woodville anclmoved to Louisiana 
and found a job at a sugar mill. In November of that 
san1e year he returned to ·wood ville when his ''"ife in-
formed him that an acquaintance of his. knO\m as Rev-
erend ~tokes, wanted to sec him. Stokes owned a gas 
station in Natchez, Mississippi, several miles north of 
·woodville and, upon his return, McDonald went to see 
him. After talking to Stokes, McDonald agreed to make 
a statement to Chambers' attorneys, "·ho maintained 
offices in K a tchez. Two days later he appeared at the 
attorneys' offices and gave a sworn confession that he 
shot Officer Liberty. He also stated that he had already 
told a friend of his, James ,.rilliams, that he shot Liberty. 
He said that he used his own pistol, a nine-shot .22-
caliber revolYer, which he had discarded shortly after 
the shooting. In response to questions from Chambers' 
attorneys, McDonald affirmed that his confession ''"as 
voluntary and that no one had compelled him to come 
to them. Once the confession had been transcribed, 
'.Ltm,.,~ Willian!;.; was inrliclcJ along with ChambN~. The Slate, 
howe1·er, fai!Pcl to inlrodurc nn)· c1·idellrc at trinl ihat could implicate 
'i'i'illinms in the ~lwoting. ,\t tlw rondu.,iou of lhe Rlalc':-; ra~c-in­
rhid thr trial court granted a dircrtccl 1·crdiet in his fa 1·or. 
/ 
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signed, and witnessed, McDonald was turned over to the 
local police authorities and was placed in jail. 
One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald 
repudiated his prior sworn confession. He testified that 
Stokes had persuaded him to confess that he shot Liberty. 
He claimed that Stokes had promised that he would not 
go to jail and that he would share in the proceeds of a 
laYvsuit that Chambers would bring against the town 
of ·woodville. On examination by his own attorney 
and on cross-examination by the State, McDonald swore 
that he had not been on the scene when Liberty was 
shot but had been down the street drinking beer in a 
cafe with a friend, Berkley Turner. When he and 
Turner heard the shooting he testified that they walked 
up the street and found Chambers lying in the alley. 
He, Turner and Williams took Chambers to the hospital. 
McDonald further testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he did not know what had hn,ppened, that there 
was no discussion about the shooting either going to or 
coming back from the hospital, and that it was not 
until the next day that he learned that Chambers had 
been felled by a blast from Liberty's riot gun. In addi-
tion, McDonald stated that while he once owned a .22-
caliber pistol he had lost it many months before the 
shooting and did not own or possess a weapon at that 
time. The local justice of the peace accepted McDonald's 
repudiation, released him from custody, and the local 
authorities undertook no further investigation of his 
possible involvement. 
Chambers' case came on for trial in October of the 
next year." At trial he endeavored to develop two 
~Upon Chamber:l' motion, a change of Yeuuc wa.· granted and 
the trial was held in Amite County, to the ea~t of WoodYille. The 
change of trial sett ing w~L' in re~pon~e to petitioner's claim that, 
becau~e of uch'cr,;e publicity :mel the hostile attitude of the police 
mul shcriiT',; :;taff:> in Woodville, he could not obtain a fair aud 
impartial trial there. 
/ 
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grounds of defense. He first attempted to show that 
he clicl not shoot Liberty. Only one officer testified 
that he actually sa\Y Chambers fire the shots. Although 
three officers sa\Y Liberty shoot Chambers and testified 
that they assumed he \Yas shooting his attacker, none 
of them examined Chambers to see whether he was still 
alive or whether he possessed a gun. Indeed, no "·capon 
\Yas ever recovered from the scene and there was 110 proof 
that Chambers had ever O\vned a .22-caliber pistol. One 
witness testified that he "·as standing in the street near 
where Liberty \Yas shot. that he was looking at Chambers 
when the shooting began, and that he was sure that 
Chambers did not fire the shots. 
Petitioner's second defense was that Gable McDonald 
had shot Officer Liberty He was only partially suc-
cessful, however, in his efforts to bring before the jury 
the testimony supporting this defense. Sam I-I ardin, a 
lifelong friend of McDonald's, testified that he saw 
McDonald shoot Liberty. A second witness. one of 
Liberty's cousius, testified that he saw McDonald im-
mediately after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. 
In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, 
Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald 
had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers at-
tempted to prove that McDonald had admitted respon-
sibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once 
when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers' counsel 
and three other times prior to that occasion in private 
conversations with friends. 
In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to 
present this portion of his defense by the strict appli-
cation of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Chambers 
asserts in this Court, as he did unsuccessfully in his 
motion for new trial and on appeal to the State Supreme 
Court, that the application of these evidentiary rules ren-






of clue process of law.~ It 1s necef'sary, therefore, to 
examine carefully the rulings made during the trial. 
II 
Chambers filed a pretrial nwtion requesting the court 
to order McDonald to appear. Chambers also sought.,........ 
a ruling at that time that, if the Rtate chose not to call 
McDonald itself, he be allo,,·ed to call him as an adverse 
witness. Attarhrcl to the motion \\"ere copies of Mc-
Donald's S\YOrll confession and of the transcript of his 
preliminary hearing at \Yhich hr repudiated that con-
fession. The trial court granted the motion requiring 
McDonald to appear but reserved ruling on the aclven:e 
\vitness motion. At trial after the State ~ailed to put 
McDonald on the stand. Chambers called McDonald, 
luicl a predicate for the introduction of his sworn out-of-
court confesf'ion, had it admitted into evidence, and 
read it to the jury. The State, upon cross-examination, 
elicited from l\1cDonald the fact that he had rejected his 
/ 
"On thr rrrord in this easr, it i.~ clrar that Chamber~· ns~rrtrd 
drnial of clnr proe!'~ . .; i~ proprrl.1· brl'orr u~. Jir ob.iPrtrd during 
trial to raC"b of thr romt'~ ruling~. ,\~ to thr rtmt'rontntion claim, 
pctitionc·r :l~~c·rtrd. both brforr and clming trial, hi~ right to trrat 
::\1rDonald a~ an ach·rr"r witnr~s. His motion for nrw !rial, filrcl 
aftrr thr jur.1·'~ Yrrdirt, listrd :1~ rrror tbr trial court's rrfusal to 
prnnit rro~"-rxmninat ion of '!\I r Donald n ncl thr rxrlu,ion of rYi-
dc•nrr corrohorati1·r of l\fc-Donalcl's guilt. Tlw mot ion rondndrcl 
that thr trial "was not in arrord with fnnclamrntal fairnr.':' guamn-
trrcl h~· tbr FomtrPntb Amrndmrnt of thr Con,titution." Chnmhrr~ 
rra~~rrtrcl thosr cl:tim~ ou nppral to thr Statr fluprrmr Court. 
.\ftrr thr affirmnnrc' of hi' ronvietim1 b~· that comt. ChnmbrrR 
Glrrl a pc•tition for rrhrarin~ nddrr,~rd :dmo~t rntirrl~· to thr rl:lim 
that hi,; trial had not brrn romlurtrd in a m:wnrr consi,trnt ll'ith 
t r:1di1ionnl noti011' of due prorrss. The Rtntr Suprc•mr Comt r:<i,rd 
no qur 't ion t hn t Ch:unbrr;-;' claims wrrr not proprrl~· a""rrt rcl, n ncl 
no rlnim ha~ brr·n 111:1dr b~ · thr Statrfthat thr qnr,tion~ are not 
proprrl~· rr1·irll"ahlc• b)· thi~ Court. flrr Street v. New York, 39-l 
U. S .. ')70. 5~1-5~2 (1069); Dow;las "· Alabama, U. S. 415, 
-- 1'1 !1-.s )-e spCf)?>e. ro 
-r.J,'( p~ filim J.. c, y. co -.+ -
4 20-423 ( 1955). 
/r;J-} i Yl i fJ h 1- i (.. J.. (/?1 
) 
t- h{.. Jnerifs CJI- ()....+ 
J 
ora. I o... r/jfltn~+-- _ 
Unlike Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), 
this case does not involve the state procedural 
requirement of contemporaneous objection to the admission 
of evidence. Petitioner's contention, asserted before 
the trial court on motion for new trial and subsequently 
before the Mississippi Supreme Court, is that he was 
denied "fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amebdment" as a result of several evidentiary rulings • 
.. His claim, the substance of which we accept in this 
opinion, rests on the cumulative effect of those 
rulings in frustrating his efforts to develop an excul-
patory defense. Although he objected to each ruling 
.. -
individually, petitioner 0 s constitutional claim--based 
as it is on the cumulative impact of the rulings--could . 
not have been raised and ruled upon prior to the c9nclusion 
of Chambers' evidentiary presentation. Since the State 
I 
has not asserted any independent state procedural ground 
jas a basis for not reaching the merits of petitioner's 
constitutional claim, we have no occasion to decide 
whether--if such a ground exists--its imposition in 
this case would serve any "legitimate state interest." 
fj Id. at 447. Under these circumstances, we cannot 
doubt the priopriety of our exercise of jurisdiction. 
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prior confession. McDonald further testified, as he had 
at the preliminary hearing, that he did not shoot Liberty, 
and that he confessed to the crime only on the promise 
of Reverend Stokes that he would not go to jail and 
would share in a sizable tort recovery from the town. 
He also retold his own story of his actions on the evening 
of the shooting, including his visit to the cafe dmm the 
street, his absence from the scene during the critical 
period, and his subsequent trip to the hospital with 
Chambers. 
At the conclusion of the State's cross-examination, 
Chambers renewed his motion to examine McDonald as 
an adverse \\·itness. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating: "He may be hostile, but he is not adverse in 
the sense of the word, so your request will be overruled." 
On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, finding that "McDonald's testimony was 
not adverse to appellant" because "rn -lowhere did he_... 
point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2d., at 220. 
Defeated in his attempt to challenge directly Mc-
Donald's renunciatio11 of his prior confession, Chambers 
sought to introduce the testimony of the three \\·itnesses 
to whom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. 
The first of these, Sam Hardin, would have testified 
that, on the night of the shooting, he spent the late 
evening hours with McDonald at a friend's house after 
their return from the hospital and that, while driving 
McDonald home later that night, McDonald stated that 
he shot Liberty. The State objected to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that it "·as hearsay. The 
trial court sustained the objection.4 
1 Hardin'~ tr~timon~·, unlikr the te~timon~· of the otlwr two mrn 
"·ho ~fated that l\IcDonalcl had ronfr~~rd to thrm, wa~ actunlly 
gil"('ll in thr jnr.1·'H prrNrncr. Al'trr thr St:1tr'~ oh.irl'lion to Hardin's 
arcount of l\feDonnld'~ ~tatrmrnt was ~nstninrd, thr trial court 
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Berkley Turner, the friend with whom McDonald 
said he was drinking beer when the shooting occurred, 
was then called to testify. In the jury's presence, and 
without objection, he testified that he had not been in 
the cafe that Saturday and had not had any beers \vith 
McDonald. The jury was then excused. In the absence 
of the jury, Turner recounted his conversations with 
McDonald while they ·were riding with James Williams 
to take Chambers to the hospital. When asked whether 
McDonald had said anything regarding the shooting 
of Liberty, Turner testified that McDonald had told him 
that he "shot him." Turner further stated that one 
week later, when he met McDonald at a friend's house, 
McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and 
urged Turner not to "mess him up." Petitioner argued 
to the court that, especially where there was other proof 
in the case that was corroborative of these out-of-court 
statements, Turner's testimony as to McDonald's self-
incriminating remarks should have been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection. 
The third witness, Albert Carter, was McDonald's 
neighbor. They had been friends for about 25 years. 
Although Carter had not been in Woodville on the evening 
of the shooting, he stated that he learned about it the 
next morning from McDonald. That same clay he and 
McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald's house 
and there McDonald told him that he was the one 
who shot Officer Liberty. Carter testified that McDonald 
also told him that he had disposed of the .22-caliber 
revolver later that night. He further testified that sev-
eral weeks after the shooting he accompanied McDonald 
to Natchez where McDonald purchased another .22 pistol 
to replace the one he had discarded." The jury was not 
G A gun dealer from Nat chez te~tified that J\Il'Donald had made 
two purchase::; . The witnesti ' bu~inc~s rccordti inclicatccl that 
McDonald purchased a nine-shot .22-calbier rcYolver about a year 
/ 
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allowed to hear Carter's testimony. Chambers urged 
that these statements were admissible, the State ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.n On appeal, 
the State Supreme Court approved the lower court's 
exclusion of these witnesses' testimony on hearsay 
grounds. 252 So. 2cl, at 220. 
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a 
consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party 
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rulr, he was 
unable either to cross-examine McDonald or to present 
witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited 
McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. 
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of 
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony 
from other sources illdicating that he had not been seen 
in the cafe where he says he was when the shooting 
started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the 
cnme. But all that remained from McDonald's own 
~ was a single written confession counterrd by an 
arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense 
was far less persuasive than it might have been had he 
been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's state-
ments to cross-examination or had the other confessions 
been admitted. 
III 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to 
prior to thr murder. He purchased a difTprent st~·lc .~:2 tlm'r wrrks 
after Liberty's death. 
HIt is not entirPly clear whethrr the trial court'~ rulin11; wa~ 
prpmi~rd on the same hcar;:;ay rationale underlying thr !'xrlu~ion 
of the othrr testimony. In thi::; itmtnme the State arg11rd that 
Cartrr's testimony was an impermi::;~ible attempt by petiticmrr to 
impeach a witness (MrDonnld) who was not adverse to him. The 
tri:1l court did not state why it was excluding the evidence but the 
State Supreme Court indicated that it was excluded as hearsay. 
252 So. 2d, at 220. 
/ 
71 -5908--0PH\TO~ 
10 C'1IA:\J I3Jl:HS v. l\fl8SI8SIPPI 
defend against the State's accu13ations. The rights to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf have long beC'Il recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for 
the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), 
identified these rights as among the minimum essential 
of a fair trial: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in 
his defense- a right to his clay in court-·are basic 
to our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against you, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
See also Morrissey v. Rre'wer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); 
Jenkins v. JYicKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 428-429 (1969) ;/ 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Both of these 
elemC'nts of a fair trial are implicated in the present case_ 
A 
Chambers IYas denied an opportunity to subject 
McDonald's damning repudiation and alibi to cross-
examination. lie was not allowed to test the witness' 
recollection, to probe into the dC'tails of his alibi, or to 
"sift" his conscience so that the jury might judge for 
itself whether McDonald's tC'stimony was IYOrthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-243 
(1895). The right of cross-examination is more than a 
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the 
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure 
the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74. 89 (1970). It is, indeed, 
"an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind 
of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 405 (1965). Of course, 
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute 
/ 
' . ' 
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and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. 
E. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). But its 
denial or significant diminution calls into question the 
ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process" and re-
quires that the competing interest be closely examined. 
Berger v. California, 3!)3 F. S. 314 (Hl69). 
In this case. petitioner's request to cross-examine 
McDonald ''"as denied on the basis of a Mississippi com-
mon law rule that a party n1ay not impeach his own 
witness. The rule rests on the presumption-without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that 
a party who calls a 'vitness "vouches for his credibility." 
Clark v. Lansford, Hll So. 2cl 123, 125 (Miss. 1966). 
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule 
are uncertain, it appears to be a remnant of primitive 
English trial practice in which "oath-takers" or "com"/" 
purgators'' were called to stand behind a particular party's 
position in any controversy. Their assertions ''"ere 
strictly partisan and, quite unlike "·itnesses in criminal 
trials today, their role bore little relation to the impartial 
ascertainment of the facts. 7 
·whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once 
enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains 
today in the civil trial process, it bears little present rela-
tionship to the realities of the criminal procrss.H It 
might have been logical for the early common law to 
require a party to vouch for the credibility of witnesses 
he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having 
selected them especially for that purpose, the party might 
1 3A J . Wigmore, E\·idenl'e § R96. at 6.'iR-661 (Chadbourn rd .. 
1970); C. l\IcCormirk, EYidenee § :3~, ~~ 75-7~ (1972). 
R The "yourhrr" rule h:t~ been eondrmnecl as archaic, irrntional, 
:1nd potentially de~trnrtiYc of thP truth gnthering proce~~. C. 1\Tr--
Cormirk, EYidenrc § :38, nt 75-78 (1972); R ':\Jorgnn, Ba~ic Problems 
of E\·idcncc 70-71 (196::!); :u .T. Wigmore, E\·idencc § S98, at 661 
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reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testi-
mony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are 
rarely able to select their witnesses: they must take 
them where they find them. Moreover, as applied in 
this case, the "voucher" rule's u impact was doubly harm-
ful to Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only 
was he precluded from cross-examining McDonald, but, 
as the State conceded at oral argument,' 0 he was also 
restricted in the scope of his direct examination by the 
rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the 
witness is bound by anything he might say. He "·as,, 
therefore, effectively prevented from exploring the cir-
cumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions 
and from challenging the renunciation of the written 
confession. 
In this Court Mississippi has not sought to defend 
the rule or explain its underlying rationale. Nor has 
it contended that its rule should override the accused's 
right of confrontation. Instead, it argues that there is 
no incompatability between the rule and Chambers' 
rights because no right of confrontation exists unless the 
testifying witness is "adverse" to the accused. The 
State 's brief asserts that the "right of confrontation 
is limited to witnesses against the accused." 11 Relying 
on the trial court's determination that McDonald was 
not "adverse," and on the State Supreme Court's holding 
that McDonald "did not point the finger at Chambers," 12 
the State contends that Chambers' constitutional right 
was not involved. 
u The "voucher'' rule ha~ been rejrrted altogether by the new 
Rules of Evidrnre that will apply in all federal courts. Rule 607, 
Hulcs of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistral~ 
(a.pprowd Nov. 20, 1972 and to be(·ome effec1i'e July 1, 19i3). '/0 'f 
10 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 36. 
11 llr~ponclcnL'.:; Brief, at 9 (emphasis :::upplird). 
1 " 252 So . 2d, at 220. 
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The argument that McDonald's testimony was not 
"adverse" to, or "against," Chambers is not convincing. 
The State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more 
than one person participated in the shooting of Liberty. 
To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended 
to incriminate him , it tended also to exculpate 
Chambers.1 3 And, in the circumstances of this case, 
McDonald's retraction inculpated Chambers to the same 
extent that it exculpated McDonald. It can hardly 
be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in fact seri-
ously adverse to Chambers. The availability of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been 
held to depend on whether the witness was initially put 
on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject/ 
the notion that a right of such substance in the crim-
inal process may be governed by that technicality or by 
any narrow and unrealistic definition of the word 
"against." The "voucher" rule, as applied in this case, 
plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against 
the State's charges. 
B 
We need not decide, however, whether this error alone 
w·ould occasion reversal since Chambers' claimed denial 
of due process rests on the ultimate impact of that error 
when viewed in conjunction with the trial court's refusal 
to permit him to call other witnesses. The trial court 
refused to allow him to introduce the testimony of 
Hardin, Turner, and Carter. Each would have testified 
to the statements purportedly made by McDonald, on 
three separate occasions shortly after the crime, naming 
himself as the murderer. The State Supreme Court ap-
proved the exclusion of this evidence on the ground that 
it was hearsay. 
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The hearsay rule, which has long been rccogni~ed and 
respected by virtually every State, is based on experience 
ancl grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence 
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-
court statements arc traditionally excluded because they 
lack the convrntional indicia of reliability: they are 
usually not m.ade under oath or other circumstances that 
impress the speaker " ·ith the solemnity of his statements; 
the declarant 's \\"Ord is not subject to cross-examination; 
and he is not available in order that his demeanor and 
credibility ma.y be assessed by the jury. Cal1"jorrzia Y. 
Green, 3!)9 U. S. 140, 158 (1970). A number of excep-
tions have developed over the years to allow admis~:"ion 
of hearsay statements made under circumstances that 
tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for 
the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-
examination. Among the most prevalent of these ex;:.--
ceptions is the one applicable to declarations against 
interest ''- an exception founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a. statement against his 
own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes 
this exception but applies it only to declarations against 
pecuniary intere~t.' " It recognizes no such exception for 
declarations, like McDonald's in this case. that are· 
against the penal interest of the declarant. Brown v. 
State, 99 Miss. 719. 55 So. 961 (1011). 
This materialistic limitation on the declaration-again~t­
interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by 
most States in their criminal trial processes.' 0 although 
a number of States have discarded it. 17 Prior to the-
11 .frffrr8oJl, Drdamiion~ Again;.;t Intrrr~ t , 5S Han·. L. Rrl'. 1 
( 1!).1.~). 
'"H. l\1rEiroy, l\fiH8i:<~ippi E1·idrnrr § ~6 (1955). 
'"C. l\1rCormick, E1·idrnrc § 27R, at 67:~ (2d rd. 197:2) ; 5 .J.. 
\Yi!!morr , E1·iclrnrr § 1~76 , at 2~:~-2S7 n. !) (19~0). 
17 Srr, e. (!., People v. Sprigos, ;)6 Cal. Hptr. ~~1 , ;3,1;9 P. 2d 377, 
GO Cal. 2d 8G8 (106~); People v. Letlrich, 413 111. 172, 108 N. E. 
/ 
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changes accomplished,.,.. the new Federal Rules of Evi-
c~'" declarations against pellal interest were lJOnnally 
excluded in federal courts under the authority of Don-
nelly v. United Sta.tes, 228 U. S. 243, 272-273 (1!)13). 
Exclusion, where the limitation prevails. is usually prem-
ised on the view that admission would lead to the fre-
quent presentation of perjured testimony to the jury. 
It is believed that confessions of criminal activity are 
often motivated by extraneous considerations and, there-
fore, are not as inherently reliable as statements against 
pecuniary or proprietary interest. While that rationale 
has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism,' 0 
we need not decide in this case whether, under other 
circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose 
by excluding untrustworthy testimony. 
The hearsay statements involved in this case \\'Crc 
originally made and subsequently offered at trial under 
circumstances that provided considerable assurance of 
their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confe~:"sions 
"·as made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly 
after the murder had occurred. Second. each one was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case-
McDonald's sworn confession. the testimony of a.n eye-
witness to the shooting. the testimony that McDonald 
\vas seen \vith a gun immediately after the shooting, and 
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and 
2d 4SS (10.52): Proplc , .. Brmcn. 2G X Y. 2d SS, :308 X. Y. 8. 2d 
S25, 2:37 X. K 2d 16 (1970): Hinrs Y. l'ir(linia, 1:3() 'i'n. 72S, 117 
S. R 8+~ (1923). 
. .. 
, ,. Rulr 80-t, Hulr;; of E,·idrne<' for thr 1'nitrd Statr~ Comt~ nnd tcc.tl 
11 
(; "'S u/'1 {, Jf7J \• 
-:\[agi~tr:ltC'." (appro,wl Xo\'. 20. 19727l b e 1 , :/. 
'n Src·, c. (!., AdYi~or~· Commiti<'C' :\otr~. llulr SO+. Hulr~ of E,·i-
drnrr for thr Unitrd fltatr~ Court~ and -:\[:tgi~tmtr,.; (:tpprnwd "/ () f.J• 
:\To\·. ~0, 1972); 5 .T. Wigmorr. E,·iclrncP § HiG. nt 2S.J. (:)d rd. / ;! \ 
Hl..J.O); \\'right, (Tniform Rulr>< of Hr:tr.•a~·. 26 U. Cinn. L. Hrv. {, J 1 ;1, 
575 (Hl57); United States, .. Amnmzioto, 293 F. 2d 373,378 (CA2), 
rrrt. denied, 3G8 P. S. 019 (19Gl) (Friencll.'·· .T.): Sr.olail' "· United' 
States, 40G F. 2d 5G3, 5G4 (CAO), rrrt. clrniecl, 391) U. S. 981 (19G9) _ 
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subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer num-
ber of independent confessions provided additional cor-
roboration for each. Third, whatever may be the 
parameters of the penal-interest rationale,~0 each 
confession here was in a very real sense self-incrim-
inatory and unquestionably against interest. Sec / 
Un ·ited States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 473, 484 (1971); 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970). Mc-
Donald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role 
in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must 
have been aKare of the possibility that disclosure would 
lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling 
Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner 
not to "mess him up." Finally, if there was any ques-
tion about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial state-
ments, McDonald was present in the courtroom and had 
been under oath. He could have been cross-examined 
by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed 
by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 
(1970). The availability of McDonald significantly dis-
tinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, 
Brown v. State, supra, and from the Donnelly-type 
situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavail-
able at the time of triaF1 
~ 0 The Mississippi rase which refused to adopt a hearsay excep-
tion for declarations aga inot penal int crest concerned an out-of::.. 
eourt declarant who purportedly stated that he had committrd the 
murdrr with which his brother had been charged. The lVIi::;~i~~ippi 
Supreme Court believed that the declarant mn~· have bren moti-
vntrd by a desire to free his brother rather thnn by any compulsion 
of guilt. The Court nl::;o noted that the derlarant hnd flrd, waH 
unaYailable for cro;,;s-examination, and may wrll have known at 
thr time he made the statement that he would not suffer for it. 
Broll'JI v. State, 99 Mi,;s. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911). There i~, in the 
prr~ent case, no such baRis for doubting McDonald'::; ~l:llemcnts. 
2 l McDonald's pre~ence a]~o drpriYes the State's argument for 
rrtrntion of the penal-interest rule of much of ito force. In claiming 
/ 
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Fe>v rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g.,/ 
Washington v. Texa.s, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In re 
Oliver, supra. In the exercise of this right, the accused, 
as is required of the State, must comply ""ith estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure· 
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt 
and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence 
has been more respected or more frequently applied in 
jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hear-
say, exceptions tailored to allow the in trocluction of 
evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have 
long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court 
here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and 
thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception 
for declarations against interest. That testimony also 
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circum-
stances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule 
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice. 
ilml "ft]o change the rule would work a traveHty of jn~tice," the 
State posited the following hypothetical: 
"If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime; B 
could tell C and D that he committed the crime; B could go into 
hiding and nt A's trial C and D would testify as to B's admission 
of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would return to stand trial; 
B could then provide several witnesses to estify as to hi::; where:1bouts 
at the time of the crime. The testimony of tho::<e wit ne:-;se~ :1long 
with A's statement that he really committed thr crime would result 
in B'.:> acquittal. A would be barred from further prosecution 
because of the protection against double jeopardy. No one could 
be convicted of perjury a A did not testify at his fir:-;t trial, B did 
not lie under oath, and C :1nd D were truthful in their testimony." 
Respondent's Brief, at 7 n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
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We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State's refusal to permit 
Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a 
tr.ial in accord with traditional and fundamental stand-
ards of the due process. In reaching this judgment we 
establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor 
does our holding signal any dimunition in the respect 
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment 
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and 
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of 
the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
I 
lfp/ss lee 12/27/72 
MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Powell, .Jr. 
Chambers 
reflects your suggested changes. 
I have reviewed these carefully and, as modified in minor part 
(as you will note), they have my approval. The one exception is Rider A 
on page 17. This page has been troublesome for both of us. I have 
suggested a revision - attached to this memorandum as Rider X. I have 
-~ indicated to you (in our brief discussion yesterday afternoon) why I 
'0\ll 
suggest this as a substitute for your rider. 
I also deliver to you herewith my copy of the first draft, 
' 
I have noted a number of stylistic changes. None is really vital, and 
some are unnecessary in light of your changes. I do suggest, however, 
that you take a look at them . 
. : ,~;I think you have improved the draft, and suggest that you get it 
to the printer today. Unless you have some point you wish to discuss' 
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